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This thesis explores the emergence of indigeneity among a group of post-foragers 
living on the eastern coast of Sumatra. In the past, despite the lack of definite ethnic 
boundaries and the fluidity of their identity, they were known as Utan (‘Forest’) or 
Orang Utan (‘Forest People’). Since 2006, however, many Utan have adopted the 
new ethnonym of Suku Asli (‘Indigenous People’) and begun claiming their position 
within the Indonesian State as an integrated and distinctive ethnic group – a group, 
that is, associated with a unique ‘tradition’ (adat) and a particular ‘indigenous’ 
identity.  As Suku Asli, they have been trying to integrate this identity and protect the 
‘ancestral’ lands with which it is thought to be intimately associated. The emergence 
of this identity does not reflect only their own aspirations but, also, their 
entanglement with a number of government development programmes or 
interventions aiming to transform the lives of local ‘tribespeople’. Throughout these 
contexts, the most important change has been the development of their indigeneity – 
an indigeneity which, in the context of Indonesia, is ‘imagined’ and recognised in a 
very particular way by the State. It is on the basis of this indigeneity that the Suku 
Asli have begun to re-configure their traditional identity and their place within the 
Nation State. Focusing on some of its most important manifestations and 
embodiments, the thesis attempts to chart the emergence of this indigeneity and 
relate it to the entanglement of the people and the government. Treating indigeneity 
as a perspective that is created between the locals’ traditionally fluid identity and the 
government development programmes, I describe some of the ways in which 
‘tribespeople’ come to embody, resist and transform the government image of 
‘indigenous people’ and accomplish their ‘modernisation’ – a ‘modernisation’ 
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When I first met Pak Koding1, one of my best informants, he insisted that now 
everything is different and more and more people ‘become (jadi)’ Suku Asli. Now, 
as he puts it, he and his people identify themselves as Suku Asli, translated as 
‘indigenous people’. I am going to explore who the Suku Asli are and to explain the 
recent emergence of their ethnic identity first and foremost in terms of indigeneity. 
 
 
Indigeneity as an international concept  
 
Indigeneity in relation to others 
 
       Since the 1980s, the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ has become increasingly 
important at the international political level in a number of challenges attempting to 
improve the marginalised situation of native or autochthonous peoples. Indeed, the 
United Nations (UN) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) defined 
‘indigenous peoples’ and emphasised the need to protect their rights in 1986 and 
1989, respectively. At this level, the definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ is composed 
of four points: the priority of land occupation in time, cultural distinctiveness, 
identification by themselves and others, and the experience of marginalisation 
(Saugestad 2004: 264). The UN, then, declared the International Year of Indigenous 
Peoples in 1993 and the UN International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 
between 1995 and 2005. In 2007, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples was ratified in the UN General Assembly (Merlan 2009; Wawrinec 2010). In 
accordance with the international conceptualisation of ‘indigenous peoples’, more 
and more local, national and international agents, such as local authorities, non-
government organisations (NGOs) and international activists, have been involved in 
the movement to ensure and protect the land rights of local communities.   
         As a consequence of the rise of the ‘indigenous movement’, anthropologists 
began to criticise the implementation of the universal definition of ‘indigenous 
                                                          
1 Individual names that appear in this thesis are all pseudonyms.  
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peoples’. For example, John Bowen (2000) points out the risks in applying the 
concept, which was conceptualised according to understandings of indigeneity in the 
settler societies of the Americas and Australia, to non-settler societies of Asia and 
Africa, as peoples in the latter regions have moved frequently and the distinction in 
terms of ‘indigenous people’ is quite difficult to make. For instance, in terms of the 
San people in southern Africa, Renée Sylvain (2002) argues that while the 
international model of ‘indigenous peoples’ is emerging in their society under the 
support of an NGO, it prevents the recognition of the San cultural identity and 
replaces the efforts of the San activists to fight the legacy of apartheid, racial 
segregation and class exploitation, because the model ignores their bifurcated history 
and promotes a preservationism and essentialism in the way it treats their culture and 
ethnicity. In particular, Adam Kuper’s criticism (2003) has brought about intensive 
debates. He points out that the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ is based on the 
obsolete concept of ‘primitive peoples’, and questions the empirical validity of the 
claim to ‘be indigenous’ in a primordial sense that involves a traditional way of life 
and a static connection with the land. He warns that the international 
conceptualisation of ‘indigenous peoples’ involves the risk of essentialism in which 
the people who fail to prove their indigenous position are marginalised and 
discriminated against even further.  
       Indigeneity is literally understood as involving ‘first-order connections (usually 
at small scale) between group and locality’ (Merlan 2009: 304). Emphasising the 
autochthonic sense, some definitions try to specify the people through descriptions of 
‘what people must be and how people must differ from others’ (Merlan 209: 305). 
For example, the ILO definition of ‘indigenous’ in 1989 is: ‘(a) “tribal” people 
whose social, cultural, and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections 
of the national community; (b) people descended from populations that inhabited the 
country; (c) people retaining some or all of their own institutions’ (Merlan 2009: 
305; see also Dove 2006: 192). Francesca Merlan (2009: 305) sees this kind of 
definitions as ‘criterial’; it proposes ‘some set of criteria, or conditions, that enable 
identification of the “indigenous” as a global “kind”’. In this scheme, ‘indigenous 
peoples’ are defined in association with autochthony, they are pre-modern or 
‘primitive’ and differ from those who are ‘modern’ and ‘civilised’ (de la Cadena and 
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Starn 2007: 7-8). These critiques present the problems that are generated by such 
specifications of people and the attempts to provide a clear designation of conceptual 
and practical boundaries between those who are ‘indigenous’ and those who are not. 
       However, in recent studies, more and more anthropologists see indigeneity as 
‘relational’ rather than ‘criterial’ (Merlan 2009; Trigger and Dalley 2010). Merlan 
(2009: 305) defines ‘relational’ as emphasising ‘grounding in relations between the 
“indigenous” and their “others” rather than in properties inherent only to those we 
call “indigenous” themselves’. From this perspective, indigeneity can be seen not as 
a fixed state of being but as a process emerging in relationships and dialogues with 
the ‘non-indigenous’ in various forms in different parts of the world (Trigger and 
Dalle 2010: 49), based on ‘self-identification, participation and acceptance’ (Merlan 
2009: 306). In this perspective, the authentic indigeneity of ‘autochthony and the pre-
modern’ is done away with (de la Cadena and Starn 2007: 8), and indigeneity is 
understood as something constructed in the transactions between ‘indigenous’ people 
and others in each local context. 
       In this approach, ‘“indigeneity” as a political concept is like ethnicity’ (A. 
Barnard 2006: 16). As Fredrik Barth (1969: 9-15) points out, ethnicity is something 
determined in the transactions between self-ascription and ascription by others, and it 
is not necessarily related to cultural contents. In the same way, while indigeneity has 
a somewhat clearer criterion specifying a connection between land and people rather 
than it is the case with ethnicity, it is not necessarily constrained by their autochthony, 
and their identification and identification by others is more essential. In other words, 
indigeneity is ‘fundamentally not a thing in the world, but a perspective on the world’ 
(Brubaker 2004: 65), the same as ethnicity. Indigeneity is a way of viewing the world, 
which is generated in relation to others. This perspective is necessary to understand 
the claim of indigeneity especially in Asia and Africa where, historically, people 








Indigeneity as an image by others 
 
       Geoffrey Benjamin (2002, 2012, forthcoming [2017]), an anthropologist who 
has studied the Orang Asli groups in Malaysia, theorises the various social 
dimensions that emerge around the concept of indigeneity, and also suggests that 
indigeneity is something formulated in relation to others. He grasps the transactions 
between the indigenous and the non-indigenous by employing the terms of ‘indigeny’ 
and ‘exogeny’. On the one hand, he defines ‘exogeny’ as a term that is associated 
with exogenes ‘who moved away from the places inhabited by their presumed 
familial ancestors’, something which ‘characterises a high proportion of the world’s 
population, both rural and urban’ (Benjamin forthcoming). These people ‘think of 
territories as commodities (“objects”) open to exploitation’, and modernity is formed 
on the basis of such an exogenous idea. On the other hand, ‘indigeny’ is the antonym 
of ‘exogeny’, and it is associated with the indigenes ‘whose ancestors (so far as they 
know) have occupied their places of habitation from time immemorial’ 
(forthcoming). According to him, ‘indigeny has to do with family-level connections 
to concrete place, and not with the connection of whole ethnic groups (whatever they 
may be) to broad territories’ (2002: 15). In other words, ‘indigeny’ is a label which 
can be used to indicate a concrete linkage between people and place that has been 
formed through the historical sedimentation of the peoples’ everyday experiences 
and inheritances without the influence of long historical political processes. He also 
points out that this ‘indigeny’ is tacit, non-articulated and unconscious because their 
place is their subjective world itself, one that has been inherited from their ancestors 
through their language and practices. In this situation, it is also impossible to see 
their land as a commodity. Thus, for people themselves, ‘indigeny’ can be seen as an 
emotional, unconscious and primordial attachment to a land within a small 
community. At its unconscious and subjective point, ‘indigeny’ is completely 
different from ‘indigenism’ and ‘indigenousness’, which are self-conscious political 
stances that organise the related people collectively and allow them to claim a certain 
degree of autonomy from the state, or may occasionally be used by the state for its 
own purpose (2012: 8, forthcoming). 
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       On the other hand, while recognising that the term ‘indigeneity’ has been used 
for ‘indigeny’, ‘indigenism’ and ‘indigenousness’ rather vaguely, he distinguishes 
‘indigeneity’ from those similar terms and sees its utility as referring to something 
generated in relation to others. He suggests that the term can be used for labelling 
‘the images of the “indigenous” produced by non-indigenous (exogenous) 
individuals concerned to construct a model of alterity, especially in discussing 
environmental or traditional-knowledge issues’ (Benjamin 2012: 8). In other words, 
indigeneity is a form of category and identity which emerge from the perspective of 
the exogenes in the modern political context (Benjamin forthcoming). Thus, the 
‘indigenous peoples’, in which ‘indigenous’ is the adjective of this ‘indigeneity’, can 
be seen as those who adopt and embody the image of non-indigenous people – that is, 
‘indigenising’ themselves –  in and through their communication with non-
indigenous, modern people.  
       Indigeneity stands in association with others’ modern perspective and its politics 
rather than the peoples’ traditional way of life or connection with an ancestral land. 
Some anthropologists describe such qualities of indigeneity. In the context of 
Amazonian Indians, Beth Conklin (1997) argues that the Amazonian manifestation 
of indigeneity is created in and through active adoptions and demonstrations of the 
Western image of indigenous people. While it is a strategically effective tool in order 
to claim the protection of their environment, she concludes that it encompasses a 
downside that they reduce their own cultural authenticity to a Western conception of 
authenticity. Along similar lines, through describing the process by which 
‘indigenous people’ in the Philippines were recognised, Frank Hirtz (2003) suggests 
that indigeneity is recognised only in and through the modern administrative 
procedures and representational processes. According to him, ‘it takes modern ways 
to be traditional, to be indigenous’; and, by doing so, the ‘groups enter the realm of 
modernity’ (2003: 889).  Indeed, the manifestation of indigeneity involves various 
procedures such as the examination of historical facts, the documentation of identity, 
legitimation of traditional institutions and the establishment of museums, foundations 
and ethnic organisations (see Masuda 2009). Thus, Michael Dove et al. (2007: 131) 
suggest that ‘the rise of interest in indigeneity’ is ‘both a product of, and a marker of, 
modernity’. Indigeneity is a process that emerges in the communication with 
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modernity among people who have ‘indigeny’ (see also Porath 2002a), and this 
communication results in their entering ‘modernity’. 
       If so, how are people who have ‘indigeny’ brought to the arena of modernity and 
how is indigeneity embodied in local communities? The main agents are activists, 
local authorities and the government, which have adopted the concept of ‘indigenous 
peoples’ from national and international contexts, and they intervene in the life of 
local communities under the banner of development programmes that involves the 
power of, to echo Foucault, “governmentality” (Foucault 1991; Li 2000, 2007b). 
Distinct from ‘sovereignty’ and ‘discipline’, which directly restrict and reform the 
behaviour and knowledge of a population, ‘governmentality’ is an attempt to shape 
human conduct by ‘educating desires and configuring habits, aspirations, and beliefs’, 
and is especially concerned with the ‘well-being’ of the population (Li 2007b: 5). 
‘To govern means to act on the actions of subjects who retain the capacity to act 
otherwise’ (Li 2007b: 17). Demonstrating these quests for the well-being of the 
people themselves, the activists, local authorities and governments try to introduce to 
the local communities their idea of how they should live and encourage them to 
accept the category and identity of ‘indigenous people’. As a result, the local 
communities conceptualise their position as ‘indigenous peoples’ in the state and 
embody the position in their way of life.    
       This process is not enacted through imposition but in collaboration between the 
agents’ suggestions and the historical identity and practices of the people. Michael 
Hathaway (2010) describes the process whereby the Chinese living in Yunnan 
became ‘indigenous’ after the 1990s through environmental conservation and rural 
development programmes, and suggests:  
 
Their work in fostering an indigenous space is neither a top-down imposition of 
a foreign social category nor a spontaneous bottom-up social movement of social 
activism. Rather, it works mainly in an intermediate realm, and is being pushed 
outward by Chinese public intellectuals, tentatively and unevenly. (2010: 320) 
 
Tania Murray Li (2000) goes one step further and suggests indigenous identity is 
something ‘articulated’ in the history of confrontation, engagement and struggle. 




a group’s self-identification as tribal or indigenous is not natural or inevitable, 
but neither is it simply invented, adopted, or imposed. It is, rather, a positioning 
which draws upon historically sedimented practices, landscapes, and repertoires 
of meaning, and  emerges through particular patterns of engagement and 
struggle. The conjunctures at which (some) people come to identify themselves 
as indigenous, realigning the ways they connect to the nation, the government, 
and their own, unique tribal place, are the contingent products of agency and the 
cultural and political work of articulation. (2000: 151) 
  
The ‘historically sedimented practices, landscape, and repertoires of meaning’ can be 
seen as unconscious and subjective ‘indigeny’ of a local community. Self-
identification as indigenous is drawn upon such ‘indigeny’ and emerges in and 
through the ‘engagement and struggle’.  
       In short, indigeneity is a perspective that emerges in the transactions between 
people who are regarded as indigenous and exogenous or modern others. On the one 
hand, outsiders try to introduce the image of ‘indigenous peoples’ to the people 
whom they regard as indigenous through the echo of ‘governmentality’. On the other 
hand, the people themselves embody the image held by the outsiders and indigenise 
themselves. However, this is not a simple adoption of the outsiders’ image. They 
have their own unconscious and subjective identity and practice that is sedimented in 
their history – that is, ‘indigeny’ – and, upon this basis, indigeneity is both 
manifested and embodied.  
       What I would like to explore in this thesis is the emerging process of indigeneity 
among the Suku Asli living on the eastern coast of Sumatra, Indonesia. The Suku 
Asli recognise themselves and are recognised as orang asli, which can be translated 
as ‘tribespeople’ or ‘indigenous people’ in the region. They are obviously 
tribespeople. With the term ‘tribespeople’, which I adopted from Benjamin’s work, I 
mean the segmentary and uncentralised peoples, who are not completely subsumed 
under centralised state control based on their own choice in the state political 
structure of ruler-peasant-tribespeople relationship (Benjamin 2002: 7-9; Scott 2009; 
see also Chapter 1). They have a history of rejecting their assimilation to peasants, 
who are, in this region, Malay, Javanese and Minangkabau. In addition, although 
their ancestors were certainly first occupiers at some places in this region, they are 
not people who can be clearly defined as indigenous. Living in a region that is 
characterised by frequent population moves and low density in the past, they are 
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more or less exogenous, and their position as ‘indigenous people’ can be seen only in 
relation to others living around them. In recent years, the Suku Asli have begun to 
manifest indigeneity in and through their engagement with development programmes 
imposed by the government. In this process, they have adopted the government 
image of ‘indigenous peoples’ and tried to demonstrate their position in the state 
administrative system. Why did they begin demonstrating their position as 
indigenous peoples? How do they interpret and manifest their indigeneity? How have 
they adopted the government image in relation to their ancestral but segmentary 
identities and practices? Combining the relational definitions of indigeneity and 
Benjamin’s definition of indigeneity based on an outsider’s image, I argue that 
indigeneity is a perspective drawn upon ‘indigeny’ in and through the government 
development programme, and I would like to explore the transactions between 
tribespeople and the government in the context of the Suku Asli.  
 
 
Indigeneity in Indonesian politics 
 
‘Indigenous people’ and ‘adat community’ 
 
       Let me explain the historical process of the conceptualisation of indigeneity in 
Indonesian politics. The Indonesian version of indigeneity as a political concept has 
its roots in the Dutch direct rule that began at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
For the purpose of controlling the population effectively, the colonial government 
divided it into two legal categories, i.e. ‘Europeans’ and ‘Natives (inlanders; 
bumiputera)’. While the Europeans followed the Dutch national laws, the ‘Natives’ 
were supposed to follow their customary law – that is, adat (Fasseur 2007: 50-51; 
Moniaga 2007: 277; Li 2007b: 44; see also Chapter 5). When the Republic of 
Indonesia declared independence in 1945, these categories were abolished because 
the government attempted to end the racial discrimination derived from them. Thus, 
in the Constitution of Indonesia of 1945, the government used the term orang 
Indonesia asli (real/indigenous Indonesians) (Moniada 2007: 277). Then, under the 
Sukarno regime (1945-1967), the concept of pribumi (sons of the soil; native 
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Indonesians) gained legal standing in 1959. The main purpose of establishing this 
category was to distinguish and protect the rights of autochthonous populations from 
those who had their origin outside Indonesia, especially the ethnic Chinese who 
gained power in the Indonesian economy (Moniaga 2007: 277-278; Tsing 2007: 54-
55). The pribumi category was maintained until 2006 when a new citizenship law 
was passed (Wawrnec 2010: 102). While the concepts of ‘Natives’, orang Indonesia 
asli and pribumi, are related to being indigenous, they are obviously different from 
the current concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ because they are concerned with large-
scale and national-level connections between population and territory. The 
government maintained this linkage between the population as a whole and state 
territory in post-independence Indonesia, because being indigenous in this way was 
meant to ‘look back to the anticolonial project and the alliance between elites and 
peasants that created the nation-state’ (Tsing 2007: 54). In other words, the concept 
was used for integrating the state bridging a number of different people together.  
       From this perspective of large-scale, national-level linkage, the government did 
not regard as important the small-scale connections that could be related to the 
international concept of ‘indigenous peoples’. During the Sukarno and Suharto 
(1967-1998) regimes, the government pursued centralised sovereignty, in which they 
implemented various laws which claimed state priority over local lands and resources, 
and imposed resettlement programmes on rural populations (Duncan 2004a; Persoon 
1998; Wee 2002; see also Chapter 1). The government justified their policies by 
emphasising the ‘development’ of the state as a whole. The government’s negative 
attitude to the small-scale connections is also seen in their resistance to the 
international definition of ‘indigenous peoples’. The government resisted the 
implementation of the ILO Convention 169 in 1989 and the United Nations Year of 
Indigenous Peoples in 1993 (Bedner and Huis 2008: 165-169; Persoon 1998: 294-
295). Also, even in recent years, although the government ratified the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007, they emphasised that all 
ethnic groups in Indonesia are indigenous or native (Bender and Huis 2008: 169; 
Merlan 2009; Tsing 2007: 54).  
       However, through the political actions by national and international activists as 
well as local authorities who adopted the international concept, the government’s 
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attitude eventually changed. The massive exploitation of local lands and resources 
during Suharto’s New Order regime raised dissatisfaction among the locals. However, 
social protest was censored in this era, and the ways the locals could resist the 
government exploitation were extremely limited to only ones that the government 
may have accepted as legitimate. Some local communities tried to negotiate with the 
government moderately insisting on their ancestral use of lands and resources using 
the term adat (Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 2011: 183); and some 
activists and locals emphasised the land rights of rural communities in their attempt 
to protect natural environments (Tsing 2007: 37).  In 1998, President Suharto fell 
from power and the government changed its policies under the slogan of 
‘Reformation (Reformasi)’. This change was characterised by ‘decentralisation’, in 
which the new polity distributed political power and economic profits to the 
provinces, regencies, sub-districts and villages while previously power and authority 
were concentrated on the state capital, Jakarta. In this political atmosphere, an NGO, 
AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara; Archipelagic Alliance of Adat 
Community) was founded in 1999 (Henley and Davidson 2007: 1-2). This 
organisation is involved in international indigenous rights advocacy organisations, 
and has frequently received foreign funding and utilised international media 
effectively (Henley and Davidson 2007: 7-8). Under their umbrella, local people, 
who had experienced exploitation of their lands and resources by the government and 
government-sponsored corporations, began claiming their rights to ancestral land and 
its resources. 
       However, the term ‘indigenous peoples’ in international discourse was not 
simply imported to the Indonesian ‘indigenous movement’. Instead, the term was 
translated into ‘adat community (masyarakat adat)’ by AMAN, and the locals have 
mobilised their indigenism under the banner of this Indonesian concept (Li 2000: 155, 
2001: 645-646). Adat is usually translated as ‘tradition’, ‘custom’ and ‘customary 
law’, therefore, ‘adat community’ can be interpreted as ‘traditional or customary 
community’. During the late colonial era, the ‘adat law community’ 
(adatrechtsgemeenschap in Dutch; masyarakat hukum adat in Indonesian) was 
recognised by the colonial government and allowed to regulate matters such as 
access to farmlands and forests, and was associated with the ideal image of a 
11 
 
historically continuous and harmonious rural community (Henley and Davidson 
2007: 20; Li 2000: 159, 2007b: 50; see Chapter 5). However, during the New Order 
regime, customary laws or adat that had controlled the local use of lands were 
depoliticised and reduced to harmless cultural forms like dance, song, architecture 
and ritual (Acciaioli 1985; Tsing 2007: 35; see also Chapter 5). Therefore, the main 
purpose of AMAN was to regain the legitimacy of adat and ‘adat community’. Some 
powerful ethnic groups such as the Balinese and Minangkabau have begun to revive 
or newly acquire political authority and land rights by reinforcing the organisation of 
their local ethnic councils in this movement through an emphasis on adat (Biezeveld 
2007; Warren 2007).  
       Given the continuous lobbying by the locals and the various NGOs, and the 
political atmosphere of ‘decentralisation’, the government also began to recognise or, 
at least, give more respect to ‘traditional’ access to and maintenance of lands and 
resources, i.e. adat, among the local communities. The government revised a series 
of the national laws concerned with land ownership such as the Basic Forestry Law 
and the Natural Resources Law between 1999 and 2004 (Bedner and Huis 2007: 184-
190; Fitzpatrick 2007: 139-142), and the land rights of local communities based on 
adat were ensured in the realms where it did not collide with the national laws and 
government policies. Furthermore, in the last few years, the government has sought 
to officially recognise ‘customary law communities (masyarakat hukum adat)’ and 
grant them special status, rights and entitlements. In 2013, according to Arizona 
Yance and Erasmus Cahyadi (2013: 56), the Indonesian parliament discussed a 
national law, in which five points were decided to be the criteria for specifying a 
‘customary law community’: to have a shared history as adat community; to own 
adat territory or customary land; to have adat law; to possess adat property, relations, 
and artefacts; and to have a customary governance system. These points, which are 
formulated in a very criterial fashion without mention of their relational quality, 
repeatedly foreground adat and emphasise social integration based on it. For the 
government, an ‘adat community’ is something substantial, which has a strong 




       In the historical process of this conceptualisation, we can see some characteristic 
features of the Indonesian ‘indigenous movement’. First, the Indonesian ‘indigenous 
movement’ is characterised by a great quest for adat that has been inherited from 
ancestors in local communities and was once recognised by the Dutch colonial 
government. Thus, David Henley and Jamie Davidson (2007) call the Indonesian 
indigenous movement ‘adat revivalism’. This movement centres on the locals trying 
to gain their land rights in and through actions to revive or, more precisely, construct 
their ‘traditional’ legal orders that were ignored by the post-independence 
government. Therefore, not only marginalised ‘tribal’ groups, but also rather 
‘civilised’ peoples such as the Minangkabau and the Balinese participate in this ‘adat 
revivalism’. Second, this ‘adat revivalism’ is deeply related not only to the legal 
sphere in terms of land rights but also the spheres of tradition and culture. This is 
because the term adat generally has the implication of not only law-like rules but 
also morals, norms, rituals and other cultural practices in everyday life. Furthermore, 
the state emphasised its cultural aspect rather than the legal ones during the New 
Order regime. Therefore, a common and distinctive tradition or culture is often much 
more important to be ensured as ‘adat community’ than the one’s priority of land 
occupation in the past that is the first criterion within the international concept, and 
indeed, local communities actively try to demonstrate their shared and distinctive 
tradition or culture. In other words, the Indonesian ‘indigenous movement’ includes a 
process of traditionalisation or culturalisation. Third, Indonesian state itself has also 
been involved in its quest for ‘adat communities’. It is certain that the activists and 
local authorities led the introduction of the concept and that there have been tensions 
and conflicts between the state and the locals in terms of land rights in some regions 
even after the government amended the centralised laws. However, within the 
politics of ‘decentralisation’, the present-day government begins to define the criteria 
of the ‘customary law community’ and is creating and dispersing the image of it 
through conferring land rights to such communities. Therefore, the government is a 
powerful agent in the creation and integration of the ‘adat community’ idea, and the 
movement struggles cannot be reduced to a simple scheme of the state versus the 
locals that is found elsewhere in the world. This is especially the case for some local 
communities which are not supported by national and international activists. In such 
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situations, the locals have tried to create the social integration imagined by the state 
based on adat by (re)organising their past relationships to related peoples, 
circumscribing their territories, reinforcing their local rules, facilitating rituals and 
arts, and empowering traditional political organisations.  
         
 
The emergence of ‘governmentality’ in policies on tribespeople 
 
       The conceptualisation of indigeneity in Indonesian policies is also related to 
definitions of and policies to autochthonous tribespeople. Shortly after Indonesia 
achieved its independence, the Department of Social Affairs in Jakarta designated a 
category of tribespeople and referred to them as ‘suku-suku terasing (isolated tribes)’. 
This category was changed into ‘masyarakat terasing (isolated communities)’ in the 
mid-1970s (Persoon 1998: 287-288). Suku-suku terasing or masyarakat terasing 
were seen as the main target of government development programmes. 
        Generally, a development programme includes a variety of policies and aims. 
First, it may aim to aid industrial development, involving the exploitation of 
resources and land, the construction of infrastructure, and the promotion of tourism. 
Second, it may involve ‘development’ of the people themselves. These particular 
programmes have covered a great variety of aims: the implementation of 
immigration and resettlement, the management of land and resources, the 
legitimisation of culture and autonomy, the establishment of educational and medical 
institutions, the improvement of agricultural techniques, and the introduction of 
industry, and so forth. Tribespeople are especially the target of these kinds of 
programmes, which have become one of the most important political issues not only 
for the Indonesian government, but also for other Southeast Asian governments 
(Duncan 2004a: 3).  
       The development programmes for tribespeople can be seen as involving one of 
two agendas: ‘raising their level of “civilisation”’ and ‘raising their standard of living’ 
(Duncan 2004a: 3). The aim of the Indonesian development programmes has mainly 
focused on the former agenda, in which the government has tried to socially and 
culturally integrate them into the mainstream rural Indonesians (Persoon 1998:289; 
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Porath 2010: 275). To achieve this aim, the government implemented mainly three 
policies during the Sukarno and Suharto regimes. The first one was resettlement 
programmes, in which the government constructed uniformly designed permanent 
houses and villages, and resettled tribespeople who lived in the forests, mountains 
and river or sea coasts. The second policy was the introduction of permanent 
agriculture to those who were often shifting cultivators in the forests. The third one 
was to encourage them to convert to one of the government recognised religions 
(agama) (Persoon 1998: 290-294). Through these policies, the government tried to 
directly constrain and reform the tribespeople’s behaviour, knowledge and identity, 
and assimilate them into ‘civilised’ Indonesians, although the influence of these 
policies was limited. For the government, tribespeople’s ways of life were 
‘backward’, ‘primitive’ and something that should be improved through development 
programmes. They did not consider the people’s historical connection with and 
emotional attachment to a place. Here, the government did not see tribespeople’s 
ways of life as a part of Indonesian ‘cultures’ that the government admitted was an 
important component of the multi-ethnic Nation State.  
       However, since the last years of the Suharto regime, the government and public 
perceptions of tribespeople have been gradually changing. In the rise of the 
environmental movement between the late 1980s and early 1990s, tribespeople were 
regarded as ones who have managed to live together with the vulnerable natural 
embironments harmoniously. From that point on they were seen as having 
‘indigenous knowledge’, acknowledged through which they maintained harmonious 
and sustainable relationships with their environment (Dove 2006: 195-196; Effendy 
1997, 2002). In 1999, the government category of masyarakat terasing was replaced 
by ‘Komunitas Adat Terpencil (KAT; geographically and politically isolated adat 
community)’ as a result of AMAN’s activities (Duncan 2004b: 91), and as such their 
ways of life were connected with adat or ‘adat community’ gaining the implication 
of belonging to idealised and harmonious rural communities – that is, an essential 
component of the Indonesian Nation State. This change of image is also reflected in 
the government way of intervention in tribespeople’s life. For example, in the 
government project to designate a national park in Jambi province, the Orang Rimba 
(the Kubu), who had been seen as one of the most ‘primitive’ people in Indonesia, 
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were permitted to live in the park with the support of the NGOs that emphasised their 
traditional culture as being dependent on living in the forest (Li 2001). Thus, the 
‘primitive’ and ‘backward’ image of tribespeople has shifted towards something 
related to adat that is an essential component of Indonesian culture.  
       However, this change of image and policies does not mean that the government 
stopped its intervention in their lives or permitted complete autonomy and self-
determination among them. Instead of the direct constraint and reform of their 
behaviour and knowledge, the government (and also activists of the NGOs) began to 
intervene in tribespeople’s life in a different way, a way through which they attempt 
to educate their desires and configure their habits and aspirations suggesting a better 
way of life (Duncan 2004b; Li 2007b). As I will show in the case of the Suku Asli, 
this attempt involves various procedures, in which the government recognised the 
ownership of ancestral space owned by the community, legitimised the establishment 
of an ethnic organisation, documented their ethnic background, promoted the 
traditional performances and integrated their registered religion. These policies were 
not imposed on the communities; instead, the government only encouraged the locals’ 
actions through setting conditions, advising, and supplying subsidies to encourage 
them to behave as they should (Li 2007b: 16). The aim of these approaches is to give 
them the opportunity to be an ‘adat community’ recognised by the government. 
Through these policies, the tribespeople are involved in the re-configuration of their 
position in the state system, and, as Nathan Porath puts it, they become ‘a state-
defined “primitive” ethnic minority’ (2010: 269). 
        This change of government development programmes can be seen as the 
emergence of ‘governmentality’. The old development programmes for tribespeople 
tried to restrict and reform their behaviour and knowledge through resettlement, 
agricultural and religious programmes. However, as a result of local resistance and 
the introduction of the international concept, the government tries to control their 
desire and aspirations through education and support. Here, indigeneity is delivered 
through ‘governmentality’, which regards the manifestation of adat as proof of 





The field site: Geography and population 
 
Riau province and the Bengkalis regency 
        
       The province of Riau covers a vast area, exhibiting a complex geography and 
diverse populations. The province is situated in the eastern part of Sumatra. It 
includes about ninety thousand square kilometres and has a population of more than 
six million. The province capital is Pekanbaru.  
       The western inland boundaries of the province border the Western Sumatra 
province and hilly areas that connect with the mountainous area of Minangkabau 
highlands. Eastward, the altitude gradually lowers and a relatively moderate valley 
area extends for some hundred kilometres. In this area, the four large rivers of Rokan, 
Siak, Kampar and Indragiri run into the Malacca Strait, and the downstream area of 
each river is low and marshy. Around the estuary areas, there are many islands just 
off from the mainland, and numerous brackish rivers and channels make up swampy 
lands, which are covered with mangrove forest. The south-eastern coast faces the 
cross point of the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, and, offshore, there is the 
Riau-Lingga archipelago that was a part of Riau province until 2008. Historically, 
people’s settlements have been formed along the rivers and their tributaries 
depending on the water for transportation (T. Barnard 2003: 12; Kathirithamby-
Wells 1993).      
       Facing the Malacca Strait that connects the Indian Ocean and the South China 
Sea as well as the Indonesian Archipelago and the Malay Peninsula, this region has 
been historically open to outside influences politically, economically and culturally. 
In ancient times, this area was controlled by the maritime trading kingdom of 
Srivijaya. As a trading hub, this kingdom prospected for several hundred years. 
Srivijaya gradually declined between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries and, then, 
several Malay kingdoms such as the Indragiri, Rokan, Pekantua and Gassib were 
established on the eastern coast of Sumatra. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, 
a successor of Srivijaya, the Melaka kingdom obtained control of this area, and it 
also became prosperous during the fifteenth century. Then the Portuguese conquered 
the kingdom in 1511. Then, Melaka’s successor, the Johor kingdom, controlled the 
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basins of Indragiri, Siak and Kampar Rivers from the seventeenth century (Andaya 
2008: 50-78). In 1725, Raja Kecik, who had been a Minangkabau adventurer, 
founded the Siak kingdom, and this kingdom reached the height of its power at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century (T. Barnard 2003). In 1858 when the Dutch 
government concluded a series of new treaties with the sultanates of Siak and 
Indragiri, these kingdoms lost their sovereignty, but initially had considerable 
autonomy (Colombijn 2003a: 508-509, 2003b: 338-341). Under Dutch control, the 
administrative boundaries were reshuffled. Siak, Indragiri and the Riau-Lingga 
Archipelago were combined as an administrative unit. In 1873, Siak was split off 
from the single administrative unit, and established as a new administrative unit, the 
Bengkalis district. Under Japanese rule between 1942 and 1945, while the Riau-
Lingga Archipelago became a part of Singapore, Siak (including Bengkalis), 
Indragiri and Bangkinang, which had been a part of West Sumatra, were designated 
as Riau syu (province). After Indonesia achieved independence, Bangkinang, 
Bengkalis, Indragiri and the Riau-Lingga Archipelago formed the new province of 
Riau (Colombijn 2003b: 341). Finally, in 2008, the Riau-Lingga Archipelago was 
split off from the mainland Riau as a new province, the Riau Islands province.          
      Its complex geography, its position as an international trading centre, and 
repeated changes of the administrative borders have brought about the ethnic 
diversity of the population in Riau province. At present, the Malays (Orang Melayu) 
are the people who identify themselves and are identified as indigenous in general. 
However, their society and culture have not been integrated clearly, and, indeed, 
their identity has been formed by incorporating various populations through a long 
history of state control (Andaya 2008; T. Barnard 2003; see also Chapter 1). Since 
the era of the pre-colonial Malay kingdoms, the Minangkabau from western Sumatra 
have immigrated into this area. The Minangkabau established their settlements on the 
eastern coast and engaged in the exportation of gold, pepper and, then, the tin that 
was produced in the western highlands. They were intimately related to the 
establishment of the Malay kingdoms in this region as members of the ruling class. 
Their immigration has been continuous until today. Also, Chinese, Arab and 
European traders visited this area. In particular, the Chinese established a number of 
trading posts along the eastern coasts from the pre-colonial era. Their number 
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dramatically increased in the mid-nineteenth century when the Siak kingdom 
delegated timber harvesting to Singaporean Chinese merchants (panglong system; 
see Chapter 1), and in the 1940s when mainland Southeast Asia was involved in the 
turmoil of the Japanese intervention. From the early twentieth century, many 
Javanese also immigrated into this region first as contract labourers in Dutch times 
and, then, as forced labourers under the Japanese. After Indonesia achieved 
independence, the government also encouraged the Javanese to immigrate to this 
area. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, a number of Batak from northern 
Sumatra also came here to engage in labour around the oilfields. In addition to these 
migrants, the Bugis from Sulawesi and the Banjarnese from southeast Kalimantan 
have visited the Riau-Lingga Archipelago and south-eastern coastal areas of 
mainland Riau (Andaya 2008: 88-91; T. Barnard 2003: 14-15; Colombijn 2003b: 
142).   
       In addition to these peoples, there are several more groups who identify 
themselves and are identified as indigenous, but have different identities from the 
Malays. They are the orang asli groups. The Talang Mamak live in the forest area of 
the mid-stream Indragiri River (Indoragiri Hulu regency), a moderately hilly area. 
They cultivate rice on dry fields by slashing and burning rainforest, and also grow 
rubber and coconut trees. In addition, they engage in the collection and trade of a 
kind of agarwood (kayu gaharu), hunting in the forest and fishing on the tributaries 
of the Indragiri River (Isjoni 2005: 35-81). In recent years, the Riau branch of 
AMAN has begun activities to protect their land rights. The Bonai live in the 
upstream of the Rokan River (Rokan Hulu regency). For them, fishing in the 
tributaries of the Rokan River is an important source of livelihood (Isjoni 2002: 125-
134; Pemerintah Propinsi Riau 2005: 22-40). The Orang Laut are traditionally sea 
nomads, most of whom live in Riau Islands province, but some live around the 
mouth of Kampar River (Pelalawan regency) (Pemerintah Propinsi Riau 2005: 22-
40). They traditionally depended on the coastal resources and, in recent years, began 
demanding to have the waters in which they live recognised as belonging to them 
and inherited from their ancestors (Chou 2003, 2010; Chou and Wee 2007). The 
Petalangan are slash-and-burn cultivators of rice on dry fields living in the forests of 
the midstream of Kampar River (Pelalawan regency). While they have been regarded 
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as a part of the Malays, they are trying to protect the rainforest area claiming their 
historical use of the forests and demonstrating their position as an ‘adat community’ 
against the encroachment of the forest by palm plantations – they have established an 
ethno museum and a foundation that is the recipient of international support (Effendy 
1997, 2002; Masuda 2009). Around the basin and estuary area of the Siak River, the 
Sakai, Rawa, Akit and Suku Asli make their homes. I shall describe them later.  
       According to a report written by the Riau government (Pemerintah Propinsi Riau 
2005), the government recognises six groups as KAT which are the main target of 
government development projects because of their marginalised position (see 
Chapter 1). 2  The six groups are the Talang Mamak, Orang Laut, Bonai, Utan (Suku 
Asli), Sakai and Akit. According to a report written by the Department of Social 
Affairs in 1996 (see also Isjoni 2002: 17), the populations of these groups are: the 
Talang Mamak – 4816; the Bonai – 2070; the Orang Laut (including those in the 
Riau-Lingga Archipelago) – 7750; the Sakai – 2955; the Akit – 2736; and the Utan – 
3884. However, these figures have fluctuated greatly depending on the census (see 
also Benjamin 2002: 23), and seem to be much smaller than their actual populations 
at present. According to a survey of the KAT by the Department of Social Affairs in 
the Bengkalis regency in 2010 (Dinas Sosial Kabupaten Bengkalis 2010: 52-56), the 
number of households (kakak) of the Sakai was 2094; that of the Akit – 1504; and 
that of the Suku Asli – 1439. Therefore, the populations of the Sakai and Akit are 
around ten thousand people and eight thousand people, respectively.3 In terms of the 
Suku Asli, there are 1385 households in the Meranti regency (unpublished data 
obtained from the Department of Social Affairs in Meranti regency in 2012) and 
some thousand people who were called the Rawa in Siak regency (see Chapter 1 and 
4), in addition to the figure in the Bengkalis regency above. Therefore, the total 
                                                          
2 The categorisation of masyarakat terasing or KAT varies according to the source cited (see Persoon 
1998: 289). For example, Benjamin (2002: 23) quotes data about masyarakat terasing between 1990 
and 1995 provided by the Department of Social Affairs in Jakarta, which says that there were eight 
groups of masyarakat terasing in Riau, i.e. the Orang Laut, the Talang Mamak, the Bonai, the Utan, 
the Akit, the Sakai, the Kuala/Laut and the Bertam. In addition, according to Kazuya Masuda (2009), 
while the Petalanagan had not been recognised as the KAT, they obtained the position until 2009. 
3 I calculated their total populations based on an estimation of seeing that one household is 
averagely composed of five people. This estimation is derived from some fragmented data in the 
survey by the regency government (Dinas Sosial Kabupaten Bengkalis 2010).  
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population who identify themselves as Suku Asli is estimated at about fifteen 
thousand people around the area of the estuary. 
       Present-day Riau is characterised by three economic, political and geographical 
traits. The first trait is the spectacular industrial exploitation of its rich natural 
resources. At the turn of the twentieth century, rich oilfields were found around Duri 
city. Throughout the Japanese occupation and post-independence Indonesia, the 
oilfields and related infrastructure have been dramatically developed, and the oil 
industry is the largest business in the province (Colombijn 2003b: 343; Porath 2002: 
775-776). Growing oil palm is also an important industry. In the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, the vast rainforests that had covered most areas of the province 
were transformed into large-scale oil palm plantations. While these industries have 
generated many employment opportunities for the locals, the capital was controlled 
by the central government and foreign corporations. In 1989, an international 
development scheme was set up among Riau, Johor and Singapore: the ‘Growth 
Triangle’. This international framework was established so that Singapore would be 
able to utilise cheap resources and labour from Malaysia and Indonesia. In return, 
Malaysia and Indonesia would obtain capital and technologies from Singapore. In the 
wake of such economic developments, the province has attracted many migrants 
from North and West Sumatra, as well as Java, and the landscape of Riau has 
undergone tremendous change (Chou and Wee 2002: 318-324). Riau is one of the 
richest provinces in Indonesia.  
       Second, Riau is a centre of Malay ethno-nationalism. Although Riau is regarded 
as originally the land of the Malays, they have been far from dominant in the 
economic and political domains as a result of continuous migrations of the 
Minangkabau and Javanese. This situation resulted in the separatist independence 
movement of Riau. The kingdoms of Riau and the southern coast of the Malay 
Peninsula had strong political connections throughout the pre-colonial era, which 
forged strong emotional connections between the Malays in Riau and the southern 
coast of the Malay Peninsula. After World War II, the Riau Malays plotted the 
independence of Riau from the Indonesian Republic several times aiming for the 
revival of the Sultanate of Johor-Riau. Under Suharto’s regime, the celebration of 
Malay culture was organised through restoring historical graves and palaces, 
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establishing museums, conducting linguistic and literary research, and organising 
conferences (Wee 2002: 498-501). Just after the fall of Suharto, Riau Malay elites 
tried to seek independence, just like Acheh and Papua, by emphasising the value and 
distinctiveness of Malay culture. Unlike Ache and Papua no violence was involved, 
yet it could not win the wide support of citizens and resulted in failure because the 
movement could not give clear and persuasive distinctions of boundaries, people and 
territory (Colombijn 2003b). At present, this ethno-nationalism among the Riau 
Malays has changed into a claim for indigeneity and self-determination within the 
territory. 
       Third, Riau is one of main arenas for environmentalism struggles in Indonesia. 
The area of rainforest is rapidly decreasing because of logging and clearing for 
plantations, and several national and international NGOs, such as the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) and the Indonesian Forum for Environment (WALHI: 
Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia), are conducting research and campaigns for 
the purpose of protecting the rainforest. 
       Through his historical study of the Siak kingdom, Timothy P. Barnard (2003:1-
3) characterised the nature of the kingdom as ‘kacu (mixed)’ (see also Chapter 1). 
With this word, he summarised the mixed and complex social and ecological 
situations of the kingdom. Although the situation has changed, the ‘kacu’ feature of 
the Siak kingdom can still be applied to the present-day Riau province. In the 
complexity and mixture of environments and populations, various identities, cultures 
and political and economic agents are competing in this province.   
       The Bengkalis regency lies at the eastern coast of Riau province, which has an 
area of about seven thousand square kilometres and a population of five hundred 
thousand people. Facing the Malacca Strait, this area has been the centre of 
international communications with the outside world in Riau historically. Between 
the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, this area was controlled by the Siak kingdom, 
which had its capital at Siak Sri Inderapra, which was situated at the midstream of 
the Siak River. When the Dutch government obtained control of this kingdom in the 
mid-nineteenth century, the Dutch administrative centre was moved to Bengkalis 
town on Bengkalis Island and temporarily controlled the whole area of the eastern 
coast of Sumatra (Colombijn 2003b: 341). After Indonesia achieved independence, 
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the realm of the Siak kingdom became the Bengakalis regency. Then, Dumai city and 
the Siak regency were separated in 1999 and Meranti Islands regency also split off in 
2008. At present, Bengkalis regency consists of the coastal area, mainly Bengkalis 
and Rupat Islands, and an inland area, of which the political and economic centre is 
Duri city. The regency capital is Bengkalis town on Bengkalis Island. 
       The population of this area is as diverse as that of Riau province; there are 
Malays, Javanese, Minangkabau, ethnic Chinese, Batak and some orang asli groups. 
In the coastal area, the population of the ethnic Chinese is relatively large compared 
with other regions in Riau because of the introduction of the panglong system in the 
late nineteenth century. Some of them live in towns and engage in trading businesses. 
Some live in rural areas and earn their livelihoods from cultivating coconut and 
rubber gardens and fishing in the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea.   
       The Sakai are one of the orang asli groups who live in the moderately hilly area 
around the basin of the Mandau River, a tributary of the Siak River (Porath 2000, 
2002, 2003). Traditionally, they practised shifting cultivation of tubers. Today, many 
Sakai villagers cultivate dry rice and most of them have converted to Islam. 
Throughout the pre-colonial era, they had a certain connection with the downstream 
Siak kingdom. They exchanged rainforest products for commodities, such as cloth, 
salt and iron, and recognised the sultan as their overload in return for the sultan’s 
protection of their territory. During the 1930s and the 1940s, oilfields began to be 
established in Sumatra, and the Sakai’s region became a major oilfield. During 
Suharto’s era, the Caltex oil company expanded the oilfields and roads throughout 
their ancestral rainforest. Following the expansion of the oilfields and roads, the 
Batak, Javanese and Minangkabau immigrated into the area and built settlements 
along the roads (Porath 2002a: 771-75). In the post-Suharto era, they began claiming 





Map 1. Coastal area of Riau province 
 
       The Rawa, Akit and Suku Asli live around the coasts and offshore islands. The 
Rawa live in the low and swampy basin of the Rawa River (Siak regency) in 
mainland Sumatra. While they were clearly documented in the colonial records, they 
have been confused with the Utan and Akit in the following periods. Indeed, they 
have strong social and cultural connections with the Suku Asli and Akit as will be 
explained in the following chapters, and identify themselves as Suku Asli Anak 
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Rawa allying with the Suku Asli living on offshore islands who were called Utan in 
the past. In their region, the Caltex oil company has sought oilfields, and an 
environmental NGO is working to protect the rainforest in alliance with the Rawa. 
The Akit live on Rupat Island. Their settlements are concentrated around the coast of 
the Morong Channel which runs through the centre of the island from east to west. 
Most of them earn their livelihood by harvesting mangrove timber that is used for 
charcoal. While the Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa were or are regarded as different 
orang asli groups in the state categorisation, they have had regular communications 
and similar cultural and economic traits.  
 
 
The Suku Asli 
 
       The Suku Asli live mainly on islands that are divided by narrow water channels 
around the Siak estuary, mainly Bengkalis, Padang, Merbau, Ransang and Tebing 
Tinggi (except for Bengkalis Island, these islands belong to Meranti Islands regency). 
They are Austronesian speakers. Their language, the Malay dialect of this region, and 
the Indonesian that migrants speak are mutually intelligible.  
       As mentioned earlier, the Suku Asli are tribespeople. They have a history in 
which they have avoided the state control to a considerable extent and becoming 
Malay. They have been seen as ‘primitive’ or ‘backward’ from the state’s perspective 
and categorised as one of the KAT. In addition, they are post-foragers. Although 
there are several characteristic features embedded in the label ‘foragers’ (see Lee 
2005: 19-20), I place a strong emphasis on their mobility in their past life: they were 
people who foraged around the coastal forests along the brackish rivers and channels 
with canoes, and engaged in fishing, gathering, hunting, trading and waged labour. 
Their settlements are scattered over the islands in a vast area. Although they are 
settled in villages at present, they still maintain some characteristics of their foraging 
past such as occasional moves to different communities, little dependence on 
agriculture, and rather loose political and social institutions. 
       Although they have been regarded as one of the orang asli groups in this region 
by the state, their identity cannot simply be framed by the category of ‘adat 
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community’. First, although the state has categorised them as the Utan since the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, they have constructed an identity which goes 
beyond the state ethnic categorisation. In their foraging ways of life, they have 
strongly associated with the Akit and Rawa who were or are categorised as distinct 
groups by the state. As a result, rather than as Utan, they have traditionally identified 
themselves as orang asli, a comprehensive word that covers the identities as the Akit, 
Rawa and Utan. Second, their communities have historically incorporated many 
ethnic Chinese. In the late-nineteenth century, there was a mass immigration of male 
Chinese labourers into the forest areas where the Utan lived, and they married with 
Utan females. Their descendants are called peranakan, or ‘the mixed-blooded’, and 
they have maintained the Chinese way of ancestral worship and other elements of 
Chinese culture. As a result, in their society, there are heterogeneous traditional 
practices and identities.      
       Therefore, it is different to see them as an ethnic ‘group’ in which people share a 
common identity based on their culture or descent. If we adopt a strict definition of 
‘ethnic group’ (Brubaker 2003: 12; Scott 2009: 256), they cannot be seen as an 
‘ethnic group’. Furthermore, if we approach them in the criterial fashion, they are not 
an ‘adat community’, as they have heterogeneous traditional practices and histories 
within their community.     
        Despite of this diversity and fluidity of adat and identity, in recent years, they 
developed their ‘indigenous movement’ emphasising their position as an ‘adat 
community’. In 2005, they established an ethnic organisation, IKBBSA (Ikatan 
keluarga besar batin Suku Asli; Suku Asli Headman’s League)4 which has a dual role 
– it is a headmen’s council and the primary means of communicating with the 
government. In 2006, they negotiated with the regency government and succeeded in 
having them officially recognise their new ethnic name Suku Asli – now, they are the 
Suku Asli. Since 2010, they have held periodic ethnic meetings and festivals and 
demonstrated Suku Asli traditional culture in front of government officials. Around 
2011, they designated Buddhism as traditional agama. In 2013, they applied for 
                                                          
4 ‘Batin’ is an Arabic term that means ‘inner’ and generally used in the Malay world. However, in 
Suku Asli usage, it always indicates ‘headman’. I use this term in the meaning of ‘headman’ in this 
thesis (see also footnote 54). 
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ownership of the mangrove swamps in which they have traditionally lived 
emphasising that they were their ‘ancestral lands’.  
       However, their way of manifesting indigeneity is quite unique. First, while in 
many cases of indigenous movements in the world people confronted issues that 
could bring about predicaments such as land competition with their neighbours, 
large-scale deforestation or the designation of national parks, the Suku Asli are not 
facing such urgent issues. Second, while international or national NGOs of outsiders 
often support and encourage people to protect their rights or environment, no NGOs 
have worked in their communities in the Suku Asli communities. Third, while 
Indonesian indigenous movements are characterised by the recovery of past authority, 
i.e. ‘adat revivalism’, the Suku Asli do not seek the revival of past authorities or 
‘traditional’ authenticity. Rather, the trigger for their movement was a government 
intervention, through which they were encouraged to establish an ethnic organisation. 
Subsequently, through this organisation, they have tried to communicate directly 
with the government and establish their new position as an ‘adat community’ within 
the Indonesian state. 
 
 
Anthropological issues around the Malacca Strait 
  
       Southeast Asianists have been attracted to the topic of ethnic identity and 
category, as the populations in this area have the enormous diversity of society and 
culture. This has been especially so for scholars who study the regions around the 
Malacca Strait because this area is characterised by the historical frequent moves of 
the populations. In classic ethnological approaches, scholars tried to classify ethnic 
categories and their cultures focusing on the differences of ‘race’ such as ‘Negritos’, 
‘Veddoids’ and ‘Proto-Malays’, which was derived from the difference of the 
periods when the people had migrated to a region from south western China or 
elsewhere (e.g. Winstedt 1961; Loeb 1935). However, over the last three decades, 
archaeological, linguistic and human biological evidences have shown that it is hard 




       In this situation, recent scholars have explored the issues of ethnic identity and 
category focusing on the interactions between agencies of local populations and the 
state (see Steedly 1999). For example, T. Barnard (2003), a historian studying the 
eastern coast of Sumatra, explores how the Siak kingdom formed its control over the 
eastern Sumatra on the basis of the kacu situation of ethnicity as mentioned above. 
Leonard Y. Andaya (2008), also a historian studying the Malacca Strait, scrutinises 
the core of Malay ethnicity describing the historical interactions between the Malay 
states and various local populations. The studies of tribespeople, whose identity may 
have been seen as primordial in public, also adopt a similar perspective. Benjamin 
(2002: 9) examines the formation of the Orang Asli in Malaysia and other 
tribespeople elsewhere in the Malay World and suggests that ‘tribal societies are 
secondary formulations, characterised by the positive steps they have taken to hold 
themselves apart from incorporation into the state apparatus’. Analysing the history 
of mainland Southeast Asia, James Scott (2009) takes one step further and explains 
the formulation of tribespeople by their struggles with the historical state policies 
such as taxation, corvée and slavery.  
       On the other hand, at an ethnographic level, more and more anthropologists 
focus on the process of how people embody ethnic categories as their own identity 
within their societies. Porath (2003) describes the shamanic healing ritual of the 
Sakai and suggests that the ritual procedures can be seen as a process of the 
reconstruction of individual and group identity. Cynthia Chou (2003; 2010) 
researched Orang Laut communities in Riau-Lingga Archipelago and has written two 
books. In the first (2003), she scrutinises exchange between the Orang Laut and 
Malays and reveals that their ethnic boundary is configured by their attitudes toward 
magic and money. In the second book (2010), she explores how the Orang Laut 
developed their attachment to territory in their semi-nomadic way of life on the sea 
and why they began claiming the right to the territory in relation to state 
development projects. Nicholas Long (2013) examines Malay identity in Riau 
Archipelago in ‘decentralised’ Indonesian politics. Considering the fluidity and 
dynamism of ethnic identification as being Malay, he suggests that ‘acts of ethnic 
identification might be contingent and circumstantial’; however, ‘by destabilising the 
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identity of so-called Malays and thereby problematising the category of “ethnicity”, 
it actually reified the “Malayness” they were claiming’ (2013: 18).  
       This thesis contributes to some of these issues of identity and category especially 
in relation to indigeneity. More specifically, first, this thesis contributes to the issues 
of how the categories of tribespeople emerged, how they have maintained their 
identities, and why the categories were associated with indigeneity. Considering 
geographic settings, national and regional history, and social and cultural differences, 
this thesis reveals a way of transactions between tribespeople and state politics in the 
arena of indigeneity. Second, this thesis deals with the complexity and involvement 
of various identities. The Suku Asli had heterogeneous identities in their tribal way 
of life, and, furthermore, there are many people who have Chinese identity derived 
from their ancestry. Exploring the boundaries within their community as well as with 
outsiders, this thesis describes the dynamic transactions of such identities. Finally, 
this thesis explores the detailed processes of destabilising, problematising and 
embodying indigenous identity. The Suku Asli have not simply adopted the 
government policies to them, but also objectified and abstracted their thoughts and 
practices, and eventually reified their integrated indigenous identity in the state 
politics. This thesis provides a salient depiction of the construction of local identity, 
which could be applied to tribespeople not only in Indonesia but also elsewhere in 
the world.   
 
 
Fieldwork and methodology 
  
       I conducted my fieldwork between January and December 2012 (twelve months) 
in the village of Teluk Pambang, which is situated at the eastern edge of Bengkalis 
Island. I lived in a Suku Asli house, I also visited other villages, and sometimes 
travelled to settlements beyond Bengkalis – including the Rawa region, Rupat Island 
and Tebing Tinggi Island – for the purpose of getting to know the Suku Asli (and the 
Akit and Rawa) living in each place. While most of the ethnographic information I 
utilise in this thesis stems from this period of fieldwork, I also use some 
complementary data obtained in Rupat, where I conducted fieldwork between July 
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2006 and December 2007 (eighteen months) in the Akit villages of Titi Akar and 
Hutan Panjang. 5 
       Before the fieldwork, I had several plans about how I would go about collecting 
data on indigeneity. First, I planned to live in a Suku Asli village. By establishing 
‘rapport’ with the Suku Asli and learning their language, in a village context, I hoped 
to understand their world more deeply. Second, as my interest was in transactions 
between the Suku Asli and state politics, I would concentrate on the networks of 
Suku Asli leaders as well as government officials. In particular, the broad network of 
Suku Asli leaders was important. Through my work with Suku Asli leaders, I 
expected to accumulate significant information on the implementation of government 
programmes in each village. Third, I would seek as much information as I could on 
Suku Asli adat. I would gather and, if possible, make a list of their various adat 
prescriptions and practices, and explore adat’s relationship to state policies. 
Integrating these data, I would explore Suku Asli engagement, struggle, negotiation 
and compromise with the state. With one exception, my plans worked out quite well. 
       My move to a Suku Asli village happened smoothly. My first and strongest 
supporter was Pak Ajui, the batin headman in the Bengkalis regency. He was well 
respected in the village and the wider area. He managed to arrange my host family 
and introduce me to a number of elders and adat functionaries who were willing and 
able to facilitate my work. In this context, particularly helpful were Pak Odang and 
Koding, who had a great deal of knowledge of Suku Asli adat and history. I was 
extremely fortunate to choose the ‘right kind’ of village – that is, a village that was at 
the very centre of Suku Asli engagement with development programmes; something 
I did not know at the beginning but I found out almost as soon as I arrived in the area.  
       At Bengkalis town, where I had to complete the various administrative 
procedures for my research permit, I met a number of officials from the Department 
of Social Affairs. They promised support and provided me with a new report on the 
development programmes for orang asli groups in the area (DINAS Sosial 
Kabupaten Bengkalis 2010). They explained the purpose of the various government 
programmes and gave me their views on the life of the Suku Asli. After that first 
                                                          
5 The focus of this fieldwork was investigating shamanic practices among the Akit. The thesis was 
submitted to Tokyo Marine Science and Technology as a Masters dissertation (Osawa 2009). 
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meeting, an official took me to a house of a batin headman that was the closest to the 
town. The batin was Pak Atang in the village of Selat Baru. When we arrived at his 
house, he was about to go to a wedding ceremony held in the village of Teluk 
Pambang. He took me to the village and introduced me to Pak Ajui and other leaders 
invited to the ceremony from the village itself and further afield. After talking with 
them for a while, I found out that Teluk Pambang was the centre of the Suku Asli 
ethnic organisation, IKBBSA. IKBBSA had the potential to be an excellent focus for 
my research, and so I asked Pak Ajui to allow me to live in the village. I returned to 
Bengkalis town, Pak Ajui contacted me through a mobile phone a few days later to 
tell me that he had arranged a host family for me. I moved to the village just a few 
days after my first visit. 
       The head of my host family was Pak Kiat, and his family included himself, his 
wife and two unmarried sons. He had built a new house made of concrete a few years 
ago, which had a room available. While the house did not have a bathroom or 
electricity, my stay there was comfortable. Pak Kiat was thirty nine; he occasionally 
worked as a temporary labourer in road construction and the logging of mangrove 
timber. His wife was in her early forties and worked on a coconut plantation owned 
by Pak Kimdi, an ethnic Chinese in the village. Their sons were in their late teens, 
and worked together with their parents. Just like other Suku Asli villagers, they had 
little schooling. Pak Kiat, his wife and elder son had completed their primary school 
education. The younger son had graduated from junior high school in the village and 
wanted to enter high school, but his family circumstances did not allow him to do so 
– there was not enough money. Staying at their house and utilising the vast network 
of Ajui’s friend and acquaintances, I managed to establish relations with most of the 
villagers in Teluk Pambang, but also to visit leaders’ houses in other villages, which 
are generally a dozen kilometres distant, with a motorbike. 
       From the very beginning of our contact, I could communicate with Suku Asli 
villagers in (what appeared to me as) a mix of Indonesian and Malay that I had learnt 
during my previous fieldwork in Rupat. Like other orang asli groups in this area (e.g. 
the Sakai; see Porath 2002), the Suku Asli in Teluk Pambang speak a Malay dialect 
which exhibits a number of differences from the Malay and Indonesian that are 
spoken by their Javanese and Malay neighbours (different accents, a number of 
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lexical differences, and so forth). Some Suku Asli called it ‘Suku Asli language’ 
(bahasa Suku Asli; bahasa asli). However, the difference was not important. ‘Suku 
Asli language’ and Malay are more than mutually intelligible. Furthermore, it varies 
from place to place even among Suku Asli communities. According to a Suku Asli 
informant in Teluk Pambang, it was often more difficult to communicate with a Suku 
Asli living in a distant community than with a Malay living in Teluk Pambang. 
Malay villagers in Teluk Pambang also thought Suku Asli spoke Malay. According 
to them, while the meaning of some Suku Asli words was sometimes obscure, such 
differences were generally found even among Malay villages in this area. A well 
known, albeit slightly old, Malay-English dictionary (Wilkinson 1957) endorsed this 
opinion; I could actually find most Suku Asli words in it.6  
       Because of this linguistic similarity, many Suku Asli villagers could easily adapt 
their accent and expressions to those nearer to standard Indonesian or Malay. They 
used such adapted accents and expressions not only when they talked with Javanese 
and Malays in the village, but also when they talked about political topics. My 
informants, mainly leaders of Suku Asli, were good at this. When they talked with 
me, they seemed to change accent almost unconsciously. While I came to understand 
their accent and actually use it in daily life by the end of my fieldwork, I mostly 
communicated with them in the ‘mixed’ language of Indonesian and Malay because 
it was easier for all of us to understand.  
       Of course, language is highly significant in the context of development and Suku 
Asli relations with the state. For instance, in later chapters, I explore the meaning of 
words such as adat and agama. The significance of these words emerged in the 
political context of unequal relations with outsiders and the need for ‘development’. 
If we were to think of bahasa Suku Asli as an indigenous language, adat and agama 
are almost certainly not indigenous terms. They reflect the way in which Suku Asli 
communities were forced to think of their lives in and through terms imported from 
‘outsiders’ in terms of ‘religion’ (agama) and ‘tradition’ (adat). In many ways, it is 
this ‘positioning’ that lies at the heart of this thesis. It is also remarkable that because 
of the language similarity with Malay and the linguistic differences among Suku Asli 
                                                          
6 On the other hand, it was relatively difficult to find bahasa asli words in Indonesian-English 
dictionaries published in recent years. 
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communities, my informants do not distinguish an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ based on 
language. Language, which may often be deeply associated with one’s ethnic identity, 
is by no means a criterion of ethnic identification in their society.  
       Both in terms of adapting their language and sharing their understanding of the 
world, Suku Asli leaders were very cooperative with my research. For one thing, 
because of my previous experience in the area, introducing myself to them and 
explaining my research was fairly straightforward. From the very first contact with 
them at the wedding ceremony, it became clear that they had a good impression of 
me because of my previous fieldwork. They knew that I had conducted fieldwork in 
Rupat; they had kinship connections with the Akit and had heard rumours that a 
Japanese anthropologist had researched Akit tradition. As the stories and rumours 
about my work in Rupat were positive, they appeared to accept me without suspicion. 
Ajui’s support in particular broadened my network. He showed me around Teluk 
Pambang and introduced me not only to Suku Asli villagers but also some Malays 
and Javanese in the village. When he had meetings or events he needed to attend in 
other villages, he took me along and introduced me to other Suku Asli leaders. Such 
leaders kindly explained to me the situation in their villages and welcomed my 
occasional visits to their houses. Through this network, I obtained much of my 
ethnographic data on the Suku Asli way of life, history and engagement with the 
state – not only in Teluk Pambang but also in other villages. 
       The leaders’ cooperative attitude was also associated with the emergence of 
indigeneity in Suku Asli society. As I describe in this thesis, Suku Asli leaders were 
trying to have the government recognise their community’s position as an ‘adat 
community’. They almost certainly thought my research, which was supported by the 
government and dealt with their tradition, could be helpful to their activities. In 
addition, as I describe in Chapter 4, the efficacy of leadership in Suku Asli society is 
related to communication with outsiders. It would have been significant for them that, 
through communication with me, they could further their own reputation and the 
reputation of their village. Of course, this is not to suggest that their cooperation was 
a simple reflection of local politics. In many ways, they were actually interested in 
my research. They found my questions useful and seemed to relish the opportunity to 
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speak about their community in ways that clarified both their tradition and their quest 
for a better life. 
       Beyond my work with leaders, I tried to establish relationships of trust with 
‘ordinary’ villagers in Teluk Pambang as well. In general, they were also cooperative. 
My everyday routine involved visiting villagers’ houses and talking about their life 
histories, economic activities, families, fears and hopes. I also participated in their 
economic and religious activities in the village. I followed their work in the 
rainforest and mangrove forest trying to learn how they used the forest resources. I 
attended shamanic séances and asked questions about their cosmology. A great deal 
of interesting information emerged from these encounters. More than that, little by 
little, they gave me the opportunity to understand better the information I was 
collecting from the various leaders by contextualising their quest for Suku Asli 
recognition in the everyday lives of ordinary people and the village world. Through 
these activities, I became especially close to some of them.  
       In addition to Pak Ajui and Kiat, Pak Odang and Koding – who frequently 
appear in my ethnographic descriptions – were my main informants. They were all 
extremely knowledgeable about Suku Asli tradition and history and they had 
experience of engagement with particular state interventions and the world of 
‘development’.  
       However, it is important to recognise that my main informants were men. This is 
because (i) it is men who usually engage in political communication with the state 
and (ii) women often hesitated to talk with a foreign male researcher. For instance, 
when I visited a house, women often introduced their husband to me and retreated to 
a back room. Yet, the wives of Pak Kiat and Ajui were good informants. As I had the 
opportunity to talk with them every day, they managed to share with me their 
perspective on the village and life in it.    
       Nevertheless, in one respect, my initial plan did not work out very well. While 
leaders in different villages kindly explained to me their village situation and history, 
I found that it was difficult to explore the significance of this data in detailed ways. A 
number of repeat visits and interviews were simply not enough. To make it work, I 
would have had to spend much more time with each one of them and understand 
their lived experiences in the villages. Consequently, I revised my original plan: 
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instead of trying to obtain data about all the villages, the leaders of which I had met, I 
decided to focus on the situation in Teluk Pambang. As a result, I mainly describe the 
situation of Teluk Pambang in this thesis, and information about other villages is 
used only as complementary data.  
       Most of my interviews were conducted in an unstructured fashion. When I 
visited villagers’ houses, I did not have many fixed questions in my mind, and I 
carried on conversations about everyday things without trying to pre-determine their 
direction. If there was something interesting in a particular context, I tried to explore 
the topic further. In this way, I tried to document as well as explicate their complex 
views of their world and, at the same time, engage with these views as emerging in a 
form closely related to their everyday life. In parallel with these unstructured 
interviews, I conducted a structured survey on the family members (and their 
backgrounds) of 185 households in the western part of Teluk Pambang (see footnote 
29). This survey was necessary for the purpose of clarifying occasional moves, 
questions of individual descent, and marriage patterns between Suku Asli and 
peranakan. 
       However, beyond interviews and surveys, it is important to emphasise that it was 
villagers’ readiness to share with me their everyday lives that mattered. I had the 
opportunity to discuss and observe these lives in many different situations – from 
visiting Bengkalis town or spending time over a coffee in a local warung, to working 
in their gardens or following them in the mangrove forest, I was allowed to learn 
something about their fears and hopes and, perhaps, share in them a little as well. For 
that experience, I will be eternally grateful. 
      My ethnographic strategy was to bring together the government’s images of and 
interventions in Suku Asli society and Suku Asli’s adoptions of and engagements 
with these images and interventions. As a result of this engagement, the Suku Asli 
have conceptualised and started to re-configure their identity, habits, categories and 
authenticity. In this thesis, by analysing such changes, I explore how the Indonesian 
version of indigeneity has been introduced to Suku Asli society, what has changed as 
a result of this introduction, and what kind of actions are emerging in relation to 
these changes.  
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       In my ethnographic descriptions, I describe not only the facts of Suku Asli 
history and their way of life, but also their attempts to reflect on both. As mentioned 
above, indigeneity is a kind of perspective that was introduced into their world in 
recent years. The Suku Asli are not familiar with the international concepts of 
‘indigeneity’ and ‘indigenous peoples’. Furthermore, at the time of my fieldwork, 
only a few members of local elites knew the terms ‘adat community’ and ‘customary 
law community’, and did not use these terms when explaining their position in a 
consistent way. Quite often, instead of these terms, they explained their perspectives 
on who they are through their own experiences and ‘cultural logic’ (see Long 2009), 
which have been formed in and through their ancestral practices, historical 
communications with outsiders, and connections with the land – experiences and 
‘cultural logics’ which, although they have started to change, have not yet been fully 
objectified in the form of an ‘adat community’. By describing my conversations with 
them and exploring their reflections on the concepts of ‘adat community’ or 
indigeneity, I have tried to reveal how the Suku Asli have started to construct their 
own indigeneity. Furthermore, by analysing such discourses and comparing them 
with everyday practices, I explore unconscious and subjective attachments, 
aspirations, desires and beliefs in the Suku Asli world. These attachments, hopes and 
desires are all related to ‘indigeny’ (see Benjamin 2002, 2012, forthcoming; Chapter 
3), and have often been more influential in Suku Asli responses to government 
interventions than abstract ideas like ‘indigenous group’.  
 
 
Structure of the thesis 
  
       Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the topic of ethnic identity as Suku Asli, which 
became the basis of the emergence of their indigeneity. While Chapter 1 deals with 
the state categorisation of orang asli groups on the eastern coast of Sumatra, Chapter 
2 is about identity based on their own perspective, a perspective that has been 
constituted by their historical experiences. From Chapter 3, I explore the social 
changes which emerged through the use of indigeneity in their world. Therefore, in 
the first section of each chapter, I described the historical background of each topic 
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before the emergence of indigeneity, and analyse the process and results of this 
emergence in the following sections.    
       More specifically, Chapter 1 is about the history of the relationship between the 
state and tribespeople in eastern Sumatra. Some people of eastern Sumatra were 
categorised as tribespeople in the process of state formation between the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and this category has been transformed into that of 
‘indigenous people’ as a result of the recent changes in Indonesian politics. In 
Chapter 2, uncoupling the idea of the ethnic category derived from state politics, I 
describe Suku Asli identity and their historical relationship with the Akit, Rawa and 
Chinese. While they historically have shared a clear opposition to Muslims who have 
their settlements near to those of the Suku Asli, their contents of culture are far from 
integrated. Chapter 3 deals with their relationship with space and livelihood 
resources. Describing their traditional life and the transition of land ownership in 
Teluk Pambang, I show a process within which they started conceptualising their 
lands as ‘descendants’ land’ and ‘ancestral land’. Chapter 4 is concerned with the 
establishment of the ethnic organisation, IKBBSA. IKBBSA was established in the 
recent political atmosphere of ‘decentralisation’ rather than Suku Asli aspirations, 
but Suku Asli elites have driven the organisation of ordinary villagers and the 
documentation of their ethnic identity in accordance with the government image of 
an ‘adat community’. Chapter 5 analyses the transformation of their adat. While 
more and more people are recognising adat as something related to art or 
performance under the government policies of culturalisation, it encourages ordinary 
villagers to form their identity as Suku Asli through participation in these activities. 
Chapter 6 describes the process of the introduction of Buddhism as their ‘ancestral 
religion’. The adopted image of a distinctive and integrated ‘indigenous people’ is 
reflected in their having an agama – that is, a religion which is both recognised and 










Under State Politics: State Formation, Ethnic Category and 
Development Subjects     
 
In Riau, the term which indicates tribespeople or indigenous people is orang asli the 
same as the Orang Asli in Malaysia. They have been seen as the people who have 
lived in peripheral areas distant from political centres, maintained their traditional 
way of life, and thus as different from the ‘civilised’ and dominant population of the 
Malays, Javanese and Minangkabau. Most of the orang asli groups are also listed in 
the government’s category of KAT, and regarded as the main subjects of the 
government development projects. Isjoni, an Indonesian anthropologist in Riau, 
summarises the KAT profile: (1) they live in small and segmented communities and 
usually depend on the natural resources around them; (2) therefore, they have poor 
material culture, are not really associated with agama, and follow their own adat 
without receiving benefits from the state development projects (penbagunan) (2002: 
20-21; see also DINAS Sosial Kabupaten Bengkalis 2010: 1-5). These images show, 
orang asli as ‘primitive’ and ‘backward’ people who have maintained in peripheral 
areas the ‘old’ ways of life inherited from their ancestors, and have not been 
‘civilised’ in modern Indonesia. In short, orang asli in Riau have been seen as 
tribespeople in a primordial fashion. 
       However, some recent studies point out that tribespeople in Southeast Asia have 
not existed or maintained themselves in a primordial way but have been formed in 
the politics of the state. Benjamin (2002) defines ‘tribespeople’ as people living in 
‘particular socio-political circumstances of life’ within state politics and suggests that 
all tribal societies are ‘secondary formulations’ therein. Negating the claim that they 
follow ‘the dictates of some collective inborn drive’ or hold ‘total collectivities’ as 
ethnic groups in a primordial fashion, he emphasises that ‘being tribal’ is a result of  
the ‘individual choice’ of the people in locating themselves in the state system (2002: 
8-12). Scott (2009: 127-177) also suggests that the people living in the ‘hilly area’ of 
mainland Southeast Asia became tribespeople in politics and economy during state 
formation, and describes the fashion in which they run away from state raids, 
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imposition of slavery, corvée and taxation. If we consider the historical and 
ethnographic records, we can see that their arguments apply to the situation of orang 
asli in eastern Sumatra as well. In the process whereby the state extends its power as 
it seeks more resources, labour and tax revenue, some people living in its realm 
became tribespeople or orang asli. 
      Thus, tribespeople or orang asli are formed in transactions between state politics 
and people’s choice. In this chapter, I would like to focus on the state politics aspect, 
and explore it using mainly information from historical and ethnographic records. 
The essential tools or arts for the state in governing the population are identification, 
categorisation and certification. To do so, the state can objectify the people with 
whom they need to intervene and control them more effectively and easily (Scott 
1998, 2009; Li 2000). This technique of objectification is important particularly to 
control tribespeople who have kept more distance from state direct control than the 
‘civilised’ populations. By identifying and categorising them, the state can show not 
only how they should be but also how the ‘civilised’ population in the state should be. 
Such politics have formed the present-day orang asli image. 
       First, I summarise the history of the pre-colonial era around the Malacca Strait 
and the formation of the category of orang asli as non-Malays. Second, I analyse the 
hierarchic and regional categorisations given to orang asli under the Siak kingdom 
and the Dutch colonial government. Third, I explore a series of policies that have 
been implemented for tribespeople since Indonesia’s achievement of independence. 
The position of orang asli groups has changed dynamically from period to period. 
The process of statecraft formed the category and image of tribespeople in eastern 
Sumatra, and they eventually became an ‘indigenous people’ or ‘adat community’, a 









Orang asli under the pre-colonial and colonial state in the Malacca 
Strait  
 
Outside the formation of the maritime states and ‘Malayu’ people       
  
        Let us begin with the formation of the early maritime state in the Malacca Strait, 
which can go back to the period of the ancient kingdom, Srivijaya. The Malacca 
Strait has been the principal maritime route connecting China, India, and the Middle 
East for the last two thousand years, and the communities along its shores continued 
to benefit from the trade for more than two thousand years (Andaya 2008: 50). After 
China became a powerful state and expanded its maritime trade in the first 
millennium, the importance of this area as a trade transit point increased. In 
particular, the port cities of southern Sumatra gradually developed because the 
southern area was the end point of the northeast monsoon winds that provided 
tailwinds for the ships from East Asia (Andaya 2008: 51). The ancient Hindu-
Buddhist kingdom of Srivijaya thus emerged around the area of present-day 
Palembang in southern Sumatra. Changing its capital repeatedly, this maritime 
trading kingdom ruled the area for several centuries and exerted its influence on the 
ports of Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, western Java and mainland Southeast Asia 
(Andaya 2008: 78). Srivijaya control gradually declined from the eleventh century, 
and by the thirteenth century, the area of southern Sumatra became subservient to the 
Javanese kingdoms of Kediri and Singasari (Andaya 2008: 57-59). At the beginning 
of the fifteenth century, Srivijaya was succeeded by the kingdom of Melaka 
established by people who claimed they were descendants of the Srivijaya royal 
family. This kingdom rapidly became a prosperous trading centre in the strait during 
the fifteenth century, supported by the Emperor of the Ming dynasty of China. Then, 
the kingdom was conquered by the Portuguese in 1511 (Andaya 2008). 
       Andaya summarises the characteristic features of the Srivijaya kingdom between 
the seventh and fourteenth centuries as follows: 
 
(1) an entrepot state involved in maritime international commerce; (2) a ruler 
endowed with sacred attributes and powers; (3) governance based on kinship 
ties; (4) a mixed population with specific and mutually advantageous roles in the 
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economy; (5) a realm whose extent was determined not by territory but by 
shifting locations of its subject. (2008: 67-68) 
 
In short, the power of the Srivijaya kingdom was concentrated on controlling ports, 
maritime commerce and its populations, but not on the territories that the state in the 
following eras were interested in (Anderson 1990). In other words, the political 
power of the Srivijaya was not really exerted as far as the peripheries of the realm, 
for example, the ‘upstream’ of the port centre or isles and inlets of the coasts and 
their populations. These characteristics transferred largely unchanged to the Melaka 
kingdom (Andaya 2008: 68). 
       Although there are no sources which deal with the identity of the population of 
Srivijaya recorded at the time, the records in the era of its successor, Melaka 
kingdom, show that the ‘Malayu’ identity gradually became prestigious in the realm 
of the kingdom during the Srivijaya period (Andaya 2008: 60). The term ‘Malayu’ is 
found in Chinese texts in the seventh century, which corresponds with ‘Malay’ in 
English and ‘Melayu’ in Indonesian and Malay. However, according to Andaya 
(2008: 59-60), this word did not mean a fixed ethnicity, which may be used like ‘the 
Malays’ in the present day. Rather, ‘Malayu’ identity was initially associated with 
the state polity – that is, the people subject to the rule Srivijaya and its successors 
were identified as ‘the Malayu people’. Then, following that, the Melaka kingdom 
developed its control over the Malacca Strait and South China Sea through the 
reinforcement of the ruler-subject relationship, a maritime trading network, and 
kinship alliances. The elite in the remote ports adopted the styles and ideas from 
Melaka because they symbolised their legitimacy as rulers. For example, the 
language used in Melaka became the trade and diplomatic lingua franca throughout 
the strait and the South China Sea; Islam, to which the Melaka royal family 
converted in the mid-fifteenth century, was introduced through the kingdom’s sphere 
of influence (Andaya 2008: 71). Such a prestigious status as ‘Malayu’ prevailed over 
not only amongst the elites but also their subjects through the expansion of kinship 
networks until the late eighteenth century (Andaya 2008: 71-77). Through these 
processes, ‘Malayu’ transformed from its polity-basis into an ethnicity, in which the 
people were ‘culturally’ connected until the sixteenth century.        
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      Records before the sixteenth century of the people who are now called orang asli 
in eastern Sumatra are extremely scarce. However, there are some writings about 
them from this early period. First, there were people who lived in the places where 
the maritime-port state could not adequately exert its power. These people were 
usually found in the inland areas, and such political centre-peripheral relationships 
are expressed in the schema of ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ or ‘hill’ and ‘valley’ in 
the studies of Southeast Asia (e.g. Bronson 1978; Kathirithamby-Wells 1993; Li 
1999; Scott 2009). On the other hand, the coastal space of eastern Sumatra, with its 
numerous isles and inlets, also had places where state control was barely exercised 
(T. Barnard 2003). In both cases, such spaces and populations were related to the 
present-day orang asli groups. Second, although they lived in the peripheral area of 
the state’s realm, they had a certain connection with the state. For the maritime 
trading state, products harvested in the forest area such as camphor, benzoin and 
beeswax were precious commodities, and the people harvested the products and 
exchanged them with the state’s subjects (Andaya 2008: 221; Kathirithamby-Wells 
1993: 80). Third, however, they were not much subject to state control. It is certain 
that some orang asli groups came under state control before the sixteenth century. 
For example, the Orang Laut supported the establishment and extension of the 
Melaka kingdom by acting as militia and pirates in the maritime world receiving 
titles from the kingdom (Chou 2002: 24-29, 2010: 40-50). However, around the 
estuary area of the Siak River, many of the coastal forest dwellers were not 
subsumed in the polities of the Melaka-Johor kingdoms (T. Barnard 2003: 18-19). In 
these peripheral areas, they maintained their autonomy and traditional way of life in 
the fashion of hunter-gatherers and shifting cultivators without strong political 
systems. In short, their position was economically connected with but politically 
separated from state control.  
       Therefore, in the process of expanding the ‘Malayu’ identity, some of these 
forest dwellers did not adopt the ‘Malayu’ identity of the state polity, and non-
‘Malayu’ identity was formed in relation to the people who had ‘Malayu’ identity. 
On the periphery of the Malay Peninsula, on the one hand, such people would have 
been the ancestors of the Orang Asli in present-day Malaysia. Yet there were also 
such people on the coast of Sumatra. They might have been the ‘Veddoid’ and 
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‘Negrite’ populations (Loeb 1935: 290-295; Moszkowski 1909), indigenous 
Austronesian speakers who just lived at places far away from the political centres, 
the sea nomads living in boats (Chou 2010 42-46), or even the ‘Malayu’ who had 
fled state control to avoid raids, taxation and slavery (see Scott 2009: 127-177).  
       Although these people must have been related to the ancestors of present-day 
Suku Asli and other orang asli in the eastern coast of Sumatra, it seems difficult to 
suggest that they are their direct ancestors because these peoples would have 
frequently moved from place to place in this era and many of them were absorbed in 
the state becoming ‘the Malays’ in the following periods. As Benjamin (2002: 8-9) 
pointed out, more than a few of such peoples became the Malays following the state 
control and adopting the ‘Malayu’ identity. For example, some of the Kubu became 
Malays before the nineteenth century (Andaya 2008: 205), and some of the Utan 
became Malays in the early nineteenth century, as mentioned below.  
 
 
The establishment of Siak kingdom and subordination to the state      
 
       After the Portuguese conquest of Melaka in 1511, the Malay kingdom was 
divided into two – that is, the Johor kingdom in the southern coast of the Malay 
Peninsula that the royal family of Melaka kingdom fled to and the Aceh kingdom in 
the northern edge of Sumatra that had been the successor of the Samudera/Pasai 
kingdom, a part of Srivijaya (Andaya 2008: 114-118). While the new Johor kingdom 
was targeted by the Portuguese and the Aceh kingdom during the sixteenth century, 
the centre of Malay culture and international trade in the Malacca Strait was 
dominated by the Aceh kingdom. The kingdom became prosperous as Middle-
Eastern traders sponsored it. As a result of the close communication with them, 
‘Malayu’ identity was increasingly associated with Islam between the sixteenth 
century and the first half of the seventeenth century (Andaya 2008: 108-145). On the 
other hand, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) took control of the trade in Java 
around the first half of the seventeenth century, and the Netherlands obtained power 
in the Indonesian archipelago. The VOC assisted the Johor kingdom and occupied 
Melaka in 1641. The VOC achieved dominance over trade in Sumatra, instead of the 
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Portuguese. In 1718, Raja Kecik, possibly a Minangkabau adventurer, took over the 
throne of the Johor kingdom with support of Minangkabau, Malay and Orang Laut 
communities in eastern Sumatra (T. Barnard 2003: 55-56). In 1722, a son of the 
former Sultan of Johor retrieved the throne from Raja Kecik with the support of the 
Bugis from southern Sulawesi. Raja Kecik fled to the coastal area of eastern Sumatra 
and established the Siak kingdom (T. Barnard 2003).  
       During this period, the eastern coast of central Sumatra emerged as an important 
supply centre of timber for shipbuilding with the increase in the number of European 
traders going back and forth. At the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning 
of the eighteenth century, the VOC and Johor kingdom signed a series of treaties for 
trading in timber (T. Barnard 1998: 90), and the VOC tried to obtain timber in this 
region. In harvesting the timber, it was necessary to seek the cooperation of local 
communities for the safety of the operations and the ability to trace the species of 
wood suitable for shipbuilding. In this situation, the Siak kingdom tried to control the 
forest and coastal dwellers. Between the eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth 
century, the forest and coastal dwellers were subsumed under state control (T. 
Barnard 1998: 92).  
       The earliest description of the forest and coastal dwellers around the mouth of 
the Siak River appears in some Dutch and British articles. Balthasar Bort (1927: 177) 
refers to the indigenous people living around Bengkalis Island in the mid-seventeenth 
century as ‘a Malay tribe of very uncivilised people, who live with their wives and 
children in their vessels among the islands roving hither and thither’. The people 
seem to be related to the Orang Laut who live mainly in the Riau-Lingga 
Archipelago at present. William Dampier, who sailed around the world and visited 
Melaka in 1689, recorded that Captain Johnson, who had gone to Bengkalis Island to 
buy a sloop, was killed on the coast between Bengkalis and Rupat Islands in an 
ambush at night by ‘a band of armed Malayans’ using canoes, and that a headman of 
the Johor kingdom at Bengkalis gave an account of it by arguing that the government 
could not control the ‘wild unruly Men, not subject to Government’ (Dampier 1906: 
41-44). These records show that there were people who were not subsumed under the 




        About a century later, one of such ‘folk’ groups appears in a Dutch record as, 
more or less, the subjects of the Siak kingdom (T. Barnard 1998: 91-93). In 1763, 
VOC officials at a post on Gontong Island at the mouth of the Siak River attempted 
to construct fences to protect the post from hostile forces, and they asked the king of 
Siak at that time, Raja Alam, to dispatch labourers to assist in cutting wood and 
constructing fences. Soon after the request, a group of the ‘king’s folk’ arrived and 
helped with the construction. After a certain period of labour, however, the ‘king’s 
folk’ refused to work any further despite the officials assuring them of payment for 
their work. Raja Alam sent his son to negotiate with the intransigent labourers (see T. 
Barnard 1998: 92-93). This event indicates that some of the forest and coastal 
dwellers were under the control of the kingdom to some extent in this era. The 
government gradually reinforced control over these forest dwellers, and eventually, 
the Siak rulers declared that they could supply a large amount of timber through their 
control by the early nineteenth century (T. Barnard 1998: 93).     
       It is remarkable that most of the forest and coastal dwellers were not completely 
subsumed under state control even after the state declared it. They maintained their 
position and identity as non-‘Malayu’ and avoided strong state control even after the 
nineteenth century. This is because their labour in the forest and its products were 
still important to the state in maintaining its commercial and political power. For the 
government the existence of orang asli living in peripheral areas was necessary as 
they were the suppliers of forest products to the state. As a result, they were not 
absorbed into the state. Rather, they enjoyed their autonomy and traditional ways of 
life in the forest, and they maintained their identity as distinct from ‘Malayu’. Their 
position was transformed into ethnicity in the manner of state control in the 
following period.  
 
 
Tribespeople in the state formation 
 
       Benjamin (2002: 8) explains the formulation of the tribespeople in the Malay 
world by employing the typological schema of ‘tribespeople–peasant–ruler’ in the 
state. Rulers are the people such as priests, tax collectors, soldiers and kings, and 
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peasants are ‘those who allow their lives to be controlled by agencies of the state, 
which they provision in exchange for a little reflected glory but no counter-control’ 
(2002: 9).7 On the other hand, tribespeople are those who ‘stand apart from the state 
and its rulers, holding themselves culturally aloof’ in a fashion where they accept the 
state system only to some extent (Benjamin 2002: 9, 15-16). This applies to the 
situation of tribespeople living in the coastal area of eastern Sumatra. The rulers and 
peasants are ‘Malayu’ people. On the other hand, the people who were not always 
subjugated to the state can be seen as the non-‘Malayu’, and this non-‘Malayu’ 
became the category of tribespeople or orang asli. In this meaning, ‘orang asli’ and 
‘Malayu’ or ‘orang Melayu’ are antonyms in the way the various group 
classifications developed. 
       On the other hand, Scott (2009) discusses the ethnogenesis of diverse 
tribespeople of mainland Southeast Asia by focusing on the political and economic 
relationship between the people and the state as well as the specific geographic 
setting. According to him, the communities of tribespeople, who live in the hilly 
areas with mosaic-like distributions, were formed by those who rejected state control 
or fled from the state that tried to extort labour and taxes from them. In this 
transaction between the tribespeople and the state, the hilly parts of inland Southeast 
Asia, called ‘Zomia’, took an essential role for the people as a shelter, which 
prevented the exertion of the power of the state that dominated valleys and coastal 
areas. While Scott’s argument focuses on mainland Southeast Asia, this seems to 
apply to the formation of the tribespeople on the eastern coast of Sumatra as well. In 
the development of the state polity, the people avoided state intervention in their 
lives, and their position as tribespeople or orang asli was formed. The numerous isles, 
inlets and channels covered by mangrove forests in this region could be a shelter. In 
this coastal forest, they tried to maintain their distance from state control, practising 
the less-integrated semi-nomadic ways of life in which the state hardly intervened. 
Their mobility, segmentation, and distance from the political centre were sustained 
by their low-population density in this region (cf. Trocki 1997: 87); the complex 
geography of the low and marshy lands penetrated by numerous channels, rivers and 
                                                          
7 The Malay world is the term used to indicate the region where the kingdoms of the Malays existed, 
i.e. the coasts of Borneo, the east coast of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula (Benjamin 2002: 7).   
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their tributaries; and the cultivation of sago palm as the staple food, which does not 
need intensive collective labour (T. Barnard 2003: 11-26).   
       However, there would also be a certain difference between the situation of the 
tribespeople in the mainland and coastal areas, as the political and geographic 
settings were different. Paddy cultivation in the valley areas sustained the mainland 
state, and its power mainly focused on organising populations and labours, or 
‘manpower’. Therefore, the state tried to strengthen its power and wealth through 
raids and taking slaves (Anderson 1990; Colombijn 2003a: 448-499), and people fled 
to the hilly areas that the state hardly exerted its power (Scott 2009). On the other 
hand, the maritime state in eastern Sumatra, which is generally unsuitable for paddy 
cultivation, was not only interested in ‘manpower’ but also in commodities that could 
be harvested in the forest. Although the state led slavery and piracy raids in coastal 
areas and exerted their power to the coastal areas to a certain extent, it did not try to 
absorb peripheral populations into the political and agricultural centres, as mentioned 
above. Rather, it tried to control the population by leaving them in the forest areas 
and maintaining trading communications (T. Barnard 2014). In this schema, while 
the peripheral populations were embedded in hierarchic and regional systems, they 
maintained some autonomy in the form of being legitimated by the state in the 
nineteenth century. Andaya summarises their situation as ‘Their ethnicization was 
[…] a deliberate effort to preserve a way of life that guaranteed their advantage and 
eventual survival from the intrusions of their numerically dominant Malayu 
neighbours’ (2008: 17). 
      Currently, many orang asli living upstream in east and south Sumatra, such as 
the Sakai, Bonai and Talang Mamak in present-day Riau and the Orang Rimba or the 
Suku Anak Dalam (or Kubu) in present-day Jambi, are thought to be derived from 
the Pagaruyung kingdom in western Sumatra. They have oral histories that imply 
their historical connections with the Pagaruyung kingdom and are more or less 
characterised by Minangkabau culture and the matrilineal descent system (Isjoni 
2002; Porath 2003; Sandbukt 1984). Yet, with regard to the Akit, Utan and Rawa in 
the coastal areas, there is no evidence implying their direct connection with the 
Minangkabau, and they have had little communication with upstream orang asli 
groups like the Sakai. Rather, they would have relations with Orang Asli groups in 
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Formation of the ethnic category under the Siak kingdom and Dutch 
colonial government  
 
The polity of the kingdom 
  
       Raja Kecik fled to Siak and established the Siak kingdom in 1723. Then, during 
the eighteenth century, the kingdom developed around the port of Siak Sri Inderapra 
and gained control over communities and ports not only in the Malacca Strait but 
also in the South China Sea by means of the charisma of its rulers, control over the 
commerce between ports, formation of kinship alliances between powerful 
communities and alliances with the VOC, and carrying out attacks and raids against 
hostile groups. By the end of the eighteenth century, this kingdom reached the peak 
of its growth (T. Barnard 2001:339-340, 2003: 116-123; Kathirithamby-Wells 1997: 
230-232). However, the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 allowed the Dutch to exert their 
influences on the Siak kingdom. In 1858, the Netherlands East Indies government 
and Sultan Ismail signed a treaty in which the kingdom was subsumed under the rule 
of the Dutch colonial government (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 270-271). Then, a 
series of treaties were signed during the late nineteenth century whereby the rights of 
taxation and some territories were handed over to the Dutch colonial government. In 
this process, the kingdom ceded Bengkalis Island, on which the Dutch government 
established its capital in 1875 to control the eastern coast of Sumatra (Hijmans van 
Anrooij 1885: 308).8 The Dutch government indirectly controlled the other areas 
through the Siak government. According to the treaties, the rights of taxation, such as 
import and export duties and passenger tax, were transferred from the kingdom to the 
government. This system of control continued until 1942, when the Japanese 
occupied the archipelago.  
                                                          
8 Bengkalis was the capital of Eastern Coast Province between 1875 and 1887. Then, it was moved to 
Deli in North Sumatra, present-day Medan. 
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       The early polity of the Siak kingdom was characterised by the ‘kacu-ness’ of its 
population (T. Barnard 2003). As I mentioned in the Introduction, ‘kacu’ means 
‘mixed’ or ‘not pure’ in Malay (T. Barnard 2003: 1). First, this implies the co-
existence of the Malays and Minangkabau in the kingdom. After the sixteenth 
century, an increasing number of Mingngkbau migrants flowed into the eastern 
lowlands from the western highlands and the Pagaruyung kingdom. This immigration 
was characterised by the pursuit of new trade-economic opportunities that connected 
the western highlands with the Malacca Strait. 9  They formed their settlements 
upstream on the Indragiri and Kampar Rivers, and traded gold, pepper, forest 
products such as camphor, bezoar and benzoin, and then tin (Andaya 2008: 88-91; T. 
Barnard 2003 12-18; Kathirithamby-Wells 1997). Raja Kecik is supposed to have 
been one of these migrants, and the migrants strongly supported the establishment of 
the kingdom. The people of Minangkabau descent formed the elite section of the 
kingdom, and they intermarried with indigenous Malays in the eastern lowlands. In 
this situation, for the Johor-Melaka Malays, who were seen as the true holders of the 
throne of the Malay state and as ‘pure’ Malay population, the Siak kingdom was 
‘kacu’. The elites of the Siak kingdom also recognised this. However, in the process 
of the state formation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Minangkabau 
and the Malays constructed a combined identity as the ‘Siak Malays’ (Andaya 2008: 
68-75; T. Barnard 2001: 339-340). Second, ‘kacu’ implies the actual diversity of the 
ways of life in this region. This area has a variety of environments that include 
hinterland hills and vast forests, large rivers and their labyrinthine tributaries, long 
channels, tidal mangrove swamps, and numerous islands and inlets. Such a complex 
geography sustained the diverse ways of life and the mobility of the population 
including the Minangkabau, the Malays and other forest and coastal dwellers (T. 
Barnard 2003: 2-3). The Siak kingdom had to establish a state system to integrate 
and control such diverse populations and geographic environments.   
       Based on this ‘kacu’ population, the kingdom established a hierarchic structure 
of the polity between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to Hijmans 
van Anrooij (1885: 311-353), the population was divided into two categories under 
                                                          
9 The words for the pursuit of the new economic opportunities on the river and sea coasts were 
‘merantau’, and for the migrants ‘perantau’. ‘Rantau’ means ‘reaches of the river’ or ‘shore-line’ 
(Andaya 2008: 89-90; see also, T. Barnard 2003: 13-15, Kathirithamby-Wells 1987: 40) 
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the sultan, i.e. sultan’s subjects and the empat suku. The empat suku (or four clans) 
were the people of Minangkabau descent and the elites of the kingdom. Their 
headmen or datuk were regarded as contributors to the state establishment and 
enjoyed a position at par with that of the sultan. They controlled their subjects, most 
of whom had their roots in western Sumatra. With almost complete economic and 
political autonomy, they were obliged to support the military affairs of the kingdom. 
The remainder of the population was under the sultan’s rule and was divided into 
three classes: i.e. anak raja, hamba raja and rakyat raja. The anak raja (king’s 
children) were literally the sultan’s kinsfolk. Although they possessed high titles and 
constituted the noble class in the kingdom, their economic and political power was 
not substantial. The hamba raja (the king’s subjects) were the ordinary citizens of 
the state. They were the Muslim Malays who were loyal to the sultan. While they had 
various rights in terms of land possession and fishing, they were obliged to pay taxes 
and be under the sultan’s control.  
       The third class, the rakyat raja (or king’s folk), was the lowest class in the state, 
and they kept their traditional headman, or batin. This category was also subdivided 
into to two classes, i.e. rakyat tantera and rakyat banang. 10 The rakyat tantera were, 
according to Hijmans van Anrooij, ‘nominal’ Muslims who had converted to Islam a 
short time ago and included the Orang Talang (the present-day Petalangan) living in 
the forest of Pelalawan region, the Rakyat Laut going back and forth along the coasts 
(the Orang Laut), the subjects of the four batin in Bengkalis Island (they are regarded 
as the ordinary Malays today), and so forth. The rakyat banang were non-Muslims; 
they were the Sakai, Akit, Utan and Rawa. The rakyat tantera were Muslims, so they 
were recognised as possessing the communal forest or utan tanah. However, because 
rakyat banang were not Muslims, Islamic law considered the forests they inhabited 
as the sultan’s possession.  
       Hijmans van Anrooij (1885: 324, 337) suggests that the boundaries between the 
hamba raja and the rakyat raja and those between the rakyat tantera and the rakyat 
banang were based on the degree of their belief in Islam. However, in the Siak 
kingdom, while religion was a part of the polity, it was not one of its foundations (T. 
                                                          
10 Hijmans van Anrooij (1885) does not mention the translations of these categories, and I could not 
confirm the meanings of ‘tantera’ and ‘banang’ in this usage. 
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Barnard 2001: 333, Colombijn 2003a: 510-511). In addition, given the fact that the 
highest class, the empat suku, obtained their privileges from their contributions to the 
state establishment, their contributions to the state seem to have been much more 
important than their actual religion. Thus, these hierarchic classifications were based 
on the communities’ loyalty and contribution – that is, the degree of subordination – 
to the state.  
       While the vertical boundaries reflected the degree of subordination to the state, 
the horizontal categories were established based on the region where the people lived. 
The kingdom legitimated local headmen of the communities as formal headmen in 
the polity and controlled the population through them. The Bab Al-Qawa’id, the Siak 
government published in 1903, addressed the headmen of each region in the kingdom 
(see Junus 2002: 69-76). The kingdom legitimated around two hundred headmen. 
The titles of the headmen were various such as datuk, penghulu, and tua-tua. These 
titles were addressed in sets including a name of a place and the name of a 
community. The subjects to each headman were referred to as the headman’s ‘anak 
buah’ which means nephew and niece or, more broadly, collateral descendants, in 
Malay (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 288). In the net of vertical and horizontal 
boundaries that was created by the state, a part of the people, who lived in peripheral 
inland and coastal forests, gradually became marginalised from the people 
subordinated to the state during the two centuries of the Siak kingdom and the Dutch 
colonial government. 11 
       Although Hijmans van Anrooij describes the position of the rakyat raja, 
especially the rakyat banang, as marginalised and discriminated in the state 
hierarchy, they were not marginalised or discriminated in a simple and fixed fashion. 
First, while the social structure was a hierarchic one, the boundaries of each class 
were vague and fluid; people could move to different categories through conversion 
and marriage. Indeed, a part of the Utan living in Tebing Tinggi and Rangsang 
Islands converted to Islam and obtained the status of the rakyat tantera before the 
end of the nineteenth century (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 355). In the same way, the 
subjects of the four batin in Bengkalis Island, who had been seen as hamba raja in 
                                                          
11 J.S.G. Gramberg (1864: 503-504), a Dutch official, presented the poverty of the Utan living around 
Bengkalis Island in term of their clothes and houses in his voyage diary in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Their marginalisation in relation to the Malays was already clear in this period.  
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the Siak kingdom, have called themselves and been seen as ordinary Malays or 
hamba raja, at latest, before the independence of Indonesia. Second, rakyat raja 
were essential to the rulers’ authority in the state. The state and the various 
populations had much respect for the rakyat raja owing to their supernatural power – 
they were believed to have strong supernatural powers or magic (ilmu). The rulers of 
the Siak kingdom tried to absorb their supernatural powers through trade relations 
and marriage and to utilise it as a part of their charismatic authority, or daulat 
(Andaya 2008: 216; T. Barnard 2003: 27-29; see also Chapter 5). Finally, although 
the Islamic law did not recognise the land right of the non-Muslims, i.e. rakyat 
banang, the right seem to have been recognised to some extent at local level. Indeed, 
for example, when the Javanese migrated into the area in which the Utan lived, they 
had to ask the Utan headman for permission and to make a contribution living in the 
area (see also Chapter 3). This means that the land rights must have been respected at 
the local level to some extent, because rakyat banang were the indigenous people, or 
orang asli, who were thought to have lived in the region before the state formed. On 
the other hand, although the empat suku were the elites of the state, they did not 
possess the communal forests because they were not indigenous to this region but 
immigrants from western Sumatra (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 317). 
 
 
Suku as a regional political unit 
 
      In the Siak polity, the concept of ‘suku’ played on an essential role. At present, 
this term implies for city dwellers ‘tribe’ or ‘inferior culture’ in rural areas (Benjamin 
2002: 16-17; Wilkinson 1957: 1129-1130). However, the term ‘suku’ in the Siak 
kingdom had an obviously different implication from the present negative one. In 
fact, ‘suku’ was used with the meaning of ‘clan’ or ‘community’ in the Bab Al-
Qawa’id 12 and the elite of the kingdom, i.e. the empat suku, was also referred to as 
                                                          
12 Together with ‘suku’, a term ‘hinduk’ is also frequently used for the meaning of ‘clan’ or 
‘community’ in the Bab Al-Qawa’id. Although the difference between ‘hinduk’ and ‘suku’ is unclear, 
these terms would have been differentiated based on the subdivision (negeri propinsi) of the 
kingdom (see Junus 2002: 71). Tenas Effendy implies that ‘hinduk’ indicates a subdivision group 
under ‘suku’ (Effendy 2002: 364). Benjamin, translator of Effendy’s article, notes that while the 
meaning of ‘hinduk’ here is unclear, ‘hinduk’ means ‘mother’ in a Malay dialect (Effendy 2002: 381). 
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‘suku’. It was used for indicating local communities neutrally as a political unit under 
a headman such as batin, penghulu and datuk. Even at present, ‘suku’ is often used 
without any negative connotations by not only orang asli but also the Malays and the 
Javanese, at least in the rural areas in the eastern coasts.  
       The term ‘suku’ would have been introduced to the Siak polity by the 
Minangkabau elites from western Sumatra. 13 According to Joel Kahn (1993: 155-
160), the Minangkabau term ‘suku’ can be translated as ‘clan’, which is characterised 
as being matrilineal. In the Minangkabau political system in the colonial era, each 
suku had a collective name and a single headman, or panghulu, who controlled the 
selling and buying of paddy fields. The fields were regarded not only as the 
individual property of a female, but also common property of the suku members as a 
whole. Although the matrilineal character of the clan disappeared 14 and paddy fields 
were very limited in eastern Sumatra, the Siak polity would have adopted the term 
‘suku’ with a similar idea. The kingdom established people’s category based on the 
(imagined) kin group as suku that was composed of anak buah of a headman, gave 
collective names to each suku, and legitimated the control of their territory. By doing 
so, they controlled the population and obtained the commodities harvested in the 
forest. On the other hand, the local headmen were granted the right to control their 
communal forest as a territory. As a result, people, who lived in peripheral forests 
and coasts, were integrated and differentiated as the regional political unit of the suku. 
       In this period, the kingdom was interested in not only controlling ‘manpower’ 
but also ‘territory’ as a result of the influences of the VOC and the Dutch colonial 
government (cf. Duncan 2004a: 6-7). In accordance with this shift in interests, the 
kingdom would have needed to control not only the ports and settlements, where the 
kingdom could control the population and obtain regular taxes, but also peripheral 
coasts and forests where people lived. The kingdom tried to control such peripheral 
                                                          
13 Edwin Loeb (1934: 29) asserts that the term ‘suku’ originated from the Minangkabau pointing out 
that ‘suku’ in Malay had different meanings as ‘leg’ or ‘fourth part’.  On the other hand, the Orang 
Laut in the Riau-Lingga Archipelago also use the term ‘suku’ to denote sub-division of groups. 
However, this term indicated mainly territorial and hierarchic occupational groups in the Riau 
kingdom, not clan (Chou 2010: 20-25). 
14 While the Minangkabau have a matrilineal descent system, the Malays in eastern Sumatra had 
patrilineal and bilateral or non-lineal descent systems. Therefore, on their intermarriage, there was 
an adat in which the first, third, fifth (and so on) children in a household belonged to the mother’s 
descent, and the second, fourth and sixth ones belonged to the father’s descent (Hijmans van 
Anrooij: 1885: 317).    
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areas as its territory by legitimating the people living in the areas and maintaining the 
boundaries with other kingdoms (Porath 2003: 15). In this process, it was essential 
for the state to array the population on the map and characterise them by giving them 
collective names for controlling the population easily and effectively (Scott 1998: 1-
83). Orang asli were also given the collective names and headmanship based on the 
region that they inhabited. 
       In designating boundaries on the criterion of region in this manner, the Siak 
kingdom ignored the people’s social and cultural boundaries, communication, 
heterogeneity or homogeneity. As a result, this horizontal boundary among the 
people was much more flexible and vague than the vertical ones. This was especially 
the case among the people living in the coastal islands, who frequently moved from 
place to place via the sea, channels and rivers. Thus, not surprisingly, some Dutch 
observers, who would have been interested in the social and cultural characteristics 
of the tribespeople, emphasised their lack of understanding of the differences 
between the Akit, Utan, Rawa and others. For example, Hijimans van Anlooij 
pointed out the vague distinction and significance of mobility between the Utan and 
the Rawa as follows:  
 
There seems to be no essential distinction between them. At least, the Rawa are 
the Utan living along and near to Rawa River. They are going back and forth, 
sometimes from mainland to the islands of opposite shore, and then to mainland 
again. (1885: 352 [my translation])  
 
J. Tideman (1935: 14) also addressed his supposition that the Rawa might be another 
name for the Akit. Also, he states that the Utan in the Siak kingdom were the same 
people as the Mantang (Orang Mantang) living in present-day Kampar regency, who 
are regarded as a regional group of the Orang Laut (Chou 2010: 6-7).  
       In addition, Hans Kähler (1960), a German ethno-linguist, refers to the 
heterogeneity of the people called the Utan. Kähler visited the two Utan villages of 
‘Tandjung Səsap’ and ‘Djanggut’ in Tebing Tinggi Island in 1939. He sketched the 
customs, such as marriage, funeral, pregnancy and circumcision, of each village in a 
few pages. The important fact is that he divided the descriptions of the two villages 
into different sections. Although he did not explain it, this would imply that he 
recognised a certain cultural diversity between them. Furthermore, their vocabularies 
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were different to some extent. The kingdom would have attempted to reduce such 
segmentation and heterogeneity among similar and mobile populations into the 
category of the Utan in order to govern them more easily and effectively by the 
hierarchic and regional political structure.  
       In short, the term ‘suku’, which is used in the present ethnonym ‘Suku Asli’, was 
formulated in the Siak kingdom. Although this term is used to imply ‘backward’ and 
‘primitive’ tribespeople, it was a regional political unit based on kinship or a class of 
the state hierarchy rather than ethnicity in a primordial fashion. The unit of ‘suku’ 
was not always concerned with the cultural and social boundaries. ‘Suku Utan’, 
‘Suku Akit’ and ‘Suku Rawa’ are the collective names imposed by the state for 
regional distinction of the units, despite the fact that their social and cultural 
boundaries were vague and fluid.  
 
 
The process and degree of subordination to the state 
 
       The implications of the state’s imposition of collective names on the 
tribespeople in the Dutch colonial records correspond with the history of orang asli 
in this region. The Akit living in Rupat Island recognise that a sultan of the kingdom 
gave them the collective names ‘Akit’ and ‘Utan’ and their territories. They have 
relatively a detailed oral history about their immigration to Rupat, subordination to 
the kingdom, and receipt of their collective names. 15  
       According to the history, their ancestors came to this island somewhere ‘from 
the east (dari timur)’.16 They frequently moved from place to place by canoes, and 
eventually entered the territory of the Siak kingdom. However, animals such as the 
                                                          
15  Their history was recorded in two reports. One is the ‘Proyek Pembinaan Kesejahteraan 
Masyarakat Terasing Hutan Panjang (Development and Welfare Project of Suku Terasing in Hutan 
Panjang)’ edited by the Department of Social Affairs in Pekanbaru (Kantor Wilayah Departomen 
Sosial Propinsi Riau 1979). Another is ‘Mengenang Sejarah Perjuangan Batin Pantjang di Kampung 
Titi Akar (Memoir of the History of Batin Patjang’s Struggle)’ edited by the village office of Titi Akar at 
the beginning of the 1980s (Kantor Desa Titi Akar n.d.). Both reports were based on the interview 
with Akit elders at that time. The given description is based on these two reports and my interviews 
during my fieldwork in Titi Akar and Hutan Panjang, Rupat, between 2006 and 2007. 
16 In different versions, they came to the mouth of the Siak River from the region of Mandau, which 
is upstream of Siak River. This had been the region of the Sakai. Indeed, there was a region in 
upstream Siak where people called the Akit (Akit Penguling) lived (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 302-
303, 350-351). However, the relationship between them is unknown. 
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tigers and elephants in this place threatened them, so they moved to Padang Island 
and lived there for a while. However, because they were still threatened by wild 
animals, they moved again. They found a safe place on Rupat Island, which, however, 
the Orang Rempang already inhabited. 17 The Orang Rempang agreed to concede the 
land in exchange for gifts of silver and gold. As the ancestors did not have the gifts, 
they went to Bukit Batu, and asked the Datuk Laksamana, a Malay title of the Siak 
kingdom, to support them. He accepted their request but asked them to support the 
construction of a court (istana) at Bukit Batu in exchange for the gifts. He divided 
them into three groups for labour as follows: 
 
(1) The group that cut down the trees in the forest: Suku Utan (the group of the 
forest).  
(2) The group that made rafts using the timbers and transported them to the 
destination: Suku Akit (the group of the raft). 
(3) The group that constructed the paths and cleaned the rivers for timber 
transportation (mehatas): Suku Hatas (the group of the hatas).  
 
After completing the labour, they received the gifts from Datuk Laksamana and 
obtained the land in Rupat. The sultan of the kingdom also recognised their right to 
live in the place. Suku Akit obtained the area ‘upstream’ of the Morong Channel, 
which penetrates Rupat Island; namely, the present-day village of Hutan Panjang. 
Suku Hatas took the area ‘downstream’; namely, the present-day Titi Akar. These 
groups have been living in Rupat and both groups identify themselves as the Akit 
today. 18 On the other hand, Suku Utan received the place of Tanjung Padang in 
Padang Island, or, in a different version, Bantan, the northern coast of Bengkalis 
Island. The state legitimated their headmen, batin, and they have since lived in 
respective territories.  
       This event occurred at the turn of the nineteenth century. 19 It is uncertain to 
what extent this oral history reflects the historical facts, because it does not explain 
                                                          
17 Orang Rempang is a group of the Orang Laut (Chou 2004: 128). According to the oral history, after 
giving the land to the Akit, they moved to the Riau-Lingga archipelago. 
18 Although it is very usual that the population of the both villages identify themselves as 
‘Orang/Suku Akit’, the people in Titi Akar may refer to themselves as ‘Orang/Suku Akit-Hatas’. 
19 According to the report of Titi Akar, the first batin in Titi Akar took the role between 1816 and 
1883, though these years are obviously estimated ones. In addition, the role of Datuk Laksamana in 
Bukit Batu was established in the latter half of the eighteenth century by Raja Ismail of the Siak 
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the origin of the Utan living in distant places such as Mendol Island. In addition, 
there is a different view of the origin of the name ‘Akit’ based on one of their 
customs. 20  Rather, it seems to be more probable that there were similar but 
distinctive orang asli groups around this region. When the state exerted its control to 
these people, the state re-allied these populations giving them either the name of 
‘Akit’ or ‘Utan’, which would have been ambiguously used to indicate coastal or 
forest dwellers. This event would have happened as a part of the process of state 
control. Yet, it is certain that the Akit in Rupat and a part of the Utan or Suku Asli at 
present in Bengkalis recognise that they obtained their position as ‘suku’ in the 
kingdom, their territory and collective names through this event.  
      The peoples of different regions would have also been subsumed under the 
control of kingdom in more or less similar ways. Nevertheless, the degree of 
subordination to the kingdom varied. For example, the people who lived in the inland 
forest of Pelalawan and conducted the slash-and-burn cultivation of dry rice were 
subsumed under the polity accepting the name ‘Orang Talang’. According to Tenas 
Effendy (2002: 364), ‘talang’ refers to ‘middle man’ or ‘trader’. They had somewhat 
closer relations with the kingdom than other forest and coastal dwellers. They 
engaged in serahan trades, which connected the inland forests and the sea-coastal 
areas through bartering forest products and salt, iron or cloths; they regularly paid 
taxes for rice and beeswax to the state; and they converted to Islam relatively earlier 
(Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 337-342), and they are the present-day Petalangan. In 
addition, the people on the upstream Mandau River, a tributary of the Siak River, 
were called ‘Orang Sakai’. ‘Sakai’ implied ‘slavery and debt bondage’ in the past, 
and forest dwellers in different regions in the Malay World are often referred to by 
                                                                                                                                                                    
kingdom (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 332-333). Therefore, this event would have occurred around 
1800.   
20 Some colonial records state a different view of the origin of their name. The name, Orang Akit, was 
derived from their custom of building a house on a raft and living in it (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 
303; Loeb 1935:  294), and Max Moszcowski took a photograph of such house at the beginning of 
twentieth century at the midstream of the Siak River (Moszcowski 1909: 36). According to old Akit 
informants in Rupat, they have never seen such houses on rafts. Moszcowski’s photograph was 
probably of the people called as ‘Orang Akit Penguling’ (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 303) who lived in 
mid-stream Siak. While Hijmans van Anrooij (1885: 358-359) states that the ‘Orang Akit Penguling’ 
also immigrated to Rupat together with the ‘Orang Akit’ and ‘Orang Hatas’ mentioned above, I did 





the same collective name (Porath 2000: 177). They were important to the kingdom in 
terms of military affairs because they lived sparsely in the boundary area between the 
Siak and Rokan kingdoms. They also engaged in serahan trade. However, the 
kingdom controlled them less; they rarely paid the taxes that they were obligated to 
pay in the form of forest products (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 347-350; Porath 2003: 
1-25).  
       The degree of subordination to the kingdom of the Utan, Akit and Rawa was 
almost the same as that of the Sakai. They were obliged to supply timber to the sultan 
(Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 359). However, the rule was reinforced regularly. At 
present, the Akit and Suku Asli do not remember any regular taxation or corvée 
imposed by the state except for the corvée mentioned above and occasional tributary 
communication with the sultan (see Chapter 4). While they lived near to the 
seacoasts where the state could access them relatively easily, the state control was 
limited as their settlements were scattered along the coasts across the labyrinthine 
rivers covered by thick mangrove forests. The state was interested only in controlling 
the lands as territory for timber in this region rather than the population. Therefore, 
after the middle of the nineteenth century, the Siak kingdom established a system to 
obtain resources and taxes from the Chinese and European enterprises, not the orang 
asli, as mentioned below in this section.   
       Although this seems to be an unreliable census, Hijmans van Anrooij (1885: 
358-360) gives the numbers of the orang asli population in the late nineteenth 
century as: the Sakai – 4000 to 5000 people; the Akit in Rupat – around 200 people; 
the Rawa around Rawa River – from 20 to 130 people; and the Utan – about 200 
people in Padang Island, 300 people in Merbau, and 600 to 700 people in both 
Tebing Tinggi and Rangsang Islands.  
       The orang asli communities did not always accept the collective names such as 
‘Suku Utan’, ‘Suku Akit’ and ‘Suku Sakai’, because the state-designated categories 
were rather ‘exonyms’ that outsiders used. On the one hand, the Akit accepted the 
name ‘Orang Akit’ relatively earlier. They have used the collective name without 
resistance together with ‘orang asli’ to date. On the other hand, the Sakai identified 
themselves as ‘orang batin (people under the batin headman)’ in the past, and they 
prefer to call themselves orang asli even today. Porath (2002: 771, 2003: 3-4) 
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identifies them as ‘upstream Mandau people’ when he mentions them before the 
1960s, because they accepted the collective name ‘Orang Sakai’ only after this 
period. In a similar way, the people called ‘Orang Utan’ in Bengkalis Island resisted 
being called this, because this expression was directly connected not only with 
forests but also with apes. They called themselves orang asli, or even ‘Orang Akit’ 
when they needed to use their collective names, while accepting the status or class of 
‘Suku Hutan’ in the state polity (see also Chapters 2 and 4). 
 
 
The early records of the Utan and involvement in trade 
     
        Although orang asli political communication with the state was rather limited, 
their life was far from isolated. Their connection with the state in the economic 
sphere was continuously maintained, as they engaged in trade. In the mid-nineteenth 
century, some European writings mentioned a group called the Utan as the suppliers 
of sago and forest products. Singapore Chronicles issued on 15th Feb 1827 mentions 
the Utan living in ‘Appong’, present-day Mendol Island (see Map 1), as follows:    
    
At Appong, the sago is made by Orang Utan, or people of the woods, who speak 
a jargon of Malayan, are not Mohammedans, and eat hogs, deer, etc. with which 
their island abounds; and the maritime Malays, who visit them for sago, are 
obliged to be always upon their guard, and not unfrequently wait two months for 
the cargo […] ; if they take money to purchase, they get it quicker, but require 
additional caution in making advances. There are said to be about 350 souls, and 
that the produce might be put down 3,000 piculs a year. The most of these 
people are dependants of Siak and Campar; the chiefs of former place exercising 
a system of extortion and rapine, enough to induce any other class of people less 
accustomed, to desert the place. The cultivators in other places are Malays, and 
much superior, though their exports are severally less; and trafficking with them 
is not so dangerous or uncertain. (Singapore Chronicle 1827)  
 
As far as I know, this is the first account that mentions the Utan living on the islands 
of the estuary areas of Siak and Kampar Rivers. Mendol Island is within the area that 
the Utan have historically moved around, and some present-day Suku Asli in 
Bengkalis Island have relatives and friends on this island. In addition, J. H. Moor 
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describes briefly the population living between Rangsang and Bengkalis Islands, who 
were also engaging in the cultivation of sago, as follows: 
 
[These islands are] partly inhabited by Malays but chiefly by another race not 
yet converted to mahomedanism. Rantao (present-day Rangsang), a low marshy 
island, produces by far the lager quantity of raw sago which is imported into 
Malacca and Singapore, for the manufacture of pearl sago, and has become, 
within the last few years, so large and important an article of export to Europe. 
The unconverted race now mentioned, and not the Malays, are the sole 
cultivators and preparers of the sago. (1837: 98) 
 
In this article, the collective name of the ‘the unconverted race’ is not mentioned, but 
it must be related to the Utan. In addition to sago, they engaged in the trade of forest 
products such as wild boar meat and the ivory of elephants and rhinoceroses (T. 
Barnard 2003: 26).  
       Their trades of various forest products with outsiders gradually converged in 
harvesting timber. In 1824, the Johor kingdom ceded Singapore to Britain, and 
Singapore rapidly became a prosperous centre trading within the whole of Asia. The 
dramatic rise in the population led to increase in demand for timber for the 
construction of buildings, so the eastern coasts of Sumatra became an important 
supply centre. In this situation, the Siak kingdom granted the rights to harvest timber 
in its realm to Singapore at the beginning of the 1850s (T. Barnard 1998: 94-95). 
This system is the panglong system. 21 In this system, about one and a half million 
hectares of forestlands along the eastern coast were designated as ‘panglong area 
(panglong-gebied)’ and the Siak government relegated the harvesting and export of 
timber to European and Chinese companies in Singapore and Bengkalis town 
(Tideman 1935: 3). In exchange for this, the government obtained taxes for each 
labourer sent by the companies. Almost all of the labourers were Chinese men who 
were employed from southern China (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 309; Tideman 
1935: 18-20). As a result, many Chinese timber mills and labourers moved to the 
forest areas in this region. 22  
                                                          
21 ‘Panglong’ means ‘timber’ in Hakka language (Tideman 1935: 19; T. Barnard 1998: 94) or 
‘enterprise’ (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 307). This term is still used in Suku Asli-Chinese society in 
Bengkalis, but it mainly means ‘charcoal hut’ that produces charcoal for export. 
22 The immigration of the ethnic Chinese was so large scale that Siak government tried to regulate 
the number of immigrants at the end of nineteenth century (Tideman 1935: 19-20). 
60 
 
       The forests of the Utan, Akit and Rawa territories were involved in this 
‘panglong area’, probably because their land rights could be ignored according to the 
principle that the non-Islamic population could not possess land in the Islamic 
kingdom. After the Chinese companies penetrated their forests, the Utan, Akit and 
Rawa were also employed as labourers. In exchange for their labour, they obtained 
cloth, iron tools, rice and money from the Chinese merchants. The dealings involving 
timber for construction were gradually reduced in the twentieth century because of 
the Great Depression from the end of the 1920s (Tideman 1935: 21), the unrest 
caused by the Japanese incursion into Southeast Asia in the 1940s,  and probably a 
reduction in number of suitable large trees. Therefore, timber trade diminished in the 
mid-twentieth century.23  Instead, the importance of trade in charcoal made from 
mangrove timber and exported to Singapore and Malaysia has increased. Even today, 
the logging of mangrove timber is the main source of cash income for most of the 
Utan or Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa (see Chapter 3).  
       After the introduction of the ‘panglong system’, the orang asli in the Siak 
estuary established kinship and close economic and political connections with the 
ethnic Chinese. Some Chinese men married orang asli women, and they are the 
ancestors of peranakan in present-day Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa communities. 
According to Tideman (1935: 14), one of the batin among the Rawa in the 1930s was 
an ethnic Chinese. The connection between them and the ethnic Chinese has been 
reinforced for a century, and constructed a specific ethnic identity and category in 
their society (see Chapter 2).   
       To sum up, in terms of the state control of the Siak kingdom and the Dutch 
colonial government, the state related to forest and coastal dwellers through 
employing them as labourers in the forests and on the coasts, and subsumed them 
under state control. The state gave them collective names, territories and 
headmanships. Therefore, ‘the Sakai’, ‘the Akit’, ‘the Rawa’ and ‘the Utan’ are 
ethnic categories given by the Siak kingdom while ignoring their actual indigenous 
identification and practices. However, the categorisation of populations in this period 
focused more on forming the state polity encompassing the ‘kacu’ populations as a 
                                                          
23 The influences of the World Depression and the Japanese incursion would be so disruptive even in 
this peripheral area. Some old Suku Asli informants remember that their standard of life dropped 
disastrously before and just after the Japanese occupation. 
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whole rather than on controlling the specific populations in peripheral and marginal 
locations. While the state succeeded in making the forest and coastal dwellers its 
subjects, the state did not directly intervene in their lives except for the purpose of 
categorisation, and almost ignored them. Therefore, although the people accepted the 
territory and headmanship that were beneficial for them, they did not always accept 
the collective names and identities. They maintained their autonomy or segmentation 
in relation to the state and retained their marginalised position while accepting the 
Chinese incomers through marriages. In this way, the relationship between the 
tribespeople and the state, characterised by the economic connection and political 
separation, was maintained until the twentieth century, though their relationship was 
much reinforced under the rule of the Siak kingdom.  
       This relationship changed after Indonesia gained independence. The group and 
headmanship categories changed from regional political units or classes to becoming 
part and parcel of the objectives of development programmes in the Indonesian 




As the subjects of development policies 
 
Masyarakat terasing or ‘isolated society’ 
 
       After a short period of Japanese occupation (1942-1945) and the Indonesian War 
of Independence (1945-1949), the archipelago declared independence in 1945 as the 
Republic of Indonesia and achieved it in 1949. Afterwards, Indonesia experienced 
changes of regimes, i.e. Sukarno’s Old Order (1949-1967), Suharto’s New Order 
regime (1967- 1998), and the present post-Suharto regime (1998- ). The government 
of this nation state of vast areas divided by the sea and including diverse populations 
faced the necessity of integrating the rural populations into ‘the Indonesians’, so they 
intervened in their life under the banner of ‘development’.  
       During the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, government policies were 
characterised by centralised sovereignty, and they tried to control the local 
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population, territory and resources by claiming the priority of the state and ignoring 
the rights of the local populations, as I mentioned in the Introduction. During the 
Sukarno regime, although the government tried to legally recognise the customary 
rights of rural communities based on the idea of ‘adat community’ that was formed 
during the Dutch colonial era, the government failed to implement the reforms 
because the bureaucracy was limited in exerting authority in the local areas (Li 2007: 
52-53; see also Chapter 5). For example, according to the Basic Agrarian Law of 
1960, when customary land rights and national law contradicted each other, it was 
customary law that had to be amended. The state had the right to regulate and exploit 
all natural resources (Porath 2000: 182). It is also remarkable that the rise of anti-
communism in the late 1960s brought about the reinforcement of control over 
peripheral areas. There were considerable government interventions in local societies, 
because the government feared the peripheral areas and their populations might 
become a hotbed for communism (Duncan 2004a: 8). 
       During the Suharto regime, the pursuit of centralised sovereignty was 
strengthened further. President Suharto took office in 1968, and referred to himself 
as the ‘Father of Development’ (Bapak Pembangunan) (Heryanto 1988: 20-21). This 
‘development’ meant, primarily, the ‘modernisation’ of the state or rising economic 
profits and constructing infrastructure. Under his development programmes, many 
mines, oilfields and industrial companies were established, and many roads, dams, 
plantations and factories were constructed. The various development schemes were 
designed primarily to pursue economic profits only for the government and a limited 
number of people associated with it. When the government claimed to achieve more 
‘efficient’ usage of land, many Indonesians in rural areas did not receive any benefits, 
and even lost their ancestral lands (Li 2007: 58). The Basic Forestry Law of 1967 
was generally interpreted as claiming that all rights over forest areas resided in the 
state (Henley & Davidson 2007: 11). In addition, this kind of development 
programme had the purpose of ‘civilising’ peripheral populations with the aim of 
limiting the influence of communism rather than raising their standard of living. 
Porath (2002: 791) cites the following comment made about this regime by a Riau-
Malay intellectual: ‘the Suharto government wanted the land without its peoples 
(Riau tampa orangnya)’.  
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       Under these development schemes, the government, mainly the Department of 
Social Affairs, set up the category of, first, suku-suku terasing (isolated tribes) and 
then, masyarakat terasing (isolated communities) (Persoon 1998: 287-288). The 
purpose of setting up this category was to classify those who lived in peripheral areas 
and were regarded as ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’ and to integrate them with ‘rural 
Indonesians’ (Duncan 2004a:1-5; Persoon 1998: 287-289; Porath 2010: 275). At first, 
not many people who were living in extreme poverty were regarded as suku-suku 
terasing. In particular, the Kubu or the Orang Rimba in Jambi and the Mentawaians 
in the islands of western Sumatra were referred to as such people. The government 
implemented some projects to improve their life, though the impact was limited 
(Persoon 1998: 287). Then, the number dramatically increased between the mid-
1960s and 1980, in which while it was estimated at thirty thousand people in the 
mid-1960s,  it increased to 1.7 million in 1980 (Persoon 1998: 288). In accordance 
with the increase, the category was changed to masyarakat terasing in the mid-1970s. 
These peoples were the main targets of the development programmes that the 
Department of Social Affairs implemented.     
       It is remarkable that the categorisation of suku-suku terasing or masyarakat 
terasing did not have strict criteria and was a product of the government imagination 
(Persoon 1998: 289). Probably, the category was first established by the central 
government in a top-down way based on the image of the people in ‘primitive’ and 
‘backward’ situations. Then the province and regency governments reported to 
Jakarta some groups in their regions as suku-suku terasing. In this process, the local 
governments seem to identify the groups based on the category of the local histories. 
They defined the people whom they had regarded as tribespeople during the pre-
colonial and colonial eras as suku-suku terasing, and ignored the peoples’ actual 
economic situation, ways of life, self-identification and their changes. The dramatic 
increase in number of masyarakat terasing in the period seemed to have resulted 
from this process. In other words, the pre-colonial and colonial categorisation of the 
people who were not subjugated to the state was inherited and consolidated by the 




       The local government of Riau designated the locals as suku-suku terasing or 
masyarakat terasing obviously under the influence of the classification formed in the 
colonial era, not necessarily considering the people’s actual economic situations and 
socio-cultural boundaries and mobility. According to a report written by Riau 
government in 2005 (Pemerintah Propinsi Riau 2005), the government recognised six 
groups as the KAT: the Akit, the Bonai, the Orang Laut, the Utan, the Sakai and the 
Talang Mamak. 24 The Talang Mamak and Bonai lived in the realms of the Indragiri 
and Rokan kingdoms respectively in situations similar to the tribespeople of the Siak 
kingdom. On the other hand, the Malays were not included in the list at all, although 
some of them would have lived in similar economic conditions. As a result, although 
the suku system in the Siak kingdom was abolished, the colonial era hierarchic 
classification and groups’ names have remained as the formal political category in 
post-colonial Indonesia, thereby transforming the people involved into the subjects of 
the development projects. 
      The main concrete development project imposed on the people of suku-suku 
terasing or masyarakat terasing was resettlement and the construction of houses 
(Duncan 2004b: 93-94; Persoon 1998: 290-291). The government brought together 
the forest dwellers living in sparsely populated areas, moved them to newly 
constructed settlements near the coasts or roads that were made accessible by the 
government, and encouraged them to establish a community as rural Indonesians. By 
doing so, the government could control them easily and effectively, obtain the 
resources of the forest without any concern for the inhabitants, and prevent the rise of 
communism. In addition, the government encouraged many Javanese and Balinese, 
who were regarded as ‘civilised’ rural populations and lived in high population 
density areas, to immigrate to the peripheral areas inhabited by masyarakat terasing. 
By doing so, the government could fill the population-devoid areas in the territory 
and bring ‘modernisation’ and ‘civilisation’ to the masyarakat terasing through 
communication between the migrants and the local populations.  
       In Riau, the resettlement projects targeting suku terasing or masyarakat terasing 
were also rolled out. For example, just before independence, oilfields began to be 
                                                          
24 In the government category of masyarakat terasing or KAT, the Rawa who are clearly mentioned 
in past records and live in present Siak regency are always omitted. They would be included in the 
Akit or Utan. The government often confuse them even today. 
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established in Mandau region, and the Sakai forests became a major oilfield. To 
access the oilfield, the Caltex oil company began to construct roads throughout their 
rainforest. Following the expansion of the oilfields and roads, North Sumatrans (the 
Bataks), Javanese and West Sumatrans (the Minangkabau) migrated to the area and 
built settlements along the roads. Many Sakai sold their lands to such migrants, and 
moved to the settlements near the roads that gave them easy access to various 
sources of income. The government often constructed such settlements with Islamic 
mosques where the Sakai could pray together (Porath 2002). In the same way, an oil 
company made a foray into the forest areas along the Rawa River between the 1980s 
and 1990s. The government and the company assembled hundreds of people who had 
lived scattered through the forest and been called the Rawa in the Siak kingdom, and 
constructed a new administrative village on the sea coast. Yet, in the islands of the 
Siak estuary including Bengkalis and Rupat Islands, the government did not conduct 
the resettlement of the Akit and Utan. However, projects for Javanese immigration 
into these islands have been intermittently implemented since the 1970s (see Chapter 
3). In addition, the government occasionally constructed dozens of new houses as 
small development projects for them near the roads and coasts.   
       The people who were in the lowest class in the Siak kingdom were transformed 
into suku-suku terasing as the subjects of development programmes in the 
government quest for control of the land and resources and ‘civilisation’ of the 
people. The word ‘suku-suku’, the plural form of ‘suku’, simply shows their position 
in the state; the word refers to ‘primitive and backward tribes’, rather than its neutral 
meaning in the Siak kingdom. Although the government category changed to 
masyarakat terasing later, suku terasing had been used to indicate ‘primitive’ and 
‘backward’ people until now. According to Porath, the government applied the image 
to the category as an ‘ideological tool’:  
      
… as an ideological tool by which the nation state interacts with tribal peoples, 
development gives the target group certain definition of who they are vis-à-vis 
the rest of national society, who they should be and how they should achieve it. 
These definitions are rooted in the modernist’s ideological mirror of primitivism 
and underline the more explicit developmental dichotomy of progressed versus 





In short, their categorisation and position were determined in relation to the ‘civilised’ 
ordinary Indonesians in the process of the state formation after independence, much 
like the position of orang asli in relation with the Malays in the precolonial kingdom. 
However, the difference was this new political categorisation involved, more or less, 
the direct intervention in the peoples’ lives. Through such interventions, the 
government tried to control them in a manner more suited to the agenda of creating 
the nation state in the modern world. 
 
 
 Post-Suharto era and change 
      
       Since the end of the Suharto regime in 1998, the government development 
policies have changed to ‘decentralisation’. The new legislation and international 
support have provided opportunities for local communities, including tribespeople, to 
govern the use of their resources locally, something that was impossible under 
previous regimes. For instance, between 1998 and 2003, the World Bank backed up 
this movement by loaning Indonesia funds worth one billion USD for the purpose of 
restructuring and empowering local communities ‘damaged’ during the New Order 
(Li 2007b: 230-31). As a result, some tribespeople, such as the Punan, Orang Rimba, 
Meratus, and Dayak, have been able to access new resources and social services 
(Erni & Stidsen 2006: 302-3; Wollenberg et al. 2009). The government is making 
efforts to raise local populations’ living standards and provide education as to how 
they can achieve their desires and aspirations. This is a dramatic change in the 
government’s attitude to the tribespeople, compared with the development projects in 
earlier periods.  
       Under these political changes, the people, who had experienced exploitation and 
marginalisation during the older regimes, began to organise local power to claim 
their right of autonomy, land, and resources. In particular, AMAN is the most 
influential organisation focusing on matters of indigenous rights. This organisation 
was established in 1999 mainly by people living in Kalimantan as an alliance of local 
communities. Then, it rapidly developed over the archipelago, and took the role of 
serving ‘as an umbrella organization for the member organizations that would 
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formulate specific programmes to carry out its demands’ (Acciaioli 2007: 299). 
Lobbying for the recognition of local rights in Indonesian state politics, this 
organisation is at the centre of the movement that tries to change government 
development schemes, and has begun supporting activities on behalf of local 
communities including tribespeople. AMAN has provided local communities the 
chance to seek an increase in their livelihood and establish their new position in the 
Indonesian state. Supported by AMAN, some local authorities and communities have 
been able to intervene in the government development programmes, which the 
government used to plan without consultation to ensure that they receive the benefits 
(Henley & Davidson 2007: 1-7).         
       These movements have made remarkable progress in demonstrating the rights of 
an ‘adat community’. By adopting this concept, many activists and local authorities 
have tried to identify themselves as an authentic Indonesian rural community, and 
tried to convince the government to legitimate their rights. ‘Adat community’ has 
linked to the transnational concept of ‘indigenous peoples’, which has been 
conceptualised at the international political level. AMAN translated ‘adat 
community’ into ‘indigenous peoples’ and required the government to deal with the 
rights of the adat communities according to the international guidelines for 
‘indigenous peoples’ (Henley & Davidson 2007: 2-5). 
       In this movement, the position of tribespeople has also changed. They have been 
regarded as not only being exploited by the state development projects during the 
post-independence Indonesia, but also clearly in need of maintaining their 
‘traditional’ way of life and knowledge, or adat. Therefore, the activists try to 
support them and protect their rights as a symbol of the movement. In accordance 
with the change, the KAT replaced the designation of tribespeople as masyarakat 
terasing in 1999 (Duncan 2004a: 91). ‘Terpencil’ in the name of KAT is a synonym 
of ‘terasing’, but it implies political marginalisation rather than geographic isolation. 
In addition, their ‘traditional’ way of life and knowledge gained respect (eg. 
Colombijn 2003b: Effendy 1997, 2002; Li 2001). Accepting to some extent the 
urgings of this movement, the government began implementing development 
projects for tribespeople with some respect for traditional practices and beliefs. 
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       In Riau, the position of orang asli groups changed in accordance with the rise of 
Malay ethno-nationalism. Riau province experienced the exploration of the land and 
resources by Jakarta and the mass immigration of the Javanese and Minangkabau 
during Suharto regime. After the fall of Suharto, many local authorities and 
intellectuals of the Riau Malays, which included many local officials, tried to regain 
the autonomy and self-determination based on Malay values and institutions. In this 
movement, they facilitated Malay ethno-nationalism by redefining the local cultures 
and traditions as Malay adat (Colombijn 2003b: 343-351). Orang asli cultures and 
traditions were also redefined as a part of Malay culture in this movement. For 
example, at the end of the Suharto regime, the Petalangan (or, as they were known in 
the past, the Talang) began claiming their ancestral land rights over the forest, which 
the government development projects were encroaching upon. Intellectuals in Riau 
began to be active in their support of this movement, and the Petalangan obtained 
subsidies and support from the local government and international foundations. In 
this process, their tradition and culture, which had been seen as different from 
‘civilised’ Malays in the colonial era, became recognised as a variation, or even a 
symbol, of the Riau Malay culture (Effendy 1997, 2002; Masuda 2009). Similarly, 
the more ‘tribal’ people, especially the Sakai and Talang Mamak, have also been 
pushed to the fore in the local autonomy movement because they are supposed to 
have maintained the culture and tradition that modern Malays have lost. The Sakai 
were honoured for their spiritual and environmental knowledge, and the Talang 
Mamak were recognised as the maternal kinsmen of the king in the Indragiri 
kingdom (Colombijn 2003b: 349). The Utan, Akit and Rawa were not included in the 
movement’s mainstream. This is probably because they are not Muslims. In the rise 
of Malay ethno-nationalism, Islam is considered essential for regarding Malays as an 
integrated ethnicity, and Malay intellectuals would not emphasise the significance of 
non-Islamic orang asli such as the Utan, Akit and Rawa. However, the local 
government is actually recognising their traditions, land rights and autonomy 
according to the changing political atmosphere.  
       Although the Sukarno and Suharto regimes wanted to integrate the ‘primitive’ 
and ‘backward’ tribespeople into the mainstream Indonesian population, successive 
recent governments have come to regard the tribespeople as people who have 
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maintained their respect for the regional tradition or culture. The government began 
to take a somewhat positive view of their autonomy and their social and cultural 
differences from the mainstream population. In these policies, the government have 
configured the image of ‘adat communities’, and along the line of this image, they 
have educated tribespeople’s desires, aspirations and habits. In this situation, orang 
asli in Riau are beginning to positively demonstrate their position as ‘adat 
communities’ or ‘indigenous peoples’, and accept the support of the activists and the 
government.  
       In the post-Suharto regime, we can see the emergence of ‘governmentality’ in 
government development interventions with tribespeople. During the previous 
regimes, development projects took the form of large-scale exploitation of rural land 
and resources that ignored benefitting local communities. In addition, the 
government had tried to transform tribespeople into ‘ordinary’ rural Indonesians 
through the resettlement while ignoring their traditional ways of life. These 
development projects seem to have directly restricted and reformed the behaviour 
and knowledge of the local population. In other words, the government tried to 
control tribespeoples’ ‘conduct’. However, since the fall of Suharto, the government 
has tried to negotiate with the local authorities and activists about how to develop 
tribespeople and educate them to improve their standard of living. In addition, the 
government affirms and respects the local autonomy based on adat and tries to 
embed tribespeople in the polity maintaining it. As a result, local communities 
including tribespeople have positively pursued the improvement of their livelihood 
and their position in local and state politics. In other words, echoing Foucault’s 
definition of ‘governmentality’, the government has come to control the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ of tribespeople (Li 2007b: 12-13). Therefore, recent development schemes 
planned by government and NGOs appear to include a ‘governmental’ ethos that was 
ignored in the past. 
       This ‘governmentality’ does not affirm all kinds of autonomy and rights among 
locals. The autonomy and rights that the government may permit is only what fits the 
government image of a local community – that is, an ‘adat community’. In an ‘adat 
community’, individuals should share the thoughts and practices inherited from their 
ancestors and so maintain historically continuous and harmonious social connections 
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(see Introduction). Only when the people can show this ‘traditional’ character of their 
community to the government can they obtain economic and political benefit. In 
other words, in the new policies, demonstrating their historical continuity as an ‘adat 
community’ is becoming more and more important for local communities. In this 
arena, culture and identity emerge as important factors in order to be recognised as 
an ‘adat community’. For example, among the Dayak people in Malinau in east 
Kalimantan, actors at the district level are creating new links with other district and 
village actors, and by doing so, they try to consolidate their power and demonstrate 
their traditional right to natural resources. The basis of their links is their identity as 
Dayak; thus ‘ethnicity has come to play a more important and political role in how 
villagers define and align themselves vis-à-vis others’ (Rhee 2009: 46-56). However, 
it is often difficult for tribespeople to do this. First, most of tribespeople did not have 
literary records until recent years, and it is impossible to show a written record of 
their history. Second, tribespeople often have heterogeneous social structures in 
which adat is diverse, and their communities are often far from politically and 
culturally integrated (Li 1999). This is different from what the government image of 
‘adat community’ seems demand.  
      Despite of such difficulties, tribespeople have begun configuring the image of a 
historically continuous community. In this process, they are trying to conceptualise 
and elaborate their adat, choose and declare their identity, and designate and claim 
their territory. By doing so, they can go fit into the government image of ‘adat 
community’ and try to obtain a certain legitimated position in the state politics. 
‘Governmentality’ is stimulating local agency to affirm their position in a way 
acceptable to the government’s view. In this situation, tribespeople are adopting and 
demonstrating their position as ‘adat community’ – that is, indigenising themselves 
in accordance with the image of ‘adat community’ that was created in the 
government imagination of how they should be – in other words, their ‘conduct’ 
needs to be ‘traditional’ and ‘indigenous’.   
       In summary, the state has taken an essential role in the formation of tribespeople 
or orang asli in eastern Sumatra. In the long historical process, the Malay identity 
was linked to subordination and loyalty to the pre-colonial state, people who did not 
adopt the identity – that is to say, ‘non-Malays’ – gradually formed their position as 
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orang asli. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the state fixed their 
ethnonyms and territories and embedded them in the polity, but left them as they 
were because of economic and political reasons. After the independence of Indonesia, 
the state designated them as needing to develop their way of life and to become 
ordinary rural Indonesians. In this process, the state adopted the pre-colonial and 
colonial ethnic categories, and the position of orang asli was fixed. However, in the 
recent ‘decentralised’ regime, their position has begun to be respected and honoured 
as a symbol of autonomy and the tradition connected with the concept of an ‘adat 
community’. Tribespeople, who had been seen as ‘primitive’ and ‘backward’, have 
been increasingly regarded as ‘indigenous peoples’, which by implication involves 
someone whose rights should be protected.  
       It is remarkable that present-day ethnicity among orang asli groups is deeply 
related to the ethnic category which the Siak kingdom developed and imposed in its 
politics and economy. Also remarkable are the meanings of development that the 
post-independence government attached to their ethnicity. Because these categories 
and meanings come from the imagination of outsiders, their images are simplified 
and do not always coincide with the actual practices, thoughts and aspirations of the 
people themselves. In this way, their identity as tribespeople is not primordial. Rather, 
they have adopted the government image and constructed and transformed their 
ethnicity flexibly and situationally. Indeed, although the Suku Asli talk of ethnicity at 
present, it has been obviously formed since the mid-nineteenth century and it does 
not always conform to the government category. Their attempts to show the position 
of their ‘adat community’ in present-day Indonesian politics are very recent as they 
involve objectification and embodiment of the ‘adat community’ reality that the 
government imagined. I will describe such attempts of objectification and 











Identity as Non-Muslims: Orang Asli, Peranakan  
and Ancestral Worship  
  
In Chapter 1, I described the processes of the formation of ‘indigenous people’ living 
in eastern Sumatra under state control. In the pre-colonial era, the category of orang 
asli was gradually established in relation to the Malays, in which the degree of 
subjugation to the state was the criterion for distinguishing them. Under the Siak 
kingdom, the government designated ethnic names for the Utan, Akit and Rawa for 
the purpose of controlling peripheral areas and resources. Post-independence 
Indonesia inherited these categories and defined them as the subjects of development 
programmes. From the state’s definition of KAT, ‘Suku Asli’ and ‘Akit’ are separate 
ethnic groups who have maintained their culture and the tradition of their ancestors. 
However, these categories are not always the same as those of the people concerned. 
They have their own understanding of who they are, an understanding of their 
historical and practical experiences. The main issue of this chapter is to explore such 
categories and collective identity at some remove from the government category. 
       The Suku Asli are basically those who were called the Utan in the government 
categorisation scheme. In 2006, the government recognised the change of ethnic 
name from ‘Utan’ to ‘Suku Asli’ as a result of the activities by their ethnic 
organisation (for this process, see Chapter 4). The term ‘suku asli’ is equivocal. Its 
literal meaning in Indonesian is ‘indigenous people’ or ‘tribespeople’ with the same 
meaning as ‘orang asli’. Indeed, the Suku Asli may use this term for indicating any 
indigenous people or tribespeople in Indonesia and in the world. However, this usage 
is rare and not related to their identity. When they use it with the implication of 
identity, it mainly indicates three different categories of people. First, in the broadest 
sense, it means ‘indigenous people living around the estuary area of the Siak River’. 
In this sense, the Utan, Akit and Rawa are included in this term, and they use it for 
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distinguishing themselves from the Malays, Javanese and so on. 25  Second, it 
indicates the people who were called the Utan, which the government recognised as 
KAT, and which I am exploring in this thesis. In this usage, Suku Asli are one of the 
orang asli groups and distinguished from the Akit and Rawa. Third, in the narrowest 
sense, it is used for distinguishing the ‘real’ from peranakan Suku Asli within Suku 
Asli communities. In this context, ‘Suku Asli’ indicates the ‘real’ Suku Asli, and its 
antonym is ‘peranakan’ who are the descendants of Chinese men and Utan women.  
       In any instance of the three usages, present-day Suku Asli may emphasise their 
connections based on ancestry (nenek moyang), which they express in the phrase, 
‘We have the same ancestors’ (nenek moyangnya sama). This view elicits an analysis 
that Suku Asli have been integrated by common ancestry and is true to some extent 
in relation to the Malays and Javanese. However, if considering their actual practices 
in detail, we can find that their view of ‘having the same ancestors’ is instead a 
product of arbitrary imagination, and their identity does not really depend on their 
ancestry. They do not care about one’s concrete genealogies when distinguishing ‘us’ 
and ‘others’, and they categorise people with different ancestry as Suku Asli. If so, 
how have they distinguished ‘us’ and ‘others’ and maintained their differences from 
the other ethnic groups around them?  
         In this chapter, I would like to explore Suku Asli collective identity and 
categorisation in terms of ethnicity as it was formed outside the state’s definitions. 
First, I describe their perception of ‘having the same ancestors’ and its historical 
background by focusing on their relationships with the Akit and Rawa as well as 
with the Malays. Second, I describe the relationship between ‘real’ and peranakan 
Suku Asli and show that they distinguish their ancestries in ritual practices. Third, 
integrating their perceptions and practices, I analyse how they have formed and 
maintained their identity, and reveal its limits. Through these descriptions, I present 
the core of their identity before the recent demonstration of their indigeneity. The 
essential component of this core is non-Islamic religious practices and beliefs. The 
people who rejected Islamic religion intermarried living in the space around the 
banks of brackish rivers, and their descendants constitute the present-day Suku Asli. 
                                                          
25 The Sakai, who live in the upstream of the Siak River, are usually not involved in this category, as 
they have not had historical connections with them. 
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However, as non-Islamic religious practices have not been integrated into a single 
whole, Suku Asli identity is limited; it is loose and flexible. Indeed, this situation 
became the basis of their manifestation of indigeneity.   
 
 
Identity and the category of Suku Asli 
 
‘We have the same ancestors’: The Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa 
 
       Let me start with a description of conversations with Suku Asli informants. One 
afternoon, I talked with Pak Odang sitting on a bench fixed at the front terrace of his 
house. Pak Odang was in his mid-forties and took the role of the adat manager 
(kepala adat) in IKBBSA (Suku Asli ethnic organisation; see Chapter 4) in Teluk 
Pambang. He was respected by the villagers as he was a famous shaman, or dukun, 
and also had much knowledge of adat. While he was an incumbent of IKBBSA, he 
was not involved in the political activities of the ethnic organisation. I often went to 
his house to hear about their adat, history and rituals. 
       On that day, I asked him a prepared question about their history. In my 
experience of fieldwork among the Akit in Rupat, I knew the oral history, according 
to which the Akit and Utan were originally the same group and, then, the sultan 
divided them into different groups. After talking about that oral history, I asked him 
whether he thought that the Suku Asli and Akit had the same ancestors. He 
answered: ‘Right, I know that the Akit have such a story. Maybe, it is true.’ As he 
had kinsmen living in Rupat, he knew the history of the Akit as well. He continued: 
 
But what I heard from elders is slightly different. According to them, our 
ancestors lived in the Rawa region. Then, they moved to islands such as 
Bengkalis and Ransang. Some of them moved to Rupat, and they are the Akit. 
Probably, that story was created when our ancestors were moving. Anyway, we 
have the same ancestors.    
 
According to him, after their ancestors moved to Bengkalis Island, they were 
recognised as Utan by the Siak kingdom. He estimated that the period was around the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. 
75 
 
      Both the Suku Asli and Akit recognise that they have the same ancestors. This 
view is not only based on the oral history above but also their historically continuous 
moves. Present-day Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa have many anecdotes of individuals’ 
moving between distant communities in the recent past. For example, a batin 
headman of the Akit in Rupat, living around the beginning of the twentieth century, 
was an Utan from Bengkalis Island. Also, a Rawa informant stated that the Utan 
headmen in Tebing Tinggi Island had frequently visited the Rawa region in the past. 
This also applied to Pak Odang’s life history. He was born in a village on Ransang 
Island, which is several dozen kilometres east from Teluk Pambang, where most of 
the population was Suku Asli. While he had been a fisherman in his home village, he 
was employed by Chinese middleman, or touke, and engaged in logging and cargo 
work in several places. When he worked as a logger of mangrove timber in Selat 
Akar, on the east coast of Padang Island, he became acquainted with a woman born 
in Teluk Pambang, who was making a trip to a kinsman’s house for a while. He 
married her, and moved to Teluk Pambang at the end of the 1980s. He built a house 
on the land of her parents and still lives there. One of his daughters married an Akit 
living in Rupat. It is very usual that people have similar experiences, and they have 
strong networks over the distant islands and beyond the ethnic categories of the Suku 
Asli, Akit and Rawa. As a result, they feel a deep connection which goes beyond the 
categories of Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa.  
       In the same way, I asked Pak Koding the same question as Pak Odang, in which 
I presented the Akit story and asked about the origin of Suku Asli in Teluk Pambang. 
Pak Koding was a peranakan Suku Asli in his early-seventies, and his paternal 
grandfather was a Chinese labourer from Teochew. His wife’s sister was Odang’s 
wife, and he was the father of Pak Ajui who was the batin headman of the IKBBSA. 
He was born and has lived in Teluk Pambang all his life and knew the history of the 
village thoroughly. He was also a famous dukun in this village. Pak Koding did not 
know the Akit story and regarded the Suku Asli in this village as being from the 
Rawa region. However, he continued, ‘The Akit work in mangrove logging (kerja 
bakau) just like Suku Asli. So, probably, they have the same ancestors with us.’ He 
categorised the Akit as having the same ancestors based on their dependency on 
mangrove logging. Their oral history, historical moves and engagement in mangrove 
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logging create the flexibility of identity experienced among the Suku Asli, Akit and 
Rawa.  
       Another day, I was taking with Pak Odang again, and it was a chat about 
everyday things rather than an interview. In the conversation, he said his plan was to 
move to Rupat some years later and live in a house near his daughter’s house. 
Hearing his plan, I asked him: ‘If you live in Rupat, are you Akit or Suku Asli?’ He 
laughed at my question and considered it for just a moment. Then, he answered: ‘The 
Akit are also Suku Asli. So, it’s the same. But it’s okay that people call me Akit if I 
live in Rupat. I have family there, and probably I may well become an Akit.’  
       In his comment, there are some important points in terms of identity and group 
categorisation. First, he stated ‘The Akit are also Suku Asli’. Indeed, in terms of the 
relationship between the categories of Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa, people often 
comprehend one category as another. Generally, the Suku Asli identify the Akit and 
Rawa with Suku Asli and call them ‘Suku Asli’. On the other hand, the Akit in Rupat 
usually refer to Suku Asli and Rawa as ‘Akit’. In short, these categories are very 
flexible and not mutually exclusive. 26 Second, he said ‘But it’s okay to call me Akit 
if I live in Rupat.’ Indeed, during my fieldwork in Rupat, I met some people who had 
been born in Bengkalis as Utan but identified themselves as Akit. An informant in 
Teluk Pambang said to me: ‘Akit live in Rupat, Rawa live around Rawa River, and 
Suku Asli live in Bengkalis (and other islands around).’ This means that they classify 
one based on the place that he/she lives. Yet, people have occasionally moved from 
place to another. Once they have moved, they easily change their identification of the 
ethnic categories from one to another in accordance with the place. 
       Therefore, their way of identification is different from the definition of KAT by 
the state. The state defines the Suku Asli and Akit as different ‘adat communities’, in 
which the people are seen as maintaining distinctive adat that were inherited from 
their ancestors and as being distinctive and independent ethnic groups. However, 
their identities are much more flexible and decided only by the place in which one 
lives. In other words, in terms of self-identification, the identities of Suku Asli (the 
                                                          
26 It is very usual that when they classify the people, they use a set consisting of an ethnic name and 
a name for a place. For example, Suku Asli call the Akit ‘Suku Asli Rupat’, and Akit call Suku Asli in 
Bengkalis ‘Orang/Suku Akit Bengkalis’. 
77 
 
Utan), Akit and Rawa are regional identities, but not ethnic identities that may often 
be defined by sharing or not sharing descent and culture. 
       They express the comradeship and connection among the Suku Asli, Akit, and 
Rawa in the phrase, ‘We have the same ancestors’. However, it is uncertain that they 
actually have the same ancestors. Although they have an oral tradition that sustains 
this view, it is ambiguous and has different versions. If we consider their situation, in 
which their adat differs from place to place and even within a single community, as 
mentioned later, and dialects also vary to some extent, it is more probable that their 
ancestors did not have a common origin. However, it is certain that they have 
historically moved from a community to another and married with each other. The 
view of ‘having the same ancestors’ is an image based on this fact.  
       The category and identity of Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa do not have strict ethnic 
boundaries between them, and they distinguish these categories only on regional 
criteria. They recognise that they have the same ancestors and similar cultural traits. 
This means that they have an identity that goes beyond the regional categories of 
Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa – that is, orang asli identity – which can be seen as an 
ethnic identity. This identity has clear boundaries in relation to the Malays. 
 
 
Boundary with Muslims 
 
       In Chapter 1, I described the historical relationship between orang asli and 
Malays. On the one hand, people who subordinated themselves to the state control 
and adopted the ‘Malayu’ identity became Malay. On the other hand, people, who 
were not completely subjected to the state control were orang asli. Therefore, it is 
natural that their boundary was flexible and ambiguous in the first step of forming 
the categories. The sharing of some cultural practices between them backs their past 
connections. For example, although there is some difference in vocabularies and 
pronunciations, the dialects of the Malays and orang asli are mutually intelligible. 
Also, the traditional instruments and performances in rituals including resin incense, 




       However, in the process in which the state implemented the hierarchical system 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the boundaries were gradually 
institutionalised and fixed. Hijmans van Anrooij (1885: 324) describes the 
communication between hamba raja (Malays) and rakyat raja (orang asli and a part 
of present-day Malays) as follows: ‘According to adat, rakyat raja are not allowed to 
eat together with hamba raja, and the latter do not give daughters to the former or 
obtain them from the former in marriage’ (1885:324 [my translation]). 27  This 
indicates that the Malays avoided the communication with orang asli in the 
hierarchal system of the Siak kingdom.  
       On the other hand, orang asli also institutionalised the avoidance of 
communication with the Malays, and their avoidance of the marriage with the 
Malays at present clearly shows the significance of the boundary between them and 
the Malays. Today, marriages between Suku Asli and Malays are very rare. When I 
questioned some Suku Asli whether they permitted their children to marry with 
Malays, their faces always showed embarrassment. Indeed, if a Suku Asli, either man 
or woman, marries a Malay, he/she is no longer regarded as Suku Asli. The person 
should basically live as Malay in the partner’s Malay community and communication 
with his/her Suku Asli kinsmen and friends would be limited.  
       One day, I talked with Pak Odang. I asked him the reason why Suku Asli have 
rejected the marriage with the Malays pointing out that, for me, their culture and 
language seem to be mutually similar. According to him,  
 
Maybe, Suku Asli and Malay ancestors are the same, and the Malays were also a 
kind of orang asli in the far past. However, their ancestors converted to Islam. 
This is different from our ancestors. […] Our ancestors were not Muslims, and 
we have never believed in Islam. The people who became Muslim (masuk Islam) 
have to throw away our adat. They do not respect Suku Asli ancestors anymore 
and have to go out of Suku Asli community. 
 
       His comments summarise some important points of the relationship between the 
Suku Asli and Malays. First, he emphasised the difference in ancestry. Although he 
                                                          
27 He continues that the distinction between hamba raja and rakyat raja was becoming less strictly 
protected around that time and points out that there were some cases of marriages between them 
(1885: 324-325). While this seems to be the case for a part of the rakyat raja, who became the 
Malays in the following period (including the Petalangan and the Orang Laut) and a part of the Sakai, 
this was applicable to Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa.   
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recognised the possibility that Suku Asli and Malays had had the same ancestors in 
the remote past, he divided the ancestors into two, i.e. those who had converted to 
Islam and those who had not converted and, along these lines, regarded Suku Asli 
ancestors as different from those of the Malays. Although some other informants 
insisted that their ancestors had been completely different from those of the Malays, 
they generally claimed their difference from the Malays were because of the 
differences in the ancestors’ religion. Second, they avoid marriage not only with the 
Malays but with Muslims. Indeed, they avoid marriage with the Javanese, who 
immigrated into this area at the turn of the twentieth century. According to my 
survey of more than three hundred households of Suku Asli, Javanese and Malays in 
the western part of Teluk Pambang, there were only two Suku Asli women who 
married Muslim men. They converted to Islam, and the Suku Asli villagers said that 
they were not Suku Asli anymore. Their communication with Suku Asli villagers 
was extremely limited. In addition, there was a case of a Javanese man married with 
a Suku Asli woman, but he changed his registration of agama to Buddhism. Suku 
Asli villagers recognised that ‘he became Suku Asli (masuk Suku Asli)’. Therefore, 
what they have tried to avoid is the introduction of Islam into their community rather 
than marriage with Malays itself. This avoidance is a rigid one, and there were no 
Suku Asli who believed in Islam or had a spouse believing in Islam in Teluk 
Pambang. Finally, he explained the reason why they avoid the marriage with 
Muslims. This is because the people who married Muslims have to abandon their 
adat. ‘Adat’ in Suku Asli society indicates, first and foremost, rituals involving 
ancestral worship (see Chapter 5). In Islamic law, the spouse of a Muslim has to 
convert to Islam (Clarke 2000: 287); thus Suku Asli regarded those who married 
Malays and Javanese as abandoning their adat. In other words, in his comments, it is 
essential for being the Suku Asli to follow their adat. 
       Avoiding marriage with the Muslims is a practice held in common among the 
Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa, and they generally give explanations which echo Odang’s 
comment. For them, the categories of orang asli and Muslim are different and 
mutually exclusive. Indeed, they strongly reject being called ‘Malay’ in spite of their 
cultural and linguistic similarity. Therefore, orang asli identity has a clear boundary 
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in relation to the Malays and Javanese, which reflects their non-Islamic religious 
practices. 
       Along similar lines, generally for the Malays and Javanese in Riau, marriage 
with an orang asli partner is not desirable. This is because they perceive the orang 
asli as having strong supernatural power and knowledge of magic (Chou 2003: 52-
72; Porath 2003:108-109) – something that makes them dangerous. Indeed, the 
Malays and Javanese living in the villages and towns sometimes asked me about the 
Suku Asli practices of magic and advised me to be careful. For them, the marriage is 
acceptable only when the orang asli partner has converted to Islam and abandoned 
his/her magical power and practices. 
       However, interestingly, if compared with other orang asli groups around Riau, 
the boundary with the Malays and Muslims among the Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa is 
remarkably strong. As far as I know, all other orang asli groups, such as the Sakai, 
Orang Laut, Orang Rimba, Bonai and Talang Mamak, have accepted Islam and 
Malays to some extent, although they also have a history in which they more or less 
rejected Islam and marriage with the Malays in the past. For example, in Sakai 
society, most people identify themselves as Muslim, and there is a term ‘Sakai 
Melayu’ that indicates the mixed-blood people between the Sakai and Malay (Porath 
2003: 6). For them, being Sakai is not really exclusive in relation to being Malay and 
Muslim. Even if it is merely nominal, many orang asli in eastern Sumatra register 
their agama as Islam at the government administrative offices. In addition, the 
boundaries with Islam and Malays among the Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa 
communities seem to have been much weaker in the past than it is today. The fact 
that quite a few Utan communities converted to Islam before the mid-nineteenth 
century backs this assumption (see Chapter 1). Why has the boundary with Muslims 
and Malays been institutionalised in such a strong way only among orang asli 
society living in the Siak estuary? This is related to their connection to the Chinese 
and, furthermore, the core of their ethnicity. I will return to this question in the last 






 Relationship between the ‘real’ and peranakan Suku Asli 
 
The formation of the peranakan Suku Asli 
 
       In the comments above, Pak Odang emphasised the importance of maintaining 
adat. However, this does not mean that their religious practices are completely 
integrated or that they always have to follow it. Indeed, there are people who do not 
conduct rituals in accordance with adat in their communities, but they are regarded 
as Suku Asli as well. Furthermore, in their ritual practices, such people distinguish 
their ancestry from other Suku Asli. This is concerned with the relationship between 
the ‘real’ and peranakan Suku Asli.  
      First, let me explain the term ‘peranakan’ and the historical emergence of 
peranakan Suku Asli. The term ‘peranakan’ in Malay originally meant ‘local-born’ 
or ‘native’ (Tan Chee-Beng 2004: 34; Wilkinson 1957: 27). However, in Indonesia, 
the term was specifically used for ethnic Chinese and indicated ‘local-born Chinese’ 
in relation to ‘China-born Chinese’, as they were distinguished in terms of legal 
rights during the colonial era. After Indonesian-born Chinese became the majority of 
the total Chinese population in the mid-twentieth century, the term has been used for 
indicating ‘acculturated Chinese’ with emphasis on the cultural sense (Suryadinata 
1978: 2). In the twenty first century, more and more ethnic Chinese prefer to identify 
themselves as peranakan, as this address includes the implication of being 
Indonesians (Reid 2009). However, the definition and identity of peranakan varies 
from place to place in accordance with the local situation of the Chinese, because the 
identity and category of peranakan has been generally formed by local relationships 
of the ethnic Chinese and native populations (Coppel 2013: 347). 
       On the east coasts of Sumatra, peranakan describes, first and foremost, the 
mixed-blood between the ethnic Chinese and Indonesian-origin populations such as 
Malay, Javanese and orang asli. In general, while those who have only Chinese 
ancestors are referred to as ethnic Chinese (Orang Tionghua; Orang Cina), those 
who have both native and Chinese ancestors identify themselves and are identified as 
peranakan. The people to whom I am referring as ‘peranakan Suku Asli’ (Suku Asli 
peranak; peranakan) are a part of such peranakan who relate to Suku Asli ancestors. 
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While peranakan or peranakan Chinese may live in Chinese communities and 
maintain the Chinese language, the peranakan Suku Asli have generally lost the 
Chinese language and live in Suku Asli communities. 28  The only point that 
differentiates them from the ‘real’ Suku Asli (Suku Asli; Suku Asli asli; Suku Asli 
betul) is that they have maintained Chinese surnames that are inherited through the 
paternal line, and conduct rituals in the peranakan or ‘Chinese’ way. Both peoples 
identify themselves as Suku Asli and share almost all aspects of everyday life 
without any distinctions.    
       The emergence of the peranakan Suku Asli is related to the manner of Chinese 
immigration in this region. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, a mass Chinese immigration 
occurred through the state’s implementation of the panglong system between the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. A large number of Chinese entered the 
rural forest areas on the east coast of Sumatra for the purpose of harvesting timber. In 
this immigration, two kinds of Chinese visited the forest where the Utan, Akit and 
Rawa lived. The first kind was traders. They were locals who had formed settlements 
in some towns of eastern Sumatra or who were dispatched from companies in 
Singapore and Melaka. They mainly engaged in the management of harvesting forest 
products and their export. Their numbers were relatively small and most of them 
went back to their home areas after their work was done. However, some of them 
settled in the rural areas and became local middleman or touke. They had 
connections with trading towns, and maintained social and commercial ties with the 
Chinese. The second kind was the many temporary labourers, or ‘coolies’, who 
engaged in physical labour in the forest under the touke’s management. They were 
from various areas in southern coastal China and were exclusively men.  
       The Chinese migrants established trading posts on the banks of brackish rivers, 
which had sufficient depth for exporting ships and were near to the hinterland forest. 
                                                          
28 In the past, the criteria distinguishing the peranakan Chinese and peranakan Suku Asli seem to 
have been, first, whether one could speak the Chinese language or not, and, second, whose 
community one lived in. In addition, the criterion distinguishing ‘pure’ and peranakan Chinese must 
have been whether one was mixed-blood or not. However, these criteria have become vague. This is 
because, in recent years, more and more peranakan Chinese (and even some of those who seemed 
to be ‘pure’ Chinese) who spoke the Chinese language within their family and lived in Chinese 
communities have identified themselves as ‘(peranakan) Suku Asli’ because they obtained the 
identity of the Suku Asli from the IKBBSA (see Chapter 4); and more and more ‘pure’ Chinese who did 
not have kinship connections with the natives have identified themselves as ‘peranakan (Chinese)’ in 
the state policies to the ethnic Chinese (see the later part of this chapter). 
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Some of these areas overlapped with the space where the Utan, Akit and Rawa lived. 
The Utan and Chinese lived in the same or nearby settlements, and the middlemen 
often also employed the Utan as labourers. Some Chinese labourers married orang 
asli women because the number of Chinese women was very small.  
         As the Chinese labourers were transients who had temporary contracts with 
touke and the companies, most of them left the forest areas after they completed their 
work. According to Suku Asli informants, some moved to Chinese communities in 
this region together with their Utan wife and children. They lived as members of a 
Chinese community and their descendants maintained the Chinese language and 
culture. They are peranakan, but specifically peranakan Chinese, who did not have 
strong social ties with Suku Asli and spoke Chinese language within their family. On 
the other hand, there were labourers who went back to China or moved to Chinese 
communities leaving their wives and children behind. There were also some 
labourers who settled in the forest areas together with the Utan and died in that place. 
In these cases, their children were usually raised by the mother and the mother’s 
kinsmen in a matrilocal way. These children have married the Utan or other 
peranakan living in the forest areas, repeatedly, for some generations. The elderly 
peranakan informants generally have a Chinese-migrant ancestor as their grandfather 
or great-grandfather. On the other hand, their marriages with the ethnic Chinese, who 
are usually touke, are relatively rare because touke are few in number, and they have 
a tendency to look for their spouses among their Chinese connections. Through the 
repeated marriages, their physical appearance is completely the same as Suku Asli; 
they have lost the Chinese language and most of Chinese culture, and they have 
engaged in the same economic activities as Utan. 
       However, they distinguish descent based on the criterion of whether one has a 
Chinese surname (sei) or not. On the one hand, the Utan had a bilateral kinship 
system and did not distinguish paternal and maternal kinsmen in terms of kinship 
terminologies, marriage avoidance and the right of inheritance. They prohibit 
marriages with bilateral kinsmen, and one cannot marry with people who are alleged 
to have any consanguineous relationship. This is still the case among present-day 
‘real’ Suku Asli, and, naturally, they do not have surnames that signal one’s specific 
descent. On the other hand, the ethnic Chinese have a patrilineal kinship system and 
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distinguish paternal and maternal kinsmen (Clarke 2000; Tan Chee-Beng 1982, 
1988; Tan Yao Sua & Ngah 2013). The peranakan Suku Asli also have this system 
and have Chinese surnames passed through the paternal line. They prohibit the 
marriage of a couple who have the same surname even when they do not have any 
consanguineous relationship, but often allow marriage between ‘cross cousins’. They 
also have kinship terminologies that distinguish paternal and maternal kinsmen.  
       At a marriage between the ‘real’ and peranakan Suku Asli, the wife and the 
children follow the husband’s custom. For example, when a woman with a surname 
marries a male without a surname, the female’s surname disappears, she and children 
follow the marriage rule of the ‘real’ Suku Asli. On the other hand, when a male with 
a surname marries a female without a surname, the female acquire the husband’s 
surname and she and children follow the rule of the peranakan Suku Asli. As these 
marriages occurred frequently, all ‘real’ Suku Asli have close consanguineous or in-
law kinsmen amongst the peranakan Suku Asli, and vice-versa. Every peranakan 
household recognises its own Chinese surname. Suku Asli generally know that a 
household is either ‘real’ or peranakan Suku Asli in their local community.  
      There are the peranakan people in Akit and Rawa communities as well 
(Akit/Rawa peranak), and the number is sizable. According to my survey in Rupat 
and Bengkalis, 30-40% of all Suku Asli or Akit households had Chinese surnames. 
However, in Teluk Pambang, about 70% of all Suku Asli households had Chinese 
surnames. 29  The reason why this village shows such a high rate, according to 
villagers, is because there was a timber mill managed by an ethnic Chinese until the 
1950s, and many ethnic Chinese continuously moved to this village from the towns 
of Bengkalis and Selat Panjang where there are large Chinese communities.  
       ‘Real’ and peranakan Suku Asli are close kinsmen and intimate neighbours, and 
share almost all aspects of their everyday life. Both of them have engaged in 
mangrove logging as their main livelihood and obtained cash income by supplying 
the timber to touke (see Chapter 3). When they need the support of other people, as 
                                                          
29 I surveyed 185 households of Suku Asli in Teluk Pambang (according to the 2010 census there 
were a total of 346 Suku Asli households in Teluk Pambang; see Dinas Sosial Kabupaten Bengkalis 
2010), in which 141 households had Chinese surnames, while 44 households did not. On the other 
hand, in Titi Akar in Rupat I surveyed all 275 households of the Akit in 2006. In this survey, 102 
households had Chinese surnames (42%). While I investigated the number in the other villages with 
smaller samples, it is only Teluk Pambang where the percentage of peranakan was higher than non-
Chinese-descended orang asli. 
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in hunting and construction of buildings, they cooperate with each other without any 
distinctions to do with descent. When they hold rituals, they participate in them and 
support their preparation, although, as I will explore in detail in the next section, their 
practices are different. It is true that some peranakan Suku Asli are better-off than 
the ‘real’ Suku Asli, as they have maintained relatively close social ties with touke 
and been able to obtain work. However, it is also the case that the economic situation 
of many peranakan is almost the same as the ordinary ‘real’ Suku Asli.  
 
 
Sharing Suku Asli and Chinese ‘cultures’ 
  
       Although the peranakan Suku Asli have lost almost all Chinese language and 
identity, they have maintained their Chinese culture in some spheres. First of all, one 
sphere is their kinship system and terminology. As mentioned above, the peranakan 
Suku Asli have inherited a patrilineal kinship system. While they prohibit the 
marriage of a couple who have the same Chinese surname, they basically permit 
marriage between ‘cross cousins’. However, in actual practice, this rule is much 
influenced by that of the ‘real’ Suku Asli. According to Pak Kiat, who was the head 
of my host family, there were quite a few cases of marriage with maternal kinsmen 
among peranakan villagers in Teluk Pambang in the past. However, at present, 
peranakan villagers do not want to engage in it as such marriages have not gone well. 
According to him, such couples suffered divorce, infertility, or a child’s death. 
Although he emphasised the failed cases, it seems more possible that peranakan in 
this village adopted ‘real’ Suku Asli bilateral marriage avoidance.  
       Interestingly, the marriage avoidance of the ‘real’ Akit is different from that of 
the ‘real’ Suku Asli; they prohibit marriages between paternal cousins and permit 
ones between ‘cross cousins’ just like peranakan do. Although it is unclear whether 
the Akit acquired this marriage avoidance from their ancestors or adopted it from 
peranakan, it is a fact that marriages between ‘cross cousins’ are very usual among 
both ‘real’ and peranakan Akit in Rupat. 
       In addition, they maintain the Chinese kinship terminologies. The Suku Asli 
have two kinds of kinship terminologies that were derived from that of the Utan and 
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Chinese, which are characterised by bilateral and patrilineal kinship systems 
respectively (see Tables 1 and 2). Basically, it is said that the ‘real’ Suku Asli should 
use the Suku Asli way of kinship terminology and the peranakan Suku Asli should 
use the peranakan one. However, the terminology was used in a mixed way in 
practice. For example, Pak Odang was called ‘akong’ (‘grandfather’ in Chinese) by 
his wife’s sister’s son’s children. I asked him why he was called by the Chinese term 
‘akong’, though he was a ‘real’ Suku Asli. He recognised that it was better to refer to 
him as ‘nek’ (‘grandfather’ in Suku Asli). However, he stated that using the Chinese 
term ‘akong’ was also no problem because ‘akong’ was more useful than ‘nek’. 
According to him, while ‘akong’ can clearly indicate ‘grandfather’, ‘nek’ indicates 
either ‘grandfather’ or ‘grandmother’ and it is vague if used in conversation. He 
concluded, ‘There are some ways to call family relatives in this village. The terms 
are different but the meaning is the same.’ In addition, it is remarkable that, in the 
kinship terminology of peranakan (see Table 2), ‘real’ Suku Asli terms are adopted 
in the addresses of the juniors in the same generation and the descendants. This 
means that they maintain a Chinese form of address only for ancestors. According to 
them, this is because they need to respect elders and ancestors.  
       Second, another sphere, which the ‘real’ and peranakan Suku Asli have shared, 
is their religious beliefs. In Suku Asli society, there are two kinds of specialists who 
can directly communicate with spirits. One is the shamans (dukun, bomo asli) 
derived from Utan culture. They can be possessed by spirits living in the natural 
world (datuk), and send their souls to distant places or the other world (see Chapter 
4). Another kind is Chinese spirit mediums (bomo cina; kiton). They can be 
possessed by Chinese deities such as Guan Yu (Kwan tei) and Guanyin (Kwat’im) 
with Chinese costumes and instruments (see photographs 1 & 2). Both of them often 
hold séances for healing illness or praying for a settlement’s peace. Both ‘real’ and 
peranakan Suku Asli can become one or both of these specialists, and indeed, there 
are many such people. Also, sacred places are maintained by both specialists. Such a 
place is called ‘keramat’ in ‘real’ Suku Asli and ‘datuk kong’ in Chinese.30 
                                                          
30 Strictly speaking, ‘datuk kong’ is a combination of Malay and Chinese words. ‘Datuk’ means elder 
or grandfather in Malay and ‘kong’ also means grandfather in Chinese. The ethnic Chinese in the 
Malay World generally call sacred places by this name, and some of them are also shared by the 






Table 1. Kinship Terminology: The Suku Asli Way
Relationship 
(Generation)
Male Female Male Female
Lineal Nek Nek Nek Nek
Collateral Nek Nek Nek Nek
Lineal Bah Mak Bah Mak
Collateral 
General Pak Mak Pak Mak
Eldest Pak-tua Mak-tua Paktua Maktua
Second Pak-long Mak-long Paklong Maklong
Third Pak-anyang Mak-anyang Paknyang Maknyang
Fourth Pak-ngah Mak-ngah Pakngah Makngah
Fifth Pak-ci Mak-ci Pakci Makci
Sixth Pak-anak Mak-anak Paknak Maknak
Youngest Pak-usuh Mak-usuh Paksuh Maksuh
Affinity
Spouse's parents Mertua Mertua Bah Mak
Lineal
Seniors Abang Kakak Bang Kak
Juniors Adek Adek Dek Dek
Collateral
Seniors Sepupu Sepupu Bang Kak
Juniors Sepupu Sepupu Dek Dek
Affinity
Spouse's Siblings Ipah Ipah Ipah Ipah
Spouse's Sibling's Spouse Meyen Meyen Yen Yen
Lineal Anak Anak N/A (name) N/A (name)
Collateral Anak penak Anak penak N/A (name) N/A (name)
Affinity
Children's Spouse Menantu Menantu N/A (name) N/A (name)
Lineal Cucu Cucu N/A (name) N/A (name)
Collateral Cucu Cucu N/A (name) N/A (name)











Table 2. Kinship Terminology: The Peranakan  Way
Relationship 
(Generation)
Male Female Male Female
Patrilateral Guakong Guama Akong Ama
Matrilateral Laikong Laima Akong Ama
Lineal Apa Mak Apa Mak
Patrilateral
General (Seniors to Father) Apek Ako Apek Ako
General (Juniors to Father) Acek Ako Acek Ako
Eldest Tuapek Tua-ko Tuapek; Apek Ako; Tuako
Second Di-pek; Di-cek Di-ko Apek; Acek; Dipek; Dicek Ako; Diko
Third Sa-pek; Sa-cek Sa-ko Apek; Acek; Sapek; Sacek Ako; Sako
Fourth Shi-pek; Shi-cek Shi-ko Apek; Acek; Shipek; Shicek Ako; Shiko
Fifth Go-pek; Go-cek Go-ko Apek; Acek; Gopek; gocek Ako; Goko
Matrilateral
General Aku Ai Aku Ai
Eldest Tua-ku Tuai Aku; Tuaku Ai; Tuai
Second Di-ku Di-i Aku; Diku Ai; Dii
Third Sa-ku Sa-i Aku; Saku Ai; Sai
Fourth Shi-ku Shi-i Aku; Shiku Ai; Shii
Fifth Go-ku Go-i Aku; goku Goi; Goi
Affinity
Spouse's Parents Mertua Mertua Apa Mak
Lineal
Seniors Ahia Aci Ahia Aci
Juniors Adek Adek Adek Adek
Collateral
Seniors Sepupu Sepupu Ahia Aci
Juniors Sepupu Sepupu Adek Adek
Affinity
Spouse's Sibling Ipah Ipah Ipah Ipah
Spouse's Sibling's Spouse Meyen Meyen Yen Yen
Lineal Anak Anak N/A (name) N/A (name)
Collateral Anak Penak Anak Penak N/A (name) N/A (name)
Affinity Menatu Menantu N/A (name) N/A (name)
Lineal Cucu Cucu N/A (Name) N/ A (Name)
Collateral Cucu Cucu N/A (Name) N/A (Name)
Reference Address
*The prefixes of "Tua " means "Old" in Malay. On the other hand, the prefixies of 
from "Di" to "Go " means from "two" to "five" in the Chinese language.
**I used Indonesian expressions in this table based on advice from a peranakan  Suku Asli, 








Around the Raya River of Teluk Pambang, there were four keramat that were 
inherited from Utan ancestors, which were managed by dukun. Three of them were 
also used as shrines for Chinese deities, and kiton also joined in the management of 
the places. While both expressions are still used in Teluk Pambang, calling the sacred 
places datuk kong is more usual than keramat even among ‘real’ Suku Asli. On the 
other hand, there were many datuk kong, in which only Chinese deities were 
enshrined, in Teluk Pambang, because peranakan households may establish their 
own datuk kong at the corner of their homestead. 
        In the same way, they have two different perspectives on the fate of the human 
soul. One day, I talked with Pak Odang in his house about the spirits of the dead. I 
asked Pak Odang where the soul of the dead goes and where the ancestral souls come 
from at rituals. According to him,  
 
I don’t know. But elders said to me that after a person died, one’s soul (roh) 
separates from one’s body (badan). And, then, the soul goes in and out the house 
in which one died for seven days. Therefore, we have to leave the entrance door 
of the house open during the days. After that, the soul is gradually going upward 
and stays in the upper space of the house until the fortieth day. I do not know 
where it is then going. Some people say it is going to the upper world (atas 
dunia). […] But if we call the ancestral souls (nenek moyang) burning incense, 
they certainly come and receive offerings. 
 
Our topic moved to the influence of the dead on everyday life. According to him, the 
spirits of the dead did not intervene in people’s everyday life; therefore, their 
ancestral souls also did not protect or impede everyday life. The spirits that exerted 
influences on everyday life were orang bunyian (invisible human beings; see also 
Chapter 3), datuk (localised guardian spirit), setan (evil spirit), jin (jinn, there are 
both benevolent and malevolent kinds living in the natural world) and so forth rather 




Photograph 1. Dukun at a séance 
 
 





Photograph  3. A keramat (with no datuk kong) and offerings for datuk (Raya River) 
 
 




       In general, Suku Asli remember their ancestors only when one has been met in 
the past. Thus, they usually remember ancestor’s names as far as grandparents on 
both sides. In the rituals, they offer meals for ancestral souls. It is for all ancestral 
souls rather than specific ancestors. Their ancestral souls neither protect the 
descendants’ life from misfortune or disease nor bring peace and welfare to them. 
More important agents which influence their everyday life are spirits living in the 
natural world. In the conversation above, I asked Pak Odang the reason why they 
hold ritual feasts for ancestors. According to him ‘It is for respecting our ancestors. It 
is not a matter whether they will help or not’. For them, rituals are practices or 
institutions that were inherited from the past, and their importance lies in ‘paying 
respect’.  
       After the conversation above, Pak Odang added, ‘But this is the [‘real’] Suku 
Asli case. In the case of the Chinese dead, the soul may intervene in our life’. 
Chinese interpretations of ancestors are different from the Suku Asli way, and, 
indeed, I often heard and observed the peranakan/Chinese view of ancestral souls. 
For instance, I saw that some peranakan fathers repeatedly teach their small children 
the names of the paternal grandfathers of several generations back as far as they 
knew them, or made a list of the ancestors and put it on the wall behind the altar 
(tepekong). A peranakan explained to me that their ancestral souls were living in a 
different world that was almost the same as the ‘real’ world. Therefore, they were 
obliged to offer meals to them and provide money and consumables by burning paper 
money (kertas mas). If they ignored the obligations, their ancestral souls became 
angry and did not protect the peace of the descendant’s house. As a result, misfortune 
and disease might be caused. A peranakan described the meaning of their offerings 
as: ‘If we do not provide food and money for the ancestors, how do they live? If our 
children will not do it, how can I live after my dying?’ His comment implies that 
their cosmology involves a strong connection between their ancestral souls and the 
living or the descendants realised through ‘Chinese’ ancestral rituals (Clarke 2000: 
289). 
       While there are two interpretations of ancestral souls and their significance, the 
actual interpretation adopted is generally dependent on individuals. For example, 
some days after the conversation with Pak Odang, I talked to Pak Koding, a 
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peranakan Suku Asli, about what I had heard from Pak Odang. As I was talking 
about the topic of ancestral souls, he nodded in agreement. Then, I asked him 
whether there was a case where peranakan ancestors may have intervened in 
everyday life. He answered ‘Right, but it’s an opinion of some bomo cina’. 
According to him, the spirit mediums of Chinese deities occasionally attributed the 
cause of disease to the lack of ancestral souls or the malevolent souls of the dead. 
However, he concluded ‘It’s a Chinese way. I don’t know which is true. But I have 
not experienced that the ancestral souls intervene in our life’.  
       In terms of these kinship systems and religious beliefs, one or both of them are 
adopted depending on the social connection between them. A ‘real’ Suku Asli who 
has only a small number of peranakan kinsmen and neighbours may take only ‘real’ 
Suku Asli ways, but those who have many peranakan ones may take both ‘real’ and 
peranakan Suku Asli ways. The peranakan Suku Asli also adopt one or both of them 
in the same way.  
 
 
The distinction of ancestral worship 
      
       However, in their practice of ancestral worship, they distinguish ‘real’ and 
peranakan Suku Asli quite strictly. In Suku Asli society, there are two ways of 
conducting rituals called ‘Suku Asli way (acara Suku Asli; adat)’ and 
‘peranakan/Chinese way (acara peranak/Thionhua)’. On the one hand, ‘real’ Suku 
Asli hold rituals in the Suku Asli way, which can be characterised by its similarity to 
Malay culture. The basic rituals are weddings, funerals, the anniversary of the dead 
(kenduri) and the feast of the New Year (tujuh likur). In these rituals, they perform 
silat, play music with drums, viola and flute, eat areca nuts and betel leaves kept in a 
sirih box, burn resin incense and wear Malay-style dresses including the sarong. In 
addition to these basic rituals, circumcision (sunat) was held in the past. This ritual 
included a large feast, traditional dances, music and ceremonies, and an elder who 
knew the technique gave a small nick to a boy’s phimotic foreskin. It was essential 
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for boys before getting married, and the marriages of males, who had not undergone 
this ritual, were not allowed or recognised by the community.31     
       On the other hand, the peranakan Suku Asli conduct their rituals in the 
peranakan/Chinese way, in which they use Chinese symbols such as incense stick 
(hyou), red colour, Chinese letters, kertas mas and sometimes short Chinese phrases. 
In addition to weddings, funerals and the anniversary of the dead, they hold the feast 
of the New Year (imlek) and seasonal rituals based on the Chinese lunar calendar. 
They also have an altar at the entrance of their house, on which Chinese deities and 
their ancestral souls are enshrined.32 They worship their ancestral souls and Chinese 
deities every morning and evening. Each member of the household burns incense 
stick and prays for the peace of the house in front of it every morning and evening. 
Their way of ritual is related to Chinese folk religion, which is often described as 
Confucianism (Khonghucu) in Indonesia (see Chapter 6). 
       ‘Real’ Suku Asli households are expected to hold rituals in the Suku Asli way 
and generally do not have an altar in their houses (see also Chapter 6). Also, they do 
not practise everyday worship, the seasonal rituals or a large feast at imlek that are 
seen in the peranakan/Chinese way. On the other hand, the peranakan Suku Asli are 
expected to hold the rituals in peranakan/Chinese way. Peranakan males should not 
be circumcised, and their households do not hold a large feast at tujuh likur.  
       These distinctions are strict ones, and they do not permit mixing the rituals. One 
day, I was in Ajui’s house listening to Koding and Odang’s chat. Pak Ajui was a son 
of Pak Koding in his late-forties; thus he was a peranakan Suku Asli. He was the 
most powerful leader of the Suku Asli in Bengkalis Island and took the role of 
regency batin, the top of the IKBBSA in Bengkalis regency (see also Chapter 4). 
Sitting on chairs in the living room, Pak Koding and Odang were talking about a 
wedding ceremony that would be held on the weekend at the village of Penebal, one 
                                                          
31 In Teluk Pambang, although all ‘real’ Suku Asli husbands whose ages were more than forty were 
circumcised before their marriages, this ritual has not been held for a few decades, because, 
according to them, it is too costly. On the other hand, in Akit communities in Rupat, circumcision is 
still conducted as an essential life ceremony, which is held almost every year as a large ceremony in 
which neighbours cooperate.  
32 Many ethnic Chinese have the tablets of their ancestors at this alter. However, peranakan 
generally do not. They place an icon of a Chinese deity and, occasionally, put a piece of red paper on 
which the ancestors’ names or some Chinese words are written to pray for the peace of the house 
hold (Cf. Tan Chee-Beng 1982: 36-37, 1983: 218).  
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hour distant from Teluk Pambang by motorbike. Even though it seemed to be a 
celebratory event, the atmosphere appeared somewhat strained. From their chat, I 
found that they had been invited to the ceremony in order to perform silat and viola. 
Pak Odang was a good performer of silat and Pak Koding was a player of viola. 
They always performed them when wedding ceremonies were held in Teluk 
Pambang. Listening to their talking, I cut in with a question, ‘So, it’s a wedding of a 
[‘real’] Suku Asli bride, right?’, because I had known that silat, viola and drum were 
performed only in a wedding ceremony for a Suku Asli bride, not a peranakan one. 
Pak Odang answered ‘No, it’s a peranakan wedding.’ This seemed odd and I asked 
Pak Odang why silat and viola were used in a peranakan bride’s wedding ceremony. 
He answered: ‘That’s the problem.’  
       According to him, the bride was a peranakan born in Penebal and worked in 
Jakarta. She would marry a Javanese bridegroom living in Jakarta. While there were 
some households of peranakan, her community in Penebal was ethnic Chinese and 
there were no performers of Suku Asli music and silat. On holding the wedding 
ceremony at her house, her family asked Pak Ajui to introduce Suku Asli performers 
in order to show ‘Suku Asli culture’ (kebudayaan Suku Asli) to the groom and his 
family. Pak Ajui asked Koding and Odang to attend and perform it. However, in their 
conversation, Pak Koding and Odang were talking about how ‘not good’ (tek baik) 
and ‘unusual’ (bukan biasa) performing Suku Asli dance and music was, and they 
obviously appeared hesitant to be involved. Although they complained for a while, 
they finally agreed to join it together, because Pak Ajui had requested it. 
       On the wedding day, I visited the site. In front of the bride’s house, some tents 
and a stage were set up, and many people were visiting. At first, Indonesian pop 
music was played by a band on the stage for a few hours, and then, Suku Asli 
performances began. The host family invited not only Pak Odang and Koding but 
also several performers from a Suku Asli community in Selat Akar, Padang Island, 
and they performed a song and dance on the stage. After their performance, there 
was an intermission. Together with Pak Koding, I visited a peranakan house very 
close to the site to have a rest. On sitting on the floor of the house, Pak Koding spoke 
to the ‘old man’ of the house who was his old friend, ‘Look, it’s a kind of chop suey!’ 
(ini macam capcai!). Following his comment, the old man nodded with a somewhat 
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bitter smile. I could not understand his comment, and asked him ‘What do you 
mean?’ He answered, ‘You saw that there was an altar in the [bride’s] house, right? 
She is actually a peranakan. However, they use [‘real’] Suku Asli way. Everything is 
mixed! So, I said “it’s chop suey”. It’s not good. It’s mistake.’ His face looked serene 
and smiling as usual, but his words were obviously critical. Another day, I asked Pak 
Koding why he complained at their use of the Suku Asli way of performances at the 
wedding. According to him, ‘It is because peranakan’s ancestors were the Chinese 
from China. So, we should pay respect for the Chinese ancestors (Kami harus 
menghormati nenek-moyang Tionghua).’ 
      Ancestral worship is an essential part, not only of the wedding ceremony but also 
of the funeral, anniversary and New Year’s feast. In these ceremonies, the Suku Asli 
perform a ritual, in which ancestral souls are called to the site and have meals 
prepared for them. In doing so, they inform the ancestral souls of a descendant’s 
marriage or death and they pray for the ancestors’ peace in the other world. ‘Real’ 
Suku Asli descendants are expected to call their ‘real’ Suku Asli or Utan ancestors 
using the Suku Asli procedures of ritual, and the peranakan descendants are expected 
to call their peranakan or Chinese ancestors in the peranakan/Chinese procedures. It 
is disrespectful for ancestral souls that descendants mix the two ways and ignore the 
inherited practice from their ancestors.  
       Thus, the Suku Asli avoid mixing the two types of rituals. This means that they 
avoid the confusion of their ancestry and distinguish ‘real’ Suku Asli and 
peranakan/Chinese ancestors. It is certain that the image of ‘having the same 
ancestors’ is multi-layered: It is possible that while one expresses that the other has 
the same ancestor in the remote past, one can simultaneously believe that the other 
has a different ancestor in the near past. Therefore, this does not completely 
contradict their image of ‘Suku Asli have the same ancestors’. However, at least, it 
can be said that Suku Asli identity does not depend on unilateral ancestry. 
Furthermore, it also can be said that their adat is not a single and integrated one. 
There are two ways of ancestral ritual that is an essential component of adat in their 
community, and they have practised them. Therefore, their categorisation of ‘us’ and 
‘others’ and identity as Suku Asli is not really sustained by their single ancestry or 
the practices of common adat.  
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Basis of their identity and its limits 
 
The exclusion of Islam and the acceptance of peranakan  
 
       The reason why the peranakan Suku Asli have maintained their 
peranakan/Chinese way of ancestral worship is related to the cultural manner of 
acculturation of the ethnic Chinese in the Malay World. There are many peranakan 
communities in Indonesia and Malaysia. For example, the baba, the peranakan of 
Melaka in Malaysia, have Malay ancestors in their maternal line, lost their Chinese 
language, acculturated with Melaka Malays, and identify themselves as the baba 
distinguishing themselves from the Malays and ‘pure’ ethnic Chinese (Tan Chee-
Beng 1988, 2003). The Tirok Chinese peranakan in Terengganu have adopted 
Malay-like language, food and dress, but identify themselves as ethnic Chinese (Tan 
Yao Sua & Ngah 2013). Peranakan in Java lost the Chinese language and the 
connection with totok, and they have a distinct and independent identity from both 
the Javanese and Chinese (Hoadley 1988; Tan Giok-Lan 1963; Willmott 1960). In all 
of these cases, their identities and pattern acculturations vary from place to place, yet 
the common thing is that all of them maintain Chinese ancestral worship. For 
Chinese migrants, it has been an obligation to worship their ancestors, basically 
Chinese paternal ancestors (Clarke 2000; Tan Chee-Beng 1982, 1988; Tan Yao Sua 
& Ngah 2013).  
       With the strong attachment to the Chinese way of ancestral worship, which 
would be involved in Chinese culture, Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia have 
generally rejected Islam not only by rejecting conversion to it but also controlling 
social belonging. Among the peranakan Chinese in Malaysia, people who converted 
to Islam are eliminated from membership in the community, and ‘“Chinese” and 
“Malay” are mutually exclusive categories’ (Clarke 2000: 290). In Indonesia, the 
situation is almost the same; in accordance with the rise of a ‘strict’ doctrine of Islam 
in the Indonesian archipelago after the mid-eighteenth century, a ‘religious barrier’ 
has prevented intermarriage between the ethnic Chinese and Muslims (Skinner 1996: 
64-66). These membership and kinship controls are the same among the Suku Asli.  
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       The reason why orang asli communities around the Siak estuary have a strict 
and institutionalised boundary with the Malays and Muslims is related to the 
rejection of Islam among the peranakan and Chinese. Before the mid-nineteenth 
century, the Utan would have rejected Islam and becoming Malay to a certain extent, 
yet the boundaries between themselves and Malays or Muslims would have been 
much weaker than they are today. There might have been a few Utan who identified 
themselves as Muslims or Malay. However, in the late-nineteenth century, the 
panglong system was introduced to this region. On the one hand, the Chinese 
migrants looked for non-Islamic spouses and mainly obtained Utan, Akit and Rawa 
women. This is because, on the eastern coast of Sumatra, the dominant groups of 
Malays, Minangkabau and Javanese are all Muslims, and the people having a non-
Islamic religion are only the orang asli. On the other hand, orang asli accepted such 
Chinese-origin members through the mutual communication and cooperation with 
them. In the process of forming kinship with the ethnic Chinese, the Utan adopted 
the Chinese way of membership and kinship control and excluded the Muslims from 
their community, and the rule became an institution of orang asli. As a result, for the 
Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa, the category of ‘orang asli’ and ‘Malay’ or ‘Muslim’ 
became mutually exclusive categories.  
       On the other hand, the regions of other orang asli groups, such as the Sakai, 
Orang Rimba and Talang Mamak, in eastern Sumatra were not involved in the 
panglong system, and the numbers of Chinese migrants were limited. Therefore, they 
have accepted the Malays and Islam to a certain extent, and, for them, the categories 
of ‘orang asli’ and ‘Malay’ or ‘Muslim’ have been not exclusive ones. It is probable 
that if the Chinese had not immigrated in the mid-nineteenth century, the identity 
among the Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa would have been dramatically different and the 
categories of ‘Suku Asli’ and ‘Malay’ or ‘Muslim’ would have not been mutually 
exclusive.  
        ‘Real’ and peranakan Suku Asli recognise their difference of ancestry and 
cultural practices. If so, why do the peranakan Suku Asli identify themselves as 
Suku Asli, not Chinese or peranakan? Indeed, some studies of the ethnic Chinese in 
Malaysia show that their Chinese identity has been reproduced and maintained 
through ancestral worship because mutual participation and cooperation in the 
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ancestral rituals integrates them as a Chinese community (Clarke 2000: 288; see also 
Chan 2005: 102; Tan Chee-Beng 1982: 48). Even though the peranakan Suku Asli 
recognise their different ancestry, they have a reason to emphasise their common 
ancestry with ‘real’ Suku Asli, and this is related to the position of ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia 
       The political distinction between ‘native’ and Chinese-origin populations in 
Indonesia began in the early colonial era. In the eighteenth century, the VOC 
government categorised Java-born Chinese (or ‘old comers’) as peranakan and 
regarded them as Dutch citizens. On the other hand, they categorised China-born 
Chinese (or ‘newcomers’) as totok and regarded them as foreigners. After the 
independence of Indonesia, the government categorised the totok as WNA (Warga 
Negara Asing: foreigners) and provided them with limited citizenship (Suryadinata 
1978: 94-96). The peranakan have constituted a peranakan identity as distinct from 
totok who did not have full citizenship (Skinner 1959; Tan Mely G. 1997). In the 
middle of the 1960s, the government suppressed the members of the Communist 
Party of Indonesia elsewhere in Indonesia (30 September Movement). In this 
movement, many ethnic Chinese were believed to have close connections with 
communism and killed by the military. In the Suharto regime, while the ethnic 
Chinese were the dominant power in Indonesian economy, they were marginalised, 
discriminated against and stigmatised as people who have a foreign origin in the 
process of the formation of the nation state (Chua 2004). Chinese schools were 
closed and the representations of Chinese culture in public spaces were banned by 
the government. Although the oppressive policies ended in accordance with 
‘reformasi’ in 1998, the discrimination and marginalisation of the ethnic Chinese and 
their identity has continued. As a result, more and more Chinese-related people 
identify themselves as ‘peranakan’ abandoning their identity as ‘Chinese’ in 
contemporary Indonesia (Reid 2009).  
       Although these harsh national policies against the ethnic Chinese did not directly 
influence the peranakan Suku Asli, they have experienced some of its fallout. 
According to Pak Koding, during the 30 September Movement, he heard many 
ethnic Chinese were killed on Babi Island, an uninhabited islet near Rupat Island. 
Also, during Suharto’s regime, the peranakan Suku Asli did not place Chinese altars 
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at the entrances of their houses and held ceremonies and rituals in the 
peranakan/Chinese way as minimally as they could. Even today, they know that it is 
not potentially beneficial or is even risky to claim their Chinese ancestry or clearly 
manifest Chinese culture. By identifying themselves as Suku Asli, they can 
demonstrate their native or indigenous position much more strongly than identifying 
themselves as peranakan. In other words, the peranakan Suku Asli have been in a 
dilemma, in which they have recognised their Chinese ancestry in rituals but 
emphasised their Suku Asli ancestry in politics. The emphasis on the common 
ancestry among the Suku Asli has been constituted not only by the historical kinship 
between the ‘real’ and peranakan Suku Asli, but also by the political emphasis on 
Suku Asli ancestry among the peranakan Suku Asli.  
       On the other hand, the ‘real’ Suku Asli accepted peranakan identification as 
Suku Asli for several reasons. First, the ‘real’ Suku Asli had a bilateral kinship 
system and did not distinguish paternal and maternal kinsmen. This means that 
peranakan and Chinese could become their kinsmen through marriage alliance. On 
the basis of such their kinship system, more importantly, neighbourhoods and 
everyday cooperation is much more important in their social ties than actual kinship. 
They regard people who live nearby, cooperate in activities and share food as 
‘friends’ (kawan) (see Chapter 3), and have a strong sense of camaraderie. The 
peranakan and Chinese could share food and everyday cooperation with the Suku 
Asli, while Muslims cannot do so because of Islamic customs. As a result, the ‘real’ 
Suku Asli accepted that peranakan identify themselves as Suku Asli regarding them 
as kinsmen or friends.  Second, the alliance with Chinese population did not 
intervene in Suku Asli traditional ancestral worship. As mentioned above, while the 
paternal descendants of the Chinese have to follow a peranakan/Chinese custom in 
rituals, this rule is not applied to maternal descendants. This means that the ‘real’ 
Suku Asli could maintain their traditional way of rituals. The Suku Asli could accept 
the peranakan without the entanglements in their adat, which could be very 
problematic in the alliance with Muslims. Finally, the alliance with the Chinese 
could be economically beneficial. As I will mention in the next chapter, touke and 
Suku Asli are in a relationship between patron and client. Although the peranakan 
Suku Asli have some boundaries with touke, they are people who have the same 
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ancestors with touke and are regarded as potential kinsmen. For ‘real’ Suku Asli, 
alliance with peranakan was desirable, as it may have brought waged labour and 
advantageous barters in relation to touke. These conditions have been created in a 
situation that Suku Asli, peranakan and touke have lived in the same living space of 
coastal banks. I will return to this topic in the next chapter.  
       Although the ‘real’ and peranakan Suku Asli have shared almost all of their 
everyday life, they have distinguished their ancestral rituals. This is because, as 
mentioned earlier, maintaining their respective rituals was essential in their culture 
for both of them, and this is one of the main reasons why they chose each other as the 
partner of alliance. On the other hand, they distinguish the Suku Asli, Akit and Rawa. 
This would have been, at first, the adoption of historical state politics, in which they 
classify themselves and other orang asli groups based on territory. However, their 
distinctions have been reinforced when they emphasised their ancestral land and 




Non-Islamic alliance and its limit in state intervention 
 
       In this sense, I would like to suggest that the identity and category of Suku Asli 
is established on the basis of a non-Islamic alliance. With the expression ‘non-
Islamic alliance’, I imply that they do not have a single ancestry or single adat, but 
their identity and category is sustained by its boundaries with the Muslims. In this 
sense, their identity and category are quite diverse, flexible and relational. Their non-
Islamic practices are legitimated by demonstrating their position as Suku Asli who 
are regarded as indigenous and native in this region where Muslims have been 
predominant.  
       The difference of ancestry and ancestral worship was not problematic for the 
Suku Asli identity inside their communities. As they were tribespeople with a 
segmentary and uncentralised social structure, it was not necessary for them to 
integrate the diversity of ancestry and adat. They were connected by kinship and 
mutual cooperation in everyday life individually. In other words, their identities were 
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mutually associated by small-scale connections which can be seen as the social tie of 
‘indigeny’.    
       However, once it was concerned with the state legitimation of their position as 
an indigenous ethnic group, it is necessary to prove it ‘objectively’ for the outsiders. 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, indigeneity and its Indonesian version of ‘adat 
community’ is critical in the government policies to define people as indigenous, and 
cultural content is one of the main criteria in distinguishing the peoples. For the 
government as well as the activists of the ‘adat movement’, the concrete image of 
adat in an ‘adat community’ includes a common history of origins, a long-
established territory, traditional political and legal institutions, common religious 
practices and beliefs, shared material cultures, and so on. In the wave of government 
interventions in local communities and the rise of adat movement in the recent 
‘decentralised’ Indonesia, cultural contents became problematic. 
        From the ‘objective’ perspective on the ‘adat community’, Suku Asli identity 
lacks integration of its cultural contents. First, in terms of their non-Islamic religion, 
the integration of religious practices and beliefs is not possible. As mentioned above, 
in the case of peranakan, the non-Islamic alliance has been formed through the 
maintenance of Chinese ancestry and ancestral worship maintaining it as a basic 
premise of their rejection of Islam. On the other hand, the ‘real’ Suku Asli, who were 
usually the majority of a community, also had their own form of ancestral worship. 
This resulted in the distinction of their ancestry and their ways of ancestral worship 
within a community; thus they did not have an integrated religious practices and 
beliefs that can be a powerful symbol of ethnic integration. Second, the common 
economic activities in the river banks also did not help to prove their integration. 
They developed their communities along brackish rivers, each of which covered a 
certain area of the hydrographic basin. Thus, their communities are a certain distance 
from each other. A number of such communities, each of which are next to Malay or 
Javanese settlements, are scattered like ‘enclaves’ over the vast area of the Siak 
estuary. It was quite difficult for them to have an integrated political and legal 
institution that directly shows their integration or could be a powerful agent to 
integrate their cultural contents. It was also difficult to imagine a bounded and 
integrated territory.  
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      In terms of the lack of integrated territory and political institution, the situation of 
the Orang Laut in the Riau-Lingga Archipelago is similar to the Suku Asli. Their 
settlements dot the scattered inlets and isles of a vast area of the archipelagos, and 
they are divided into a dozen of regional groups (suku) such as Suku Galang, Riau, 
and Mantang (Chou 2010: 20-25). However, they have been regarded as the ethnic 
group of the Orang Laut by the state since the pre-colonial era because of their 
salient cultural feature to live on the boats (Chou 2010: 40-59). In a similar way, the 
Suku Asli might have been able to emphasise the common economic activity on the 
river coasts as the symbol of their cultural integration. However, this has been also 
quite difficult because, after the 1990s, the government has regarded mangrove 
logging, which was their main labour, as illegal and tried to restrict and prohibit the 
export of charcoal in the rise of environmentalism (see Chapter 3).  
       In 2005, the government began directly intervening in Suku Asli life. The 
government had provided them with an image of ‘how they should be’ through the 
development programme, and Suku Asli leaders found that they could claim their 
position as an ‘adat community’ and receive support from the government by 
accepting and embodying the government’s image. In this situation, the leaders are 
trying to demonstrate their rights to their historical territory, establish an ethnic 
organisation revitalising past batin headmanship, unify their diverse traditions into a 
performance, and summarise their religious practices under the label of Buddhism, as 
I will describe in the following chapters. However, these attempts do not represent 
complete adoption of the government’s image. They have their own view of social 
relationships based on their history and experience. They employ a cultural logic that 
draws upon these images and represents their integration both internally and 
externally. This cultural logic is based on their common and continuous ancestry, and 
indeed, they connect this image of common and continuous ancestry with their living 
space, ethnic organisation, traditions and religion. In short, although the Suku Asli 
had a clear religious boundary and shared common economic activity in the river-
coast space, they did not have clear cultural contents that could show their 
integration when interacting with the government. However, this situation has 
changed in recent years because of the government intervention and the rise of the 
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indigenous movement. It is in this context of their identity and position that 
indigeneity emerges in Suku Asli society. 
       The Suku Asli situation reminds us of Barth’s argument about ‘ethnic boundary’ 
and the following debates. In his famous book on Ethnic Groups and Boundaries 
(1969), he insists that an ethnic group is defined by self-ascription and ascription by 
others and emphasises the importance of focusing on the formation and maintenance 
of ethnic boundaries. On the other hand, he calls the cultural contents of an ethnic 
group ‘cultural stuff’ (norms, values, origin myth and so on) and points out that they 
are not really significant for defining an ethnic group because they are chosen 
haphazardly (1969: 9-15). According to him,  
 
[…] although ethnic categories take cultural differences into account, we can 
assume no simple one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and cultural 
similarities and differences. The features that are taken into account are not the 
sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors themselves 
regard as significant. (1969: 14) 
 
However, as a result of his reconsideration of his own work over twenty years, he 
admits (1994: 16) that the choice of cultural contents is less haphazard than he 
argued. Individual experience, the activities of elites, and the states’ policies form 
certain images of cultural contents, and these cultural contents support the ethnic 
category or group (1994: 16-29; see also Colombijn 2003b). In Suku Asli society, an 
ethnic boundary separating them from the Muslims existed since almost the very 
beginning, and this formed their history and identity without integrated ‘cultural 
stuff’. However, the government has required them to define themselves more clearly, 
and they have tried to do so through attempts to integrate their cultural contents not 
only according to the government’s image but also to their own practices and beliefs. 
It is these transactions between Suku Asli images and those of the government that I 
will explore in the following chapters.   
       In summary, the Suku Asli have had their own identity and category of ‘us’ and 
‘others’, and have held a flexible identity – that is to say, orang asli identity, which 
comprises the Suku Ali, Akit and Rawa. This identity is sustained by their historical 
moves and their life on river banks, and they express this identity in the phrase: ‘We 
have the same ancestors’. However, if examining the difference of the ancestral 
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worship between ‘real’ and peranakan Suku Asli, we can see that their identity is not 
really sustained by a single ancestry or common practice of ancestral worship. 
Instead, they have been brought together in a non-Islamic alliance in their history 
without a real integration of ancestry and cultural contents. When the government 
began to intervene in their life with the notion of ‘adat community’, this ambiguity 
and flexibility became problematic, and they are trying to show their integration 
based on both the government image and their own. 
       The flexibility and diversity of Suku Asli identity and category is derived not 
only from their segmentary and uncentralised social structure as coastal-foraging 
tribespeople, but also from the difference of ancestral worship among the peranakan 
Suku Asli. Therefore, in their ‘indigenous movement’, while they try to integrate the 
segmentation of social structure by connecting distant communities, they 
simultaneously try to legitimate the unstable position of the peranakan Suku Asli 
who have relationships with the marginalised Chinese in Indonesian state policies. 
Indeed, like the fact that Pak Ajui became the headman of the IKBBSA, the 
peranakan Suku Asli and their ideas have played important roles in the Suku Asli 
‘indigenous movement’, and their attempts to maintain their Chinese ancestral 
worship while grasping a legitimated position have provided the essential motivation 
for the movement. In this sense, their indigenous movement has an aspect in which 
the potentially non-indigenous attribution of the peranakan Suku Asli drove them to 
claim and legitimate their positions as ‘indigenous peoples’ by emphasising Suku 
Asli commonness of culture and identity.  
       In such a situation, their identity both in relation to the other orang asli and the 
peranakan started changing. The main factor behind this change is the fashion in 












Consolidation of People and Place: Foraging, Space and 
Historic Continuity 
 
‘Land and resources’ is a key concept for understanding the ‘indigenous movement’. 
International activists have tried to formulate the concept of the ‘indigenous peoples’ 
for the purpose of protecting the rights to land and resources among those who have 
lived on a particular land but been marginalised; thus, its definition always mentions 
a peoples’ priority in terms of access to land and its resources (Dove 2006: 192; 
Kenrick & Lewis 2004; Niezen 2003; Saugestad 2004). While the concrete political 
actions in this movement vary, that of Indonesia is generally characterised by the 
quest for the protection of ‘land and its resources’ against the government or 
government-sponsored corporations, which exploited local land and its resources 
under the ‘centralised’ policies prior to 1998 (Davidson & Henley 2007; Duncan 
2004b; Wee 2002). In many cases, the arena of such struggle is the rainforests, from 
which local communities have customarily obtained their living. Local rights may 
often be legitimated by showing historically continuous use of the land and identity 
being backed by ancestral cultures in the particular regions. Thus, local authorities 
and activists define such lands as ancestral land that has been utilised under local 
adat (tanah adat; tanah ulayat) and try to protect locals’ right to it (Acciaioli 2007; 
Li 2000). 
       However, for the locals themselves, ancestral land has not always been clearly 
defined. This is not only because the historical and legal boundaries of the land are 
often vague in peripheral forest regions, but also because their connection with 
ancestors or adat is only one of several ways of representing locals’ attachment to 
and need for land. Rather, the relationship between people and land may be much 
more unconscious and subjective (Benjamin 2012, forthcoming) and framed 
according to distinct cultural logics in each local community. Some people may 
explain their attachment to land by ‘guardianship’ (Lye Tuk-Po 2005), or identifying 
woods as human beings (Effendy 2002). Or, some people may have just used the 
land in their past, and given no salient explanation of their connection to it in terms 
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of history and culture. Local elites and activists summarise such explanations or 
practices into the concept of ‘ancestral land’ for the purpose of legitimating their land 
usage. In this sense, ancestral land can be seen as a perspective, not a substantial 
thing. The land, which the locals feel attachment to, is objectified and emphasised as 
ancestral land in and through the process of demonstrating the historically continuous 
use of the land. 
       As I mentioned in previous chapters, the Suku Asli have lived on river banks and 
depended on the resources obtained around coastal space; their attachment to the 
space constitutes an important part of their identity. However, if we examine my 
informants’ words, most of them have not recognised mangrove swamps, from which 
they have obtained their livelihood, as their ancestral land. Rather, as they have 
naturally used the resources in the ‘niche’ space, their connection with mangrove 
swamps was a subjective and unconscious one, in which they did not objectify the 
river-bank space as ancestral. However, through the competition with outsiders, and 
their interactions with the state, some Suku Asli, especially the leaders of the 
IKBBSA, have begun to claim the right to river-bank space in very recent years. In 
this activity, they define the river coast space as ‘ancestral land’. In other words, 
‘ancestral land’ emerges through the competition with other peoples and the state as 
well as the rise of indigenous movements. 
       In this chapter, I explore Suku Asli recognition of their relationship with their 
living space and the way it has changed in the state intervention and competition 
with outsiders through the ethnographic and historical description of the village of 
Teluk Pambang. First, I describe the geographic and demographic settings of 
Bengkalis Island and provide a history of Teluk Pambang. Second, I explore Suku 
Asli perception of their living space, reconstituting the situation before the 1960s and 
the change caused by the deforestation programme between the 1960s and 1990s. 
Third, I describe their claim to tidal mangrove forest as ancestral lands in very recent 
years and analyse its implications. Although the connection between the Suku Asli 
and their living space was unconscious and subjective until very recently, they began 
objectifying it as ancestral space through competition with outsiders, which 




Bengkalis Island and Teluk Pambang 
 
The demographic and geographic settings of Bengkalis Island  
 
       Bengkalis Island is situated at the estuary of the Siak River on the eastern coast 
of Sumatra (see Map 1). The island has an area of 938 square kilometres and a 
population of 111,660 people according to the 2013 census (Badan Pusat Statistik 
Kabupaten Bengkalis 2013). The lands are flat and marshy; the highest altitude is 
only as high as several metres. Bengkalis town (see Map 2) is the largest town on the 
island and the capital of Bengkalis regency which involves a part of mainland 
Sumatra and other islands.   
 
 Map 2. Bengkalis Island 
 
       This island experienced a dramatic increase in population during the last one 
hundred years. In the pre-colonial era, the coasts of the Malacca Strait were mostly 
an unpopulated area (T. Barnard 2003: 15). Then, in the late nineteenth century, 
many ethnic Chinese migrated to the eastern coast of Sumatra for harvesting timber. 
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Then, around the beginning of the twentieth century, central Sumatra became a main 
in-migrant region from other areas in Sumatra and Java (Gooszen 1999: 83), and the 
population of Bengkalis Island would also have increased as it was the political and 
economic centre of the eastern coast. According to the census conducted by the 
Dutch colonial government in 1930, the population in Bengkalis Island was 17,035 
people (Tideman 1935: 31). Then, about forty years later, the Indonesian 1971 
census shows 57,154 people (Kantor Sensus & Statistik Propinsi 1972: 49). As the 
present population is about a hundred thousand people, the population on the island 
increased about seven times during the last eighty years.  
       In accordance with the expansion of population, the landscape of this island has 
dramatically changed. Before the twentieth century, the hinterlands were covered by 
thick rainforest. There were a number of brackish rivers, each of which had 
numerous tributaries. The coasts were covered by thick mangrove forests, and the 
water paths looked like labyrinths. Although there was a proto-hamlet of the present 
Bengkalis town and some settlements on the northern coasts of Bengkalis Island, 
they were small and sparse. In particular, the eastern coast of the island was an 
unpopulated area, and there were a few settlements of the Utan and Malays. In this 
situation, people exclusively depended on transportations by water and villages were 
developed along the coasts as with other villages in eastern Sumatra (Kathirithamby-
Wells 1993). At first, a proto-hamlet was formed at a sea or river coast. Then, the 
hamlet gradually encroached on the hinterlands and became a village. Finally, such 
villages were connected with roads. On the island, the roads were gradually 
constructed after the independence of Indonesia. 
       As a result of the construction of roads and the increase of the population, almost 
all hinterlands of the island have been already opened and used for gardens and 
settlements. The lands are used for well-maintained gardens of coconuts and oil 
palms, rubber and so on. As much of the land is covered with thick tropical peat, it is 
not suitable for cultivating crops. The lands are possessed legally by individuals, 
organisations or the government. There remain almost no forests on the island, unlike 
anywhere else in Indonesia, where the government nominally and legally possesses 
most of the vast forests based on the national forest laws while local communities 
have traditionally only used its resources. Even though there are some forests around 
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the boundaries of the administrative villages, they are as broad as a few hectares and 
possessed by individuals or logging groups that are established in each administrative 
village. Each village is connected by paved roads; the houses stand at intervals of 
several dozen metres along the roads. While some villages are bounded by rivers, 
their borderlines are generally vague. On the other hand, most mangrove forests 
which cover the river and sea coasts still remain. These areas are tidal swamps, and it 
is impossible to use them as farmland. These swamps have claimed by the state in 
law. However, in practice, the local communities have used the land and resources.      
       It is quite important for understanding the local perception of space to know that 
this region has two landscapes of hinterland and waterline. On the maps, the two 
spaces look directly connected, and their boundaries are extremely vague. However, 
they are separate and different landscapes in reality. When going through the roads, 
we cannot perceive the sea and rivers despite their closeness, because the view is 
restricted by garden trees and mangrove forests. On the other hand, it is also 
impossible to view the hinterland from the sea and rivers, as the coasts are covered 
by mangrove forests. In this situation, people have a mind map that is based on the 
two poles of ‘laut’ (sea or water line) and ‘darat’ (land). The category of darat 
literally indicates land, while that of laut includes the sea, rivers and mangrove 
forests. Their boundary is the tidemark line. The local Malays often indicate the 
direction with the two expressions and recognise the cosmological difference of the 
two spaces.33 Suku Asli also have the same perception and idioms. 
     
 
The history of Teluk Pambang and the difference of living space 
  
     The administrative village of Teluk Pambang is situated at the eastern edge of the 
island, about forty kilometres distant from Bengkalis town.34 The village has an area 
of 42 square kilometres and a population of 6,050 people. According to the 
                                                          
33 The cosmological order based on the binary relationship between ‘laut’ and ‘darat’ is also general 
among the Malays in Malaysia (see Endicott 1970).  
34 At the end of 2012, which was the end of my fieldwork, the village of Teluk Pambang was divided 
into three different administrative villages, in which the western part of Teluk Pambang, which was 
my main field, became a new village of Suka Maju. As the new village did not have any 
administrative function during my fieldwork, I describe the situation of Teluk Pambang in this thesis 
(see also the Conclusion).  
111 
 
government census in 2010, the population of the Suku Asli in this village is 1,769 
people (346 households) (Dinas Sosial Kabupaten Bengkalis 2010: 225). The 
majority of the population is made up first of Javanese, and second of Malays and 
Suku Asli; there are also a few dozen houses of others such as the Minangkabau, 
Batak and ethnic Chinese.   
       This village was developed around the north coast of Kembung Luar River (see 
Map 3). In the nineteenth century, there were some small settlements of the Suku 
Asli and Malays on both banks of the river, and the government would have regarded 
these settlements as the administrative village of Kembung. Then, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the settlements of the northern coast were separated from 
Kembung, and Teluk Pambang was established. According to the villagers, the first 
people who lived in this area were the Suku Asli. Then, the Malays and Javanese 
established their settlements in this area.       
 
Map 3. Village of Teluk Pambang 
 
      It is uncertain when the Utan first entered Bengkalis Island. However, Suku Asli 
villagers estimated that it was around the turn of the nineteenth century. Given the 
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genealogies of their batin headman, which they remember fragmentarily, it is certain 
that there was an Utan community on the island at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. According to them, they moved to this island from the Rawa region on 
mainland Sumatra going through the eastern islands of Padang and Merbau, as I 
mentioned in previous chapters (see Map 1). The first settlement was around the 
present Sekodi village (see Map 2). Then, some of the people moved to around the 
mouth of Kembung Luar River, and made up the first settlement around Rambai 
River, a tributary of Kembung Luar River (see Map 3). 
       From the very early period of their move to this area, Chinese traders from 
Melaka and, later, Singapore often visited for trading.35 Between the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, the population of the Chinese dramatically increased 
because of the introduction of the panglong system. After the Javanese migrants 
increased around the turn of the twentieth century, their main settlement was moved 
to around the tributaries of the midstream of Kembung Luar River, the space 
between the Banan and Raya Rivers (see Map 3). 
       Just after Suku Asli immigration, the Malays also set up their community in the 
northeast seashore of present-day Teluk Pambang. They were fishermen who had 
lived in Rangsang Island and moved to this island to seek new fishing grounds. They 
conducted fishing in the Malacca Strait. As their settlement was a typical fishing 
village, it expanded along the sea coasts rather than the hinterland or river coasts.  
       At the end of the nineteenth century, the first Javanese immigration occurred. 
These Javanese were those who had immigrated into Malaysia in the early colonial 
period from Java and moved into this region for the purpose of possessing their own 
gardens.36 They first settled around Rambai River, and deforested the hinterlands 
bringing their families to this area from Malaysia. In 1903, the first administrative 
headman (penghulu) was appointed by the Dutch colonial government, and the 
village of Teluk Pambang was established. The headman was a Javanese, and his 
office was situated at the north of the Rambai River. This area has been the centre of 
                                                          
35 It is also unknown when the ethnic Chinese first entered this region. Some Suku Asli informants 
told me that the households of peranakanan or the Chinese had already been involved with the first 
Suku Asli migrants; but some not.  If involved, Chinese traders who pursued forest products would 
have been the main agent of Suku Asli immigration to this region.  
36 The Dutch colonial government resettled the Javanese for the purpose of ensuring workforces in 
plantations (Li 2007b: 39-40). 
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the administrative village. This immigration continued intermittently for several 
dozen years, and people’s gardens were rapidly extended to the hinterlands towards 
the north and the west. Their interests were mainly in the hinterland because gardens 
close to river or the sea were often damaged by brackish water. 
       Around the Japanese occupation in the 1940s, a log plant was established at the 
meeting point of Raya River and Kembung Luar River, and a canning plant to 
process fish was also constructed in the Malay settlement. These plants were 
operated by touke. For the purpose of managing the plants, a dozen Chinese 
households moved to each area from towns on other islands. 
      After the independence of Indonesia, the regency government tried to open the 
hinterlands. In the second half of the 1960s, the government carried out a project that 
deforested the west part of the village, and constructed a path which connects the 
village with Permatan Duku. In the late 1970s, a path which connects the village with 
Mentai was also built. These projects were conducted in the ways that the 
government solicited for the local people to engage in construction and deforestation, 
and granted them lands for gardens and residences. In parallel with the construction 
and deforestation, the second Javanese immigration to this village took place after 
the 1970s. These Javanese were people who applied for the resettlement programme 
led by the government. By the second half of the 1990s, these paths were gradually 
paved, and almost all areas of the village were deforested and changed into gardens.  
       From the village history of Teluk Pambang, we can see the different perspectives 
on the landscape among the Malays, Javanese and Suku Asli. The Malays ‘saw’ the 
fishing ground in the open sea, and they established their settlement along the 
seashores engaging in open-sea fishing. They were not interested in hinterlands and 
brackish rivers which were far from the harbours for their boats. The Javanese ‘saw’ 
the hinterland forest as potential gardens, and extended their settlements to the 
hinterlands to create coconuts gardens. They avoided the river or sea banks because 
of the brackish water. On the other hand, as explored below, the Suku Asli ‘saw’ the 
mangrove coasts, and lived in the space between the tidal mangrove forest and 
hinterland rainforest. The open sea and hinterlands were the outside world for them 
although they occasionally passed through these spaces for the purpose of 
transportation and hunting. That is to say, the Malays oriented their cultural 
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landscape towards the sea, the Javanese towards the hinterlands, and the Suku Asli 
towards the rivers. Each did not encroach on the different landscapes of the others, as 
the economic basis of their lives was established in a particular space.  
       In the early days of the Javanese first migration, there would have been some 
tensions and negotiations between some Suku Asli and the Javanese. While the 
details of the conflicts have not been handed down to present-day villagers, 
according to Suku Asli, some families of the Suku Asli lived on the banks when the 
Javanese first immigrated. The families moved to the midstream Kembung Luar 
River, but they maintained their small gardens of coconuts and durian trees. However, 
these gardens were subsumed by the Javanese gardens or settlements without any 
compensation. Although violence would not have occurred, some Suku Asli still 
argue that Rambai River was their space. 
       However, this was an exceptional case in the early days. Because of the 
difference of their cultural landscapes and low-population density, the living spaces 
were not really in competition until the 1960s. The Suku Asli have lived in the 
midstream Kembung Luar River, the Javanese on the bank of Rambai River and the 
hinterland, and the Malays on the north-eastern seashore. Each settlement was 
separated by thick rainforest, mangrove forest and rivers or the sea, so they were 
rarely involved in land conflicts or competition.  
       Here, it is noteworthy how the government has seen the land in this region. The 
landscape perception of the post-independence government almost corresponded 
with that of the Javanese. The second Javanese immigration resettlement, sponsored 
by the government, was in government development schemes. The resettlement was, 
first, programmed to fill the space which the government regarded as ‘empty’. 
Second, the government aimed to improve local economies by providing the local 
population with progressive, diligent and effective models of sedentary Javanese 
agriculture (Duncan 2004b: 105; Li 2007b: 80). In short, the government’s ideal 
landscape in this region was co-extensive with the effectively concentrated, well-
connected and harmonious agricultural villages, which are represented in the rice-
producing areas of Java (SKEPHI & Kiddell-Monroe 1993: 247; see also Geertz 
1963). While similar transmigrations have been conducted elsewhere in Indonesia 
and often caused serious conflicts between the settlers and the indigenous 
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communities (Duncan 2004b: 104-5), the resettlement to Bengkalis Island had not 
brought about any violence. Almost all hinterlands effectively changed into well-
maintained gardens and villages. Also, some of the Malays who depended on fishing 
obtained gardens in the hinterlands and became farmers. They often intermarry with 
the Javanese, and their ethnic boundary is vague at present.  
       Yet, in the government landscape, the coasts of labyrinthine rivers are peripheral. 
In the ‘blueprint of development’ for the Sakai, Akit and Suku Asli, the Bengkalis 
regency government repeatedly implies that their poverty is derived from their way 
of living on river banks (Dinas Sosial Kabupaten Bengkalis 2010). The separation of 
the cultural landscapes between the Javanese, Malays and Suku Asli and the 
difference in the meaning attached by the government to the spaces reconfigures the 
Suku Asli’s marginal position in terms of space within the state. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the Suku Asli living place has not been geographically isolated if 
compared with other tribespeople in Southeast Asia. However, even after 
independence, they have actually been isolated politically in the narrow but complex 
space characterised by numerous tributaries and tidal mangrove forests. The 
government development scheme of landscape centring on hinterland gardens 
formulated and maintained the marginal position of the Suku Asli.  
 
 
Suku Asli recognition of the river coastal space 
 
The past way of life and economic dependency on river-coast resources   
 
       Let us explore Suku Asli’s relationship with the river coasts in detail. During my 
fieldwork, I often asked Suku Asli elders about their memories of their past life. I 
talked with them sitting on benches at the front of their houses or taking chairs under 
tents that were prepared for ceremonies in their gardens. In most cases, the elders 
gladly chatted about their past foraging ways of life with nostalgia, and taught me a 
lot of things about their ways of looking for food, building houses and 
communication between people in the coastal area. However, such information was 
often confusing, because the scenes in their stories seemed to be remote from present 
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village situations. At present, Suku Asli houses in Teluk Pambang are scattered along 
the paved roads near to rivers, and their transportation depends on the road. Almost 
all of them settle in ‘semi-permanent houses’ made of boards and timbers, according 
to the government categorisation. Noticing the perplexed look on my face, they 
stressed: ‘There did not used to be so many people as there are now’. Following their 
words, I erased roads, lanes, gardens, and most houses in front of us from my mind, 
replaced them with forests, and tried to imagine their past ways of life. As a result, 
their past life largely dependent on the waterline emerged little by little. The 
following descriptions are ones that I formulated from the information given by the 
elders. Although it is difficult to specify a concrete time period for their stories, these 
ways of life and landscape were generally in existence before the 1960s.    
       In the past, there were no roads and gardens and fewer people; the lands were 
covered by forest. There were very few houses in Teluk Pambang, and the Suku Asli 
lived in settlements with only two or three huts assembled together. A husband, wife 
and their children lived in each small hut. Trunks of bakau 37 were used for the 
pillars 38 of the hut. The frames were also bakau, and they were joined together by 
strings made of bark. The roof was thatched with the leaves of nipa palm (nipah) or 
sago palm. For the floor, the trunks of nibung palm (nibung) were arranged on the 
bakau frames, or people just trod on the soil so as to harden it. The wall was made of 
some kind of bark. The spaces around the huts were cleared, and people made small 
gardens planting tubers (ubi). They may also have planted durian and coconut palms.  
       These settlements dotted the spaces behind the mangrove forests along the 
tributaries of the Kembung Luar River. Between settlements, there were dense 
mangrove forests, swamps, rainforests and canals. Although there may have been 
trails between them in some parts, they usually used canoes to go back and forth 
between the settlements. Each settlement was called by the name of the tributary, 
such as Sungai Raya (Raya River and so forth), Sungai Banan and Sungai Tengah. 
At the headstream of the tributary and meeting point of the rivers, they enshrined the 
                                                          
37 Bakau is a kind of mangrove tree. The English term ‘mangrove’ is used for indicating various plants 
and vegetation growing in tidal forests (Giesen et al 2006/2007: 1). However, the locals distinguish 
each species. Bakau indicates a species of the Rhizophoraceae family. In the Kembung Luar River, 
bakau putih, or Rhizophora apiculata, is dominant.  
38 The trunk of the young bakau is a straight pole 5- 6 centimetres in diameter. If one cuts down its 
branches and thrusts it into the ground, it pierces the tropical peat a few metres in depth and 
become a stable pier. 
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local spirits (datuk) to protect the place by setting up a stand on which they offered 
food for the spirits. This place was thought of as keramat, and a dukun managed each 
keramat place by holding annual rituals.   
       The most important food was sago, in addition to tubers planted around huts. 
People harvested sago palms (meriyah) that grew naturally between mangrove 
swamps and hinterland rainforests. They extracted carbohydrates (sagu; sago) from 
it and preserved them in their houses. They often gathered shellfish in mangrove 
swamps as well. Game, in particular wild boar (hisim; nagoi), was also an important 
food. However, they rarely went hunting in the rainforest of the hinterland (dalam 
utan; dalam). Because wild boars often came down to the edges of the rainforest 
close to their settlements and the mangrove swamps, they just hunted them with 
spears and snares around their settlements. They ate the sago and tubers together 
with fish and the various shellfish obtained around the rivers. Each household had a 
dugout canoe (jalor) or a boat (sampan), 39  and they conducted fishing and 
transportation using it. The canoe, which was handled with two sculling oars, was an 
essential tool that was used every day.       
       They traded various forest and coastal products such as rattan (rotan), wild 
rubber (guta sondek), screw-pines and fish with touke. However, the most important 
product was the trunks of bakau. The manner of trade involved going to the touke’s 
house and arranging to exchange it for commodities such as iron products, fishing 
gears, clothes, rice, salt, sugar, tobacco and money. Then, they promised the touke to 
bring a certain amount of bakau by a certain date. During high water, they went into 
the mangrove forest using canoes and logged the trunks. Touke created charcoal from 
bakau in their charcoal huts, and exported it to Singapore and Melaka. According to 
old Suku Asli informants, their fathers and grandfathers had also worked in the 
logging of bakau with touke, and the logging of bakau was the main waged labour 
for them until 2006.  
       They often moved around. A household lived in a settlement for as long as a few 
years then moved to a different settlement or unoccupied land. If they found a ‘good 
                                                          
39 Jalor is a dugout canoe that is 3- 4 metres in length. They could make it on their own using axes 
and adzes. On the other hand, sampan is a boat which is made by putting planking together (4- 5 
metres in length). Suku Asli bought it from Malay, Chinese, or Suku Asli villagers who had skills to 
build it. At present, jalor has already disappeared and sampan are used in general. Suku Asli handle 
these boats with two sculling oars standing at the front or back. 
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place’ (tempat bagus) for living when away from their settlement, they moved to the 
new place. The move was often within a narrow space; they may have moved to the 
banks of the next tributary using canoes. The old land was often just abandoned. 
However, when the new residence was near and they had planted durian or coconut 
trees in the small garden in the old place, they may have returned to harvest them. 
People who wanted to move to the old place paid some money for the trees (ganti 
rugi) and could move there. On the other hand, they occasionally moved to distant 
places outside the Kembung Luar River or Bengakalis Island relying on connections 
with kinsmen and friends, as I mentioned in previous chapters. There were a number 
of similar settlements in the region between Rupat Island and Mendol Island. If 
people moved to a different community, they met the batin headman of the new 
place and reported that they would like to live in the place for a while; they gained 
their livelihoods by mangrove logging or temporary labours under touke. Some may 
have moved again soon, and some may have lived around the same place throughout 
their life. 
         In the memories of their past life, we can see Suku Asli dependency on the 
resources of the brackish river coasts. Their building materials of bakau, nipa and 
nibung grow in a zone between tidal mangrove forest and hinterland rainforest 
(Giesen et al. 2006/2007). The staple food, sago palm, also grows in this space. In 
addition, the most important commodity, bakau, develops in tidal forests under 
certain water salinity and less in coastal areas facing the open sea (Giesen et al. 
2006/2007: 12-15). However, the environment in mangrove swamps itself is very 
harsh for living, because of the difficulty of obtaining fresh water, the undulations of 
the land surface caused by ebb and flow, and the astonishingly large numbers of 
mosquitoes, so they did not actually live in the tidal forest. Yet, hinterlands were 
inconvenient for transportation and obtaining resources. As a result, their settlements 
have been concentrated on the space behind mangrove forests in the midstream and 




Photograph 5. A canoe and Raya River  
 
 
Photograph 6. A house of the Suku Asli (Raya River) 
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       At present, their houses are made of plank walls and tin or sago-leaves roofs, 
their transportation mostly depends on the roads, and they more frequently eat rice as 
staple food. Also, as the land ownership is fixed, they move to the different places 
less frequently. However, they still fish on the brackish river, hunt wild boars in 
mangrove swamps, grow sago palm in their gardens and log mangrove timber with 
canoes when a touke requests it. 
 
 
Unconscious attachment to river-coast space as ‘indigeny’ 
 
       Although their economic dependency on river banks in their history is obvious, 
Suku Asli do not concretely manifest their attachment to the space in their words. 
One day, I tried to scrutinise their relationship with a living place and asked Pak 
Koding about what constituted a ‘good place’ for living in when they had moved 
frequently. I expected that he would show a clear attachment to the coastal space 
with an explanation to do with the riches of resources, kin or ancestral relationships 
with the land, or the ancestral monuments or territory represented by graves and 
keramat places. However, he looked slightly perplexed and thought for a little bit 
before answering, ‘It was just doing as one likes (yang suka saja).’ He continued ‘If 
we found a “good place” while walking around (jalan-jalan), we moved and lived in 
the place. If we had good friends, we also moved to and lived in the place.’ I tried to 
grasp their preferences for location, and asked him ‘How about living in the 
hinterland forests?’ He answered ‘No, it’s far from the river (jauh dari laut), difficult 
to live’. I continued ‘How about living in banks facing the open sea?’ He said ‘It’s 
okay. But strong winds and waves shake our canoes. It’s terrifying. I do not want to 
live there.’ In addition, I asked: ‘Do you prefer to live near to the family houses?’ He 
replied: ‘If the person wants to do so, it’s okay. But it is not necessary to do so.’ His 
conclusion was that: ‘In the past, there were much fewer people around here. People 
did as they liked.’   
       From Koding’s comment, it is certain that they have always chosen space near to 
the brackish rivers as their living space. As Pak Koding presented it, they have not 
preferred to live in the hinterland or sea banks because they regard such places as 
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‘difficult to live in’. Indeed, as explained below, while they obtained gardens in the 
hinterland between the 1970s and 1990s, they did not move there to live and, even 
though the mangrove swamps largely lost their economic value after 2006, they have 
still lived around coastal spaces. Furthermore, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, for the 
Suku Asli, living near river coasts and engaging in mangrove logging is one of the 
most important criterion in distinguishing orang asli from others. They have a clear 
image that the Suku Asli have lived in the environment near the rivers and utilised 
resources. This means they have a clear attachment to the river-coast space.  
       On the other hand, Pak Koding stressed the existence of ‘friends’. Friendship is 
established by living together and sharing food, and friends may often be categorised 
as kinsmen because the Suku Asli share a vague memory that they had the same 
ancestors and may extend this category through the idea of bilateral kin relations (see 
Chapter 2). However, what he emphasised in the word ‘friend’ was that 
consanguineous closeness or kin categorisations are not so important for their 
choices of where to live. If they establish a good relationship with other people 
(usually the Rawa, Akit and ethnic Chinese; see Chapter 2), they may move to their 
place. On the other hand, even if near rivers, they do not live in the settlements of the 
Javanese and Malays, with whom it is relatively difficult to share food and 
intermarry. According to Pak Koding, they felt ‘fear (takut)’ and ‘shame (malu)’ at 
the prospect of communicating with such outsiders.  
       Peter Gow (1995) describes how the people of the Bajo Urubamba in Peru see 
kinship in their lands. Past relations, especially through the production and exchange 
of food, constitute kinship between the people. They recognise the extension of their 
space beyond the horizon by mentioning the kinsmen living in a distant place, 
although the space is separated by the forests. They also remember the history of the 
land well and who occupied it in the past. He concludes that people recognise space 
reflecting the social relationships in it. The Suku Asli see social relationships in the 
coastal area in quite a similar way. 
       However, Pak Koding did not give any concrete explanation of their connection 
with the land. They have moved to, and lived in places where they did not always 
have an ancestral connection. In my research, I tried to find a pattern of the present 
distribution of Suku Asli houses connecting them with resources and ‘religious’ 
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monuments. However, I could not find any obvious patterns except for the fact that 
they have lived on river banks where the Javanese and Malays did not live. They 
utilised the resources of mangrove swamps anywhere they could access them. Some 
houses were built near to those of kinsmen, but many houses were not. They did not 
stick to particular distances from ancestral keramat or graves. Other informants also 
expressed the reason for their choice of living space in expressions similar to: ‘It is 
just doing what one likes.’ However, given their profound dependence on the coastal 
resources and their avoidance of other spaces, it is certain that they have a strong 
attachment to river-coast space. 
       In the Suku Asli way of choosing living space, we can see their ‘indigeny’ in 
river coast space – that is, unconscious and subjective attachment to the space. 
However, this is slightly different from Benjamin’s definition which emphasises 
linkages between people and a concrete place (2002: 15; 2012). For the Suku Asli, 
their attachment is not limited to a concrete place but to the river-coast environment 
itself. For them, river coasts were naturally their space, in which they could obtain 
resources and move to different distant river coasts frequently. River-coast space was 
less competitive, and they did not need to objectify and specify the reason why they 
should live in such space.   
        Some studies of forest dwellers have tried to represent the people’s unconscious 
and subjective attachments to forest by describing cosmological or mythical mutual 
implications between people and forest. Lye Tuck-Po (2005) points out that the 
Batek, hunter-gatherers in the Malay Peninsula, are ‘looking after’ the forest. In their 
cosmology, the Batek are the essential agents in the care of the forest playing the role 
of its ‘guardianship’, and if the people left the forest, the world would collapse. She 
concludes by seeing the forest as necessarily implicated in social existence. Tenas 
Effendy (2002) explains the cosmology of the Petalangan, swidden cultivators in 
inland Riau in a similar manner. For them, a tree, which is the essential component 
of the forest, and the human body are entwined in a mutually metaphorical 
relationship, and so they take great care to protect the forest environment. Cynthia 
Chou (2010: 90-95) also points out a similar cosmology in the Petalangan among the 
Orang Laut in Riau-Lingga archipelago. However, Suku Asli have neither a clear 
explanation of their attachment to the coastal space nor any myth or cosmological 
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explanation in terms of their implication with the coastal forest, unlike the Batek or 
Petalangan. Although I cannot give an obvious reason for their lack of cosmological 
attachment to the mangrove forest, it could reflect their connection with ‘outsiders’. 
First, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, the peranakan Suku Asli have as the ancestors 
Chinese labourers who came to this region for harvesting timbers. For them, the 
mangrove forest was a commodity. Because of this kind of relationship, the Utan 
might have lost the implied connections between human beings and the forest. 
Second, as mentioned above, they frequently moved to distant coastal communities 
and did not settle in a particular place.  
       There is a sequel to the conversation with Pak Koding. Some days later, when I 
talked with him about shamanic techniques, he said to me: ‘I remembered that there 
is an important reason to choose a “good place” for living.’ He continued, ‘The 
important thing is whether the place is occupied by the “people” or not.’ This ‘people’ 
does not refer to humans, but a kind of spirit, i.e., orang or orang bunyian (people; 
people of sounds). These ‘people’ are invisible and walk about the forests, the rivers, 
settlements and other places. Although they are usually neither benevolent nor 
malevolent to human beings, if houses are built on their paths, they get angry and 
cause illness and misfortune to the family. Dukun can communicate and negotiate 
with them supported by the local spirits which have authority over them. Ordinary 
people can also communicate with such spirits in their dreams. If they found that a 
new place was occupied by the ‘people’, they moved to some other place. These 
‘people’ are not fixed at particular places and moved around the same way as the 
Suku Asli.     
       On the other hand, the Suku Asli did not depend on the resources of the 
hinterland forests. They only used the land when they passed through it or for 
occasional hunting. However, it was the hinterland rainforest that became the first 
kind of place/space which the Suku Asli objectified and demonstrated their 
relationship to. As a result of their adoption of outsiders’ images on the linkage 
between people and land, they started to manifest attachment to the hinterland space 





Connecting land and people 
 
Participation in deforestation 
 
       After the 1940s, the population around the Raya River increased dramatically. 
When the log plant was established on its banks, many Suku Asli engaged in the 
logging and transportation of timbers under the management of ethnic Chinese. At 
the end of the 1960s, the land on the shores of the Raya River became insufficient. 
Some Suku Asli began opening the hinterlands to the west of the river. Some moved 
to the upper reaches of the Kembung Luar River. In the government deforestation 
and construction projects in the 1960s, Suku Asli also joined together with the 
Javanese. They opened the forests and legally received lands along the present path 
of Jl. Budi Luhur (see Map 3). In around 1970, Suku Asli established an agricultural 
group, the Pondak Condong, and asked the Javanese administrative headman to 
allow them to open the western hinterland of Jl. Budi Luhur in order to create 
gardens. At this time, eighty Suku Asli households joined the group, and they cleared 
about 300 hectares of the forest and distributed the lands to its members. In the late 
1990s, a new Suku Asli organisation called OPSA (Organisasi Pemuda Suku Asli; 
Suku Asli Youth Organisation; see also Chapter 4) was established by Pak Ajui. 
They cleared 200 hectares of the forest at the village boundary with Bantan Air. 
       However, the gardens have not become the main sources of their livelihood. 
According to them, they wanted to gain their livelihood from the gardens, and, at 
first, they planted seedlings of coconuts and rubber. Yet, it took several years until 
they were able to harvest them. Therefore, they did not move to the gardens from 
their houses near the rivers where they had historically gained their livelihood, but 
went to the gardens, several kilometres distant from their houses, to work on a daily 
basis. However, it gradually became more difficult to go and work every day, and 
they eventually sold the gardens to outsiders. This process had another significance 
in terms of the national law. Although the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 set forth the 
right of individual land possession, the right was legitimised only for gardens or 
fields that were well maintained. If the land returned to the forest, the state could 
claim its ownership once again (Acciaioli 2007: 312). Therefore, the Suku Asli had 
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only two choices: either they cultivated the gardens continuously with tremendous 
effort or just sold them. 
       Most of the new gardens were sold to outsiders. A large part of lands opened in 
the regency government project in the 1960s were sold to the Javanese who came to 
the village in the second wave of immigration just after the project. The situation of 
deforestation led by the Pondak Condong was relatively complex. This would have 
been conducted according to the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 40 , which partly 
recognised customary land rights of the forest (SKEPHI & Kiddell-Monroe 1993: 
236-237). On the basis of the law, the administrative village headman in this village 
would have allowed groups, which manifested ‘adat community’, to possess parts of 
the forest for the purpose of making gardens. Some Javanese groups were established 
and began applying for land titles to the forest. The Suku Asli also tried to obtain 
land titles in this situation. They promised the village headman not to sell the opened 
land to outsiders from ‘adat community’, and dealings within their community were 
permitted only when all the members agreed to it. But, eventually, most parts of the 
land were sold. In most cases, the lands were sold to the ethnic Chinese living in 
Bengkalis town who wanted to possess more gardens. The Suku Asli regarded the 
ethnic Chinese as ‘the same ethnic group’ (sukunya sama) in these dealings, and they 
persuaded the village headman as well as the group members. 41 
        On the other hand, most lands opened by the OPSA in the late 1990s are still 
possessed by Suku Asli. While some well-off Suku Asli have bought the lands from 
other Suku Asli to extend their gardens, these were dealings between members. By 
the second half of the 1990s, the roads were almost all paved, many people obtained 
motorbikes to go to the gardens from their coastal settlement, and their access to the 
lands became much easier than before. However, the majority have been not used in 
productive ways as gardens. Although they sometimes attended to the land, 
maintained the ditches as boundaries of the lands, and killed the weeds, quite a few 
of the landholders did not harvest the rubber and oil palms planted previously. The 
                                                          
40 The Basic Forestry Law of 1967 states that all forests are possessed by the state, in contrast to the 
Basic Agrarian Law (SKEPHI & Kiddell-Monroe 1993). Although I could not confirm the detailed legal 
processes of how the lands in Bengkalis Island were treated then, the Agrarian Law would have been 
applied to this area as the people obtained the lands with legitimate documents.  
41 Suku Asli basically regard the ethnic Chinese living in towns as outsiders. Therefore, this could be 
seen as the instrumental deployment of ethnic boundary (see also Chapter 2).  
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land thus does not return to forest but to bush. They deride such lands and ashamedly 
call them ‘man-made forest (utan buatan)’, which implies an ambivalent situation for 
the landholder; although one has opened the lands for growing coconuts or rubber 
with much effort and government permission, one appears only to grow bush on the 
land.    
 
Photograph 7. ‘Man-made forest’ in Teluk Pambang 
 
       These deforestations were always conducted under the supervision of the 
government, and the Suku Asli have wholly legal ownership of the land. According 
to Graeme MacRae (2003: 159), land can be a commodity under legal registration. 
He points out that the legal title to lands changes inalienable land to a commodity, 
for the title casts off the land from customary restraints on alienation. Furthermore, 
for the Suku Asli, the new gardens were not customary lands. Therefore, Suku Asli 
appear to be dealing with the forest as a commodity. However, Nicolas Long (2009: 
80-81) points out that, even if legal titles are fixed, lands can neither wholly become 
a capitalist commodity nor become free from ‘the webs of social relationships and 
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cultural logics’. Indeed, the gardens sold were involved in the webs of social 
relations and the cultural logics of Suku Asli. 
  
     
Lands as kinship in the future: ‘For children and grandchildren’ 
 
       One day, sitting on benches in front of his house as usual, I talked with Pak 
Koding about the history of the village. I asked him, as one of the three leaders of the 
Pandak Condong, the reason why he organised the agricultural group and led the 
deforestation of the hinterland. For me, it was slightly strange that they opened 
gardens that were not always necessary for them and, indeed, were then sold. He told 
me that the deforestation was ‘for their children and grandchildren’ (untuk anak 
cucu). He continued ‘People increased, and it was necessary to make sure of the 
lands where our children and grandchildren would live.’ I questioned him ‘Why were 
such lands sold to others?’ He also sold most of the land he had opened in the 
government project through the activity of Pondak Condong. His face, with a genial 
look until then, hardened, and he stated: 
 
The lands were sold not for money for cigarettes or playing (uang rokok). […] 
The lands were sold for preparing money for our children’s education, building 
houses and buying motorbikes and medicine for children. Everyone is the same. 
 
Then, our topic of conversation returned to the history of the village. However, after 
a momentary pause, he suddenly stressed the comment again, ‘The lands were sold 
for our children and grandchildren. For preparing money for our children’s education 
and to buy their medicine, we sold the land’ he said with a somewhat elegiac look on 
his face.  
       Opening forest ‘for children and grandchildren’ is not Koding’s improvisational 
expression. The phrase was used for negotiating with the Javanese headman in the 
1960s, and, indeed, Suku Asli registered the newly opened lands with the names of 
children and grandchildren. The Javanese village headman, who then allowed the 
Pondak Condong to open the hinterlands, remembered the words: ‘As they told me 
that they want to open the land for their children and grandchildren, I allowed them 
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to do it.’ For the village headman, the discourse ‘for children and grandchildren’ 
fitted with the legal regulations, which recognised the customary rights to land, as 
well as his feeling as a Javanese about the land and its importance. In this sense, this 
idea of ‘for children and grandchildren’ could be seen as being moulded by a 
hegemonic relationship between Suku Asli and the Javanese or the government. 
       However, the idea is not just an imposed one. It also fitted with the Suku Asli 
idea of ‘children and grandchildren’ based on their agency, and was used for 
integrating the members of the Pondak Condong. For Suku Asli, descendants 
including ‘children and grandchildren’ are not only those who are loved and cared 
for but also those who will take care of them in the future through rituals. The Suku 
Asli are obligated to offer food to their ancestral spirits in periodic rituals (see 
Chapter 2). At the same time, it is an obligation to have and guard descendants who 
will feed them in the future, and to ensure their livelihoods. Although every Suku 
Asli more or less shares this feeling, this is much stronger among the peranakan 
Suku Asli than among ‘real’ Suku Asli. The peranakan Suku Asli have maintained 
their strong relationship with their ancestors and descendants through their relatively-
frequent almost-monthly practices of ancestral rituals in ‘Chinese’ ways. It is not an 
accident that the three leaders of the Pondak Condong, including Pak Koding, were 
all peranakan.     
       Despite the descendants and newly opened lands being deeply related, why did 
they sell the land? It was for the same reason: ‘for children and grandchildren’, 
according to Pak Koding. Based on this reason, people chose either to sell or 
preserve cleared lands. A Suku Asli who possessed a ‘man-made forest’ told me that 
if his two sons, then living together, marry in the village, they would build houses 
and gardens in the ‘man-made forest’; however, if they left the village, he would sell 
the land to someone else. Indeed, he had sold a part of the land to an ethnic Chinese 
living in Bengakalis town when his daughter had married and gone out from the 
village. His thoughts consistently fit the cultural logic of Suku Asli. 
       They did not open and sell the land as a commodity. Nor is the productivity of 
the land for their children and grandchildren necessarily brought about by the land 
itself. Selling land and buying medicine or sending children to school is also 
productive. This is more obvious if the land is hard to access. Long (2009) describes 
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a similar case in an arbitration of land conflict between the Malays and the Batak in 
the Riau Archipelago. A Malay wife, the husband of whom had the ancestral legal 
title to an orchard very far from their house, wanted to sell the land to Batak because 
‘the sale of the land at a time of economic hardship would facilitate her in becoming 
the mother and grandmother she wanted to be, enabling her to better provide for her 
family’ (2009: 73-74). This shows the importance placed on the value taking care of 
one’s kin in Malay kinship. He concludes: ‘The “commodification” of the land was 
thus not in tension with “customary” Malay practices and values but an alternative 
means of their actualisation’ (2009: 74). For the Suku Asli, selling land was also an 
‘alternative means of actualisation’ of care for their children and grandchildren 
consistent with their cultural logic. Lands were opened and sold not as simple 
commodities but as a reflection of their culture and identity. 
       It is a dilemma that, whereas they have an ideal picture of the cleared land as 
constituting the livelihood of the descendants, they cannot accomplish it. Therefore, 
selling land involves some emotional turmoil. Koding’s restless attitude in my 
interview surely represents it, and their cynical attitude to the ‘man-made forest’ can 
also be understood in the same context. Identity and land are deeply connected in 
their world. The fact that they sold their land to the ethnic Chinese can also be 
understood not only as an expedient for negotiating with the group members or the 
village headman, but also as a feeble attempt to preserve their social identity, which 
is attached to the land. By selling the land to the ethnic Chinese, who may be 
regarded as their kinsmen, they try to keep open the possibility that the social identity 
attached to the land is maintained. They sell the lands for their children and 
grandchildren to the ethnic Chinese who are potential kinsmen. Selling the land, 
which is rather an individual action, can become morally positive and accepted by 
the society so long as it involves the possibility of maintaining or reproducing their 
social identity (Bloch & Parry 1989).       
       The image of land, which emerges in Koding’s comments and responses, 
provides us with quite a different impression from the stories about their past life. 
According to these stories, they moved around freely without attachments to a 
specific land. When they moved, they just abandoned the land, or sold only the trees 
in the land to others. In particular, lands in the hinterland forest were outside their 
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world. However, in his comments about the opened land, the land seems to be 
something emotional and concerned with identity. It is connected with their future 
children and grandchildren. Now, land and people are mutually implicated. Suku 
Asli landscape has changed.  
       As a result of the Javanese immigration, land shortage and government 
interventions, they extended their world to the hinterlands and represented the 
feelings ‘for children and grandchildren’ by attaching them to the land. Although 
their past relation to landscape ignored the land itself, their landscape is now 
characterised by mutual implications between people and land as well as the 
temporary continuity from the past to the future. Suku Asli see kinship in the opened 
land. They see their children and grandchildren who will feed them in the future, in 
the opened hinterlands. Therefore, their relation with the hinterland has changed and 




New movements in coastal space: Mangrove swamps and ancestors 
 
       Although the hinterlands were connected with their descendants and then sold 
after the 1960s, the change of coastal space where the Suku Asli lived was relatively 
undramatic. After the first Javanese migration, they began opening the hinterland and 
did not encroach on the western tributaries from the Banan River to the west of the 
Raya River. Historically, there were some Javanese households who bought land in 
this space from the Suku Asli or just moved to empty land; however, they have since 
moved to the hinterlands. This is because this space was generally less suitable for 
harvesting coconut or rubber, as the soil often became damaged by brackish water 
from the tributaries. In addition, it would have been uncomfortable for the Javanese 
to live in land surrounded by non-Islamic people. Even today, Suku Asli populations 
have concentrated on the coastal space between the Banan River and the west of the 
Raya River.     
       In this situation, the Suku Asli did not explicitly connect with their ancestors and 
the lands in this space. They have lived in this space from the past to present. They 
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obtained their main livelihood from the river and mangrove forest, logging mangrove 
trunks, fishing in the river, cultivating tubers and coconuts in small gardens and 
gathering sago and shellfish. They rarely sold the lands in this space, and the lands 
were, indeed, less involved in competition and conflict. For them, this space was 
naturally their own. 
       However, this same space began to be actively connected with their ancestors in 
very recent years in a totally different process from that in the hinterlands. The 
trigger was not the land where they have lived, but the tidal mangrove forest where 
they gained their main livelihood in combination with the progress of 
environmentalism as a fundamental part of the recent political agenda.  
 
Photograph 8. A swamp being washed out and mangrove seedlings (Rambai Raiver) 
 
       The encroachment on the river bank and the inflow of brackish water in this 
space became problematic in Teluk Pambang after the second half of the 1990s. 
Even before this, the river banks were gradually washed out, and brackish water 
flowed in gardens near to rivers or the sea at high tide, but the frequency of the 
inflow gradually increased in recent years, and its baneful influence on the 
productivity of the gardens became more and more serious. In particular, the gardens 
around the mouth of the Kembung Luar River, including the banks of the Rambai 
River, suffered from the serious effects of the floods. The Javanese living around the 
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Rambai River attributed the main cause to the decrease of mangrove forest in this 
area. Indeed, the mangrove forest is an important natural bank protection (Giesen et 
al. 2006/2007: 34-35). They began trying to protect the mangrove forest by planting 
mangrove seedlings, digging ditches in the swamps and restricting the logging of 
mangrove forests. However, for the Javanese, one of the major obstacles to carrying 
out this activity was logging of bakau by Suku Asli villagers. 
 
Photograph 9. A sign board that shows the ownership of a mangrove forest by a 
Javanese group of Makmur Bersama (Rambai River) 
 
       While the lands of coastal spaces had been divided amongst and legally 
possessed by individuals, the mangrove swamps, where brackish water flows in 
everyday, were legally possessed by the government under the national law. In 
practice, its resources were customarily utilised by the local communities. Suku Asli 
villagers conducted the logging of bakau in this space freely. They went back and 
forth along the Kembung Luar River by canoes, and obtained the trunks when they 
found good ones. If they could find good ones, they often entered the Rambai River 
and conducted logging. In order to stop their logging, the Javanese began applying 
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for land titles of the mangrove swamps along the Rambai River by organising some 
logging groups. These applications were accepted by the village headman and the 
regency offices and the mangrove swamps were given a legal right of possession by 
the logging groups. They stretched ropes around the swamps, put signs at river banks 
indicating the group’s ownership, and built sentry huts where there was good bakau 
forest. Suku Asli villagers were excluded from these swamps. At the beginning, Suku 
Asli villagers did not take counter actions, but there were some minor conflicts 
between them and the Javanese, because some Suku Asli villagers entered the 
swamps to log. However, they always ran away if they met the Javanese in the forest 
and no collective action was taken. 
       In 2003, OPSA applied for the land title of thirty hectares of mangrove swamp 
along the Raya River. According to Pak Ajui, the head of OPSA, they applied for the 
title in order to build houses or gardens for their members using the same logic as 
they had when opening hinterland. They dug ditches in the swamps, distributed the 
lands to the members, and registered the lands with their children and 
grandchildren’s names. At about this point, his answers became vague. This is 
because they regard living in mangrove swamps as very difficult and their own 
houses have always been behind the mangrove forest. Indeed, the mangrove lands 
were not used for houses and gardens at all. Rather, this had been intended as a 
counter action against the Javanese. Because of their critical feelings about the 
possession of swamp by the Javanese, they had tried to resist. They also seemed to 
have an agenda to ensure their logging space. However, this agenda ended in failure. 
       After the late 1990s, not a few domestic and foreign researchers visited the 
island for the purpose of investigating the rich and unique mangrove forests in the 
area. According to the regency officials in Bengkalis town, the central government 
ordered the regency government to protect the mangrove environment on this island 
following the reports submitted by such researchers. In 2006, the regency 
government stopped renewing the licences of the charcoal huts on this island for 
exporting charcoal to Singapore and Malaysia. 42  Although the government still 
issued licences for charcoal huts that supply the products only for local communities, 
                                                          
42 The exportation of the charcoal from other islands, such as Rupat Island and Ransang Island, is still 




this was desperately unprofitable for touke who ran large-scale huts and exported the 
products. Although some touke and Suku Asli leaders protested to the government, 
their complaints were not accepted. Eventually, several charcoal huts along the 
Kembung Luar River were closed.  
         This means that Suku Asli villagers lost their main livelihood. During my 
fieldwork in 2012, Suku Asli villagers seemed to depend less on coastal resources 
than in their past. Actually, some people now have boats engaged in net fishing and 
in logging mangrove timbers for building materials. People also go occasionally to 
the mangrove swamps and gather shellfish. However, the waged labour of rubber and 
coconut gardens owned by the ethnic Chinese and the Javanese provides them with 
their main livelihood. 43 A part of such gardens were the lands that they had sold in 
the past. Temporary labour in constructing roads and buildings is also important. On 
the basis of such labour, they make an income from their own small gardens in which 
coconuts, rubber and areca nuts are planted. In any case, their transportation is totally 
dependent on the roads and lanes with the motorbikes that every household uses. As 
for food, although they plant sago palms in the corners of gardens, they more 
frequently eat rice that is provided by the government 44 or bought with their wages. 
       In addition to closing the charcoal huts, the government continued to facilitate 
the environment movement to protect the mangrove swamps. During my fieldwork, 
the government offered many subsidies to a Javanese logging group in Teluk 
Pambang and encouraged them to plant seedlings of bakau. The government also 
held occasional seminars for logging groups. I attended one of such seminars held at 
the village of Bantan Air. In the seminar, an official, who had sufficient knowledge 
of the coastal environment, taught the attendants how important the mangrove trees 
were for maintaining the coastal environment and how important the coastal 
environment was for sustaining fishing and agriculture. Some Suku Asli loggers 
from Selat Baru also attended that meeting.   
       One day, Pak Ajui told me about a plan to apply for the land title of mangrove 
swamps around the Raya River to the government. In his plan, several hundred 
                                                          
43 Generally, the Suku Asli receive a half of the proceeds as wage. 
44 In this support, the government provides free rice for each RW (Rukun Warga; neighbourhood 
association: a political unit under the administrative village) twice a year. This support is not only for 
Suku Asli villagers, but everyone living in the designated RW.  
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hectares of mangrove swamps, which cover most parts of the swamps of the Raya 
River, would be registered for the exclusive land of the OPSA. He would build 
sentry huts in the forest, and protect the land and the mangroves. I found this plan 
strange because I knew the swamps divided in 2003 were not used for houses or 
gardens. It also seemed to be difficult to negotiate with the central government about 
reopening the charcoal exporting huts. I therefore asked him why he would want to 
do this. His answer was slightly surprising: ‘It is because the mangrove forest is our 
land. From ancestors, we have possessed it. We have to look after (jaga) the land.’  
       It was the first and only time that I heard a clear claim made in terms of their 
‘ancestral land’. As mentioned above, ordinary villagers did not always regard the 
tidal mangrove swamps as their ‘ancestral land’. However, Pak Ajui and Suku Asli 
leaders knew that the post-Suharto government might recognise the possession of a 
land by an ‘adat community’ if people demonstrate their ancestral use of the land. 
After my fieldwork ended, I confirmed with Pak Ajui that he had actually applied for 
the ownership of the tidal mangrove swamps, and the government accepted it in 2013.  
       Although the Suku Asli have had attachments to the coastal space, it was 
unconscious and subjective. However, after the mangrove swamps become difficult 
to access because of the Javanese activities, they began trying to designate 
boundaries in the coastal space, and to connect the space with their ancestors. Porath 
(2000) describes a Sakai case in mainland Sumatra, in which a burial mound of a 
Sakai historic hero was ‘re-appreciated’ as ancestral space in the process that they 
lost much of their space because of an oil-company’s encroachment on their forest. 
While the Suku Asli also have ‘re-appreciated’ their mangrove swamps, I would like 
to suggest that this process can be seen as the objectification or embodiment of a new 
way of relating to land in their world. They have objectified the space as ancestral 
land by adopting the emphasis on ‘adat community’ and used it in the competition 
for space and their interaction with government interventions. As a result, ‘ancestral 
land’ as a form of space has emerged in Suku Asli perspective. Their unconscious 
and subjective attachment to the coastal space, which can be summarised by the term 
‘indigeny’, has transformed into a conscious and objective linkage between the 
people and the land, on which the outsiders’ image is reflected – that is, the 
emergence of indigeneity in their society.  
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Space: from transient individuals to enduring social order      
 
       As Pak Ajui stated, mangrove swamp was possessed by the OPSA not for selling 
it or obtain money but for ‘looking after’ it. This means that mangrove swamps 
became something inalienable, which was inherited from their ancestors. As Karl 
Marx pointed out, the relationship between people is symbolically embodied in the 
relationship between persons and things (see Bloch & Parry 1989: 4-6). The 
relationship between persons and spaces can be included in this context (Benjamin 
forthcoming). Chou (2010: 76-78) sees the territory of the Orang Laut in the Riau-
Lingga Archipelago as the ‘inalienable gifts’ from their ancestors. Maintaining 
ancestral territories including not only land but also sea routes is deeply rooted in 
their social identity, and through its maintenance, they reconfigure and reproduce the 
relationship with their ancestors as well as their future descendants. In so doing, they 
are demonstrating their territorial rights against recent government infrastructure and 
building projects along the shore. However, the case of the Suku Asli shows a more 
dynamic aspect of the relationship between persons and things.  
        The transformation of the relationship between people and land among the Suku 
Asli can be seen as a process which aims to construct an enduring, long-term social 
order transcending individual relationship with land. Maurice Bloch and Jonathan 
Parry (1989) explore the relationship between ‘transient individual’ and ‘enduring 
social order which transcends the individual’ by suggesting two polar economic 
activities, i.e. a short-term exchange and a long-term one. According to them, ‘a 
cycle of short-term exchange […] is the legitimate domain of individual – often 
acquisitive – activity, and a cycle of long-term exchanges is concerned with the 
reproduction of the social cosmic order’ (1989: 2). The Suku Asli relationship with 
space in the past can be characterised by something related to the short-term cycle. 
Their connection to land was transient and individualistic and was not concerned 
with the moral social order; they moved from place to place relatively freely and 
obtained just the resources they needed from the space. However, after their 
participation in the deforestation of the hinterland, the lands were gradually involved 
in their moral order, in which they connected lands with their descendants. Even 
though the newly opened lands were sold, this was justified in relation to the moral 
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sphere as a practice which assured the livelihood of their descendants. Finally, 
mangrove marshland became an inalienable space which is not concerned with any 
individual transient profits. Here, the land is something that should be inherited by 
descendants as an ‘inalienable gift’. In this context, space is obviously characterised 
by a long-term cycle which is deeply connected with the reproduction of their social 
order and morality. 
       In this transformation, it is remarkable that two agents have played essential 
roles. The first one was the Javanese or the government. Their interventions in the 
Suku Asli landscape in the form of encroachment on hinterlands and the 
development projects have encouraged the Suku Asli to change their perception of 
space to a long-term one. Second, the roles of the peranakan Suku Asli are also 
important. Compared with ‘real’ Suku Asli, they have the stronger ideology for 
maintaining the symbolic relationships with their ancestors and descendants. This 
ideology was embodied in the idea of assuring descendants’ livelihood through the 
newly opened gardens. In other words, the peranakan Suku Asli have had much 
more potentiality to accept the longer-term circle of lands. As a result of the 
stimulation from these two agents, the connection between persons and space 
became natural and inevitable, and the marshland came to be regarded as an 
‘inalienable gift’. 
       Although Bloch and Parry argue that the short-term cycle and the long-term one 
are complementary to each other (1989: 25) and do not always constitute a 
revolutionary series of events, the transformation among the Suku Asli can be seen 
as a shift from the former to the latter. This seems to be in common with many 
forest-dwelling tribespeople. In many cases, their social system in terms of their 
connection to land was not obvious, and they were individually related to the land in 
a small-scale and family-level fashion. Then, through competition with outsiders and 
interventions by state development programmes, they started to construct a social 
order that transcends individual relations to land. Again, it is remarkable that the 
process can be seen as one where the current people are reconfiguring historically 
continuous relationships with their ancestors and descendants through their 
acquisition of lands. In other words, they have obtained a collective identity which 
has spatial and temporary continuities through the transformation of their perception 
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of and relation to space. The solidarity of their ‘adat community’ is reinforced by 
emphasis on their connections via their possession of land. 
       Here, it is noteworthy that the political consolidation of the Suku Asli in 
interaction with the government has its roots in the negotiation of land and resources. 
The Pondak Condong was the first organisation formed by the Suku Asli on 
Bengkalis Island. After it gained success in obtaining the government’s legitimation 
and land titles, many agricultural, fishing and logging groups of the Suku Asli have 
been organised in other villages on the island. OPSA was established in the late 
1990s by Pak Ajui under the advice of his father, Pak Koding who was one of the 
three leaders of the Pondak Condong. OPSA is an organisation which supports the 
life of Suku Asli villagers through the negotiation with the government. On the basis 
of OPSA, IKBBSA was established in 2005, and Suku Asli interaction with the 
government has dramatically increased. However, the reason why they established an 
ethnic organisation is not because they wish to protect their land and resources, and 
the protection of traditional land and resources is not the main purpose of their recent 
manifestation of indigeneity. Furthermore, they seem to have no specific economic 
or political purposes in having done so. Instead, the reason why they established 
IKBBSA and manifested their indigeneity is much more related to political power, in 
which the state and local agents are entangled, than economic reasons. I would like 
to explore this in the next chapter.  
       It is also remarkable that, as a result of their configuration of descendants’ and 
ancestral lands, the distinction between the Suku Asli and Akit become more obvious. 
This is because, after they began recognising their descendant’s and ancestral land, 
territory became more important in relation to identity. In terms of this problem, the 
establishment of the ethnic organisation also played an important role. Therefore, I 
will reconsider this topic in the next chapter.   
       Thus, through their changing relation to the land, they have the beginnings of a 
‘proper’ identity – in other words, by emphasising their connection to a particular 
land, they can start differentiate themselves from other orang asli (i.e. other lands) 
and to unite the ‘real’ and peranakan Suku Asli into a single society. Of course, this 
change is further reinforced by a number of other changes – like the establishment of 
an ethnic organisation, the unification of their ritual practices into a single adat and 
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their acceptance of Buddhism as their ancestral religion. Starting with their ethnic 



































Establishment of an Organisation: Leadership, Power and 
Government Intervention 
           
During my fieldwork in 2012, the pivotal role in manifesting indigeneity was clearly 
taken by incumbents of IKBBSA. They are the protagonists of Suku Asli traditions. 
In annual ethnic festivals, they organised ordinary Suku Asli villagers to join, set up 
performances of traditional dance and music, and invited government officials. They 
are also the protagonists of development programmes. In their periodic meetings, the 
incumbents gather together at a village, exchange information on problems, and 
decide on plans to ask the government for resolutions to these problems. In the 
organisation of IKBBSA, its members are called batin, which originally indicated the 
traditional headman of the Utan. They are the representatives of each administrative 
village where Suku Asli live, and they have engaged in various activities in terms of 
political engagement with the government. Therefore, IKBBSA can be seen as a 
union of the Suku Asli headmen and the political organisation of the Suku Asli. The 
government recognises this organisation and usually approaches the leaders first 
when trying to intervene in the lives of the community.  
       These batin are not traditional headmen who have existed in their community 
from the past, but new ones who were appointed in recent years. In the past, batin 
was a title that was legitimised by the Siak kingdom. They are alleged to have had 
rights to control the population and people in a region. When Indonesia gained 
independence, the legitimacy of the role was abolished, and the Suku Asli did not 
actually have any batin for a long time. The present-day batin are people who are 
appointed by IKBBSA, which was itself established in 2005. In other words, they 
revived the local ethno-authority. The reclaiming of ethno-history and past forms of 
authority has taken place across Indonesia in recent years. For example, in Riau, 
Malay ethno-nationalism is rising against Indonesian nationalism, created in Jakarta 
(Colombijn 2003b; Wee 2002). The titles of sultans also have been revived in many 
regions in Indonesia since 2000 (Klinken 2006). These movements are seen as the 
manifestation of local aspirations to autonomy, which was legitimate before the 
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independence of Indonesia but was oppressed or ignored during the Sukarno and 
Suharto regimes.  
       However, Suku Asli attempts to revive batin headmanship seem to be slightly 
different from similar movements elsewhere in Indonesia. First, the new batin do not 
require the government to reinstate past autonomy and the traditional order that the 
Utan possessed in the past. Rather, their activities are directed to resolving a number 
of issues in their life in relation to the modern Nation State of Indonesia. Second, the 
batin headmanship was not simply revived because of the aspirations among the 
Suku Asli. Instead, the organisation was established under the support of the 
government for administrative reasons, and in this process, the roles of batin were 
revived as a necessity for completing particular administrative tasks. Why was 
IKBBSA established, and what has been brought about by its establishment? The 
answers are closely related to Suku Asli recognition of leadership and the process of 
establishing themselves as an ‘indigenous’ group. 
        This chapter explores the Suku Asli recognition of the significance of batin 
leadership and power as well as the process of establishing IKBBSA. The first part is 
concerned with the history of batin headmanship and Suku Asli recognition of it. The 
second part deals with the process of establishing IKBBSA, and its influence. 
IKBBSA was established as a result of a government attempt to control tribespeople 
and the local leaders’ quest for political power; and this is a new relationship 
between tribespeople and the state – a relationship that emerged in the recent era of 
‘decentralisation’.       
 
 
Headmanship, leadership and power among the Suku Asli 
 
Batin headmanship before independence  
 
        I distinguish ‘headmanship’ and ‘leadership’, following Benjamin’s definition. 
While the former refers to the position that is legitimised in relation to outside 
authority or the government, the latter is one that the people recognise themselves 
internally (Benjamin 1968: 1). I would like to begin the description of batin 
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headmanship and its historical shift and then explore the form of leadership among 
Suku Asli. 
       ‘Batin’ is a title of the traditional headman, which is broadly found among 
tribespeople and some Malays living on the eastern coast of Sumatra and the Malay 
Peninsula (Skeat & Blagen 1966: 494; Andaya 2008: 202-225). 45 Although its origin 
is unclear, given the fact that it prevails over a broad area along the Malacca Strait, 
the title would have existed among tribespeople before they were subsumed under 
the control of the pre-colonial Malay state. Then the role was absorbed into the state 
polity as local authority or as headman. Under the Siak kingdom, batin was one of 
the official titles that the kingdom legitimised. According to Bab Alqawa’id 
published by the colonial Siak government at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
forty seven batin were recognised as headmen on a regional basis (see Junus 2002: 
68-76). Hijimans van Anrooij (1885: 285-310) describes that the batin of the Siak 
kingdom had both rights and obligations in terms of control of lands, resources and 
population in their territories. Batin had rights to impose taxes or labour on their 
subjects, to receive fines from criminals and to control resources. On the other hand, 
they had obligations to pay taxes and to organise their subjects for engaging in labour 
for the kingdom. These rights and obligations would have been relatively strictly 
imposed on the people subjugated by the state. However, the situations of batin 
among the Utan, Akit, Rawa and Sakai, would have been slightly different. Their 
rights and obligations were much weaker as they lived on the peripheries of the 
kingdom. 
       I could not gather concrete and clear information on past batin in terms of their 
communications with the state from Suku Asli informants in Teluk Pambang. 
However, Pak Moi, the batin headman of the Akit in the village of Hutan Panjang on 
Rupat Island, remembered some of the patterns of interaction between their past 
batin and the Siak kingdom before the independence of Indonesia. According to him, 
batin occasionally went to the capital of the Siak kingdom, Siak Suri Indrapra, some 
hundred kilometres distant from Rupat and met the sultan. They used small sculling 
canoes and brought ‘gifts’ (hadiah) of forest products such as sago, rattan and 
                                                          
45 According to Skeat and Blagden (1966 [1906]: 494), this title was mainly found among Orang Asli 
societies of ‘the Jakun’ or ‘proto- Malays’ in the Malay Peninsula. On the other hand, Semang rarely 
had it.  
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beeswax. Usually, the batin individually collected the products, and he and a few 
followers carried them by canoe. Such gifts were carried to the sultan not on fixed 
dates or even annually but ‘only on rare occasions’ (sekali-sekali saja).  
       His memory shows some characteristic features of the batin of orang asli in 
relation to the state. First, he indicated that the forest products that batin carried were 
‘gifts’ not ‘tax’ (pajak) and batin brought the products ‘only on rare occasions’. This 
means that the batin’s obligation to pay tax was weak, and a batin himself decided 
when to bring it to the sultan. Indeed, Hijimans van Anrooij (1885: 303-305, 349) 
also recorded that the kingdom was able to receive the forest products only when 
orang asli brought them. Second, a batin did not obtain the forest products from his 
subjects. He and probably a few of his kinsmen or friends collected the products and 
brought them to the sultan. Therefore, batin did not implement taxation. Indeed, I 
have never heard of batin imposing taxes on the people of Bengkalis and Rupat 
Islands. In short, batin headmanship in orang asli societies was not sustained by 
rights and obligations imposed by the state system; rather, the batin’s autonomous 
agency was much more important in this relationship. 
       If so, why did they bring the ‘gift’ to the sultan? This is obviously to do with the 
quest for both individual and community authority. In the Malay kingdoms, the 
sultan gave the titles of the kingdom in return for gifts – that is, the tributary system 
(Andaya 2008: 216). This title legitimised not only the individual status of the batin 
but also the position of his community in the state. In addition, it is important that the 
title was obtained by his heroic adventures and individual gifts. When I occasionally 
heard anecdotes of batin in both Rupat and Bengkalis, they talked about them with 
some respect due to their great accomplishments. By bringing gifts to the sultan, they 
not only obtained the legitimacy of their role and the position of their community in 
the state, but also demonstrated their authority and power as leaders in their 
community. Bringing gifts was an exchange of forest products for political power, 
and batin conducted it for the purposes of obtaining it. A batin was able to receive or 
maintain his title through the gift. 
       It is noteworthy here that, according to historians, this was not only related to the 
exchange of materials but also to the exchange of supernatural powers in Malay 
kingdoms including the Siak kingdom. In the pre-colonial and early colonial eras, the 
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legitimacy of rulers was backed not only with titles and the use of force, but also 
with their strong supernatural power, called daulat (Andaya 2008: 63, 109; T. 
Barnard 2003: 27-28, 128-130). Daulat was ‘the supernatural power that guaranteed 
the wealth and prosperity of the entire population’ (T. Barnard 2003: 27). This power 
was strongly associated with orang asli groups living in the forest who were believed 
to have strong supernatural powers, and the sultan could absorb this power by 
receiving gifts from them  (T. Barnard 2003: 26-28) On the other hand, orang asli 
received the titles with great pride and reverence as an example of the king’s 
munificence. For the orang asli recipients, the meaning of the titles was not only 
assuring their practical status and prestige, but also giving them the opportunity to 
absorb  the potent supernatural power of the rulers themselves (Andaya 2008: 216). 
At present, the Suku Asli do not use the term ‘daulat’ anymore. However, 
supernatural power is actually related to the political authority of leaders, as I will 
explain below. 
       Therefore, the traditional role of batin among orang asli was deeply related to 
the authority and legitimacy of their position within the state. They communicated 
with the state through their gifts, and they maintained their position in the kingdom. 
Batin was the main agent in the connection of a Suku Asli community with the state 
and their actual relationship. 
 
 
Batin headmanship in Teluk Pambang  
 
         According to Hijmans van Anrooij (1885: 352), there were two batin in Utan 
communities in Bengkalis Island, Batin Kembung and Batin Bantan. The oral history 
of the present-day Suku Asli memory supports this record. According to them, while 
the former was the representative of communities in the east part of the island 
including the present villages of Kembung Luar and Teluk Pambang, the latter 
represented those in northern coasts, such as the present villages of Bantan Air and 
Selat Baru.  
       According to colonial history, the situation of Bengkalis Island was slightly 
different to that of other areas in the Siak kingdom, as the island was ceded to the 
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Dutch colonial government (see Chapter 1). However, in practice, the relationship 
between Utan communities and the Siak kingdom would not have changed. The 
interest of the Dutch government lay mainly in ensuring the safety of their political 
centre, Bengkalis town, and obtaining custom duties from the ships going through 
the channels; they would not have attempted to control and administrate lands and 
populations on the island (Hijmans van Anrooij 1885: 307-310). Therefore, the 
relationship between the Utan and the Siak kingdom would not have changed 
immediately after Bengkalis Island was ceded to the Netherlands. 
       The change in batin headmanship in Teluk Pambang began due to the increase 
of Javanese immigrants and their power. At the end of nineteenth century, the 
Javanese immigrated to the eastern part of Bengkalis Island (see Chapter 3). At first, 
the Javanese regarded the batin as having some authority and legitimacy in the 
community. Therefore, when they first arrived at Teluk Pambang, they visited the 
batin’s house and asked him for permission to open the lands. After their population 
increased, the Javanese applied for recognition of their own headman to the colonial 
government, and the government recognised a Javanese administrative headman, 
penghulu, in 1903. At the same time, the administrative village of Teluk Pambang 
was established, separated from Kembung village. After the independence of 
Indonesia, the penghulu was reappointed as the official administrative village 
headman by the post-independence government, and his authority and legitimacy 
was increased. Even though the Suku Asli living on both sides of the Kembung Luar 
River at first had minimal contact with the Javanese, people living on the northern 
coast gradually recognised the authority of the Javanese penghulu. By the 1960s, the 
Suku Asli lived who in the realm of Teluk Pambang recognised the political 
authority of penghulu, and they negotiated with him to open the hinterlands. On the 
other hand, Batin Kembung was appointed penghulu of the village of Kembung Luar 
just after independence. However, after a few years, his role was replaced by a 
Javanese penghulu by the government. The Batin Kembung, who still lived in 
Kembung Luar village in the 1960s, was not at all concerned with this movement of 
opening land in Teluk Pambang. Also, the Batin Bantan, who lived in the present-
day Selat Baru, did not become penghulu, as the Malays and Javanese were dominant 
in the village. The last Batin Kembung and Batin Bantan died in the 1970s and the 
146 
 
1980s, respectively. Suku Asli did not appoint new batin. The role of penghulu was 
replaced with kepala desa in the 1980s when elections were introduced to local 
administrative villages. In both Teluk Pambang and Kembung Luar, the Javanese 
headmen continuously took on the roles. The role of batin headman was abolished 
and its authority declined. 
       The abolishment of the role of batin on Bengkalis Island can be interestingly 
contrasted with that of the Akit. In Rupat, two titles of batin, Batin Akit-Hatas Titi 
Akar and Batin Akit Selat Morong, were maintained even after the independence of 
Indonesia. The difference between them and the situation of the Suku Asli is simple: 
the post-independence government reappointed existing batin to penghulu posts in 
the two administrative villages of Titi Akar and Hutan Panjang. The Akit have been a 
majority in the two villages, and the roles of penghulu and kepala desa have been 
kept by the leaders of the Akit. As a result, the title has been inherited together with 
the role of penghulu.  
       The difference between the Suku Asli and Akit cases shows that batin 
headmanship was sustained by government politics and authority. The reason why 
the role of batin was not maintained in Suku Asli communities was because it lost its 
state legitimacy. And, among the Akit, it seems to be highly probable that if their 
batin had not been appointed to penghulu, they would have lost the role too. As Pak 
Odang put it, ‘we have followed batin in the past, then penghulu and now kepala 
desa’. Through experiencing the pivotal role of penghulu in actual political affairs in 
post-independence Indonesia, Suku Asli now regard the role of batin as something of 
the past. The deprivation of legitimacy by the government reduced the opportunity of 
having batin headmanship within their community. The batin headmanship needed to 
be backed by the state’s authority and it was not. 
 
 
Leadership in Suku Asli community 
 
       While batin headmanship was sustained by government recognition, how was 
their leadership experienced within their communities? According to informants, the 
role of batin in their community was, first, to mediate disagreements between 
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villagers. When disagreements emerged, the batin called both sides to a meeting in 
his house and mediated them. Second, when Suku Asli moved to different 
communities, they had to visit the house of the batin and inform him of their 
movements. Third, when they held weddings or funerals, they invited the batin and 
asked him to manage the ceremony. Finally and most importantly, they always asked 
the batin for help when they needed to negotiate something with outsiders. I could 
not correctly specify their manner of leadership, outside their interactions with the 
state in the past, in any more detail than this. However, the present situation 
demonstrates the manner of leadership in their community. 
       ‘Leader’ is a term that I am using as an analytic term as I defined it above, and it 
is not the word they use. 46 Leaders are generally male, and when the people wish to 
refer to them, they just use their names, paying respect by attaching the Indonesian 
honorific prefix for a male, ‘Pak’ to their names. It is difficult to delineate a clear 
boundary between them and ordinary villagers. Some leaders may have the title of 
Ketua Rukun Tetangga/Rukun Warga (Ketua RT/RW: heads of neighbourhood 
association/community association, which are appointed by administrative village 
headman in Teluk Pambang), some may have expertise in a shamanic technique, and 
some may be ordinary elders (orang tua) who have knowledge of adat. Therefore, a 
leader’s role is ‘informal’, in the sense that they are not always officially recognised 
by the state.  
       In terms of kinship and economic activities, Suku Asli leadership and authority 
are not clear; even if there is person who leads a specific activity, the position of 
leader is not fixed. In a household that is composed of a nuclear family, the father is 
generally registered as a head (ketua keluarga) on the family registers of the 
administrative village office. However, I have never seen a Suku Asli father try to 
control the behaviour of his wife and children. For example, fathers do not intervene 
in the choice of their children’s spouse. According to an informant, ‘If my children 
get a mate or suitor (jodoh), they should just marry, as it is their thing.’ In the same 
way, parents do not intervene in the affairs of the children’s household. They do not 
                                                          
46 Although they often use synonyms of ‘leader’ like ‘kepala’, ‘penghulu’, ‘peminpin’ and ‘ketua’, 
these terms seem to be used only for those who have a title, or posts of headman, such as the 
present batin, adat manager and the headmen of neighbourhood community appointed by the 
administrative village headman (ketua RT/RW), regardless of one’s leadership within the community. 
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have a system of paternal leadership in the family. Moreover, in terms of economic 
activities, their authority is also vague. Until 2006, their main livelihood was 
mangrove logging. This was completely through individual labour, in which one 
person went into the mangrove swamps with a small canoe and logged the timber 
(see Chapter 3). Also, although they occasionally undertake hunting and gathering 
together, there is no leadership in their cooperation. When several people go into 
mangrove swamps to correct shellfish, they individually gather them and bring it 
back to each house. When several men hunt a wild boar with snares and spears in 
coconuts gardens and mangrove swamps, the people have their own individual roles 
and the game is equally divided. While they frequently cooperate in everyday life, 
there is no one who always tries to control others in these activities. Even if people 
take on a leadership role when cooperating, such leadership is situational. 
       In the past they were foragers who moved from place to place and obtained 
resources through hunting and gathering. Such a society is characterised by 
egalitarianism, and it is difficult to institutionalise fixed power, authority and 
leadership within this type of community (Lee 2005: 19-20). The lack of fixed 
leadership in the social sphere of economic activities and kinship has not changed 
since the era of batin headmanship. 
       However, it is also true that in some spheres of their life, there have been leaders 
in their communities. First and foremost, leadership emerges in the context of 
interaction with outsiders. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, communication with 
outsiders was stressful for Suku Asli in the past because they felt ashamed (malu) 
and fear (takut). They have avoided troubles with outsiders as far as they can; indeed, 
some Suku Asli families moved to the upstream of the Kembung Luar River when 
the number of Javanese increased around the mouth of the river. However, leadership 
and a form of authority appeared when Pak Koding and some other people began 
negotiating land possession with the village headman in the 1960s to ensure access to 
their land and resources. In this process, they integrated the opinion of ordinary 
villagers and negotiated with the headman as their representative. Even after the 
negotiation of land-accesses finished, Suku Asli villagers depended on Pak Koding 
and some other leaders when they needed to communicate with the village headman, 
as these people were regarded as having the skill to communicate with the Javanese. 
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This can be seen as a form of leadership in their community, where leaders are the 
people who can engage with outsiders.  
       Indeed, the most powerful leader of the Suku Asli not only in Teluk Pambang 
but also over the Bengkalis regency as a whole, Pak Ajui, obtained his reputation as 
leader through his ability to communicate with outsiders. He was born in Teluk 
Pambang, the first son of Pak Koding in 1966. He graduated from primary school in 
this village and junior high school in a neighbouring village.  Graduating from junior 
high school was quite an achievement among the Suku Asli of his generation. More 
importantly, according to him, he was a very good football player in his school days, 
and he could establish excellent friendships with Javanese boys in neighbouring 
villages. After graduation, he worked in the village for about ten years in mangrove 
logging. In 1991, he was employed by a touke and worked in an oil corporation in 
the Rawa region for several years, and learned of things beyond the village. After he 
returned to the village at the mid-1990s, he organised the OPSA.  
       According to him, OPSA was first organised by some of his friends for the 
purpose of obtaining subsidies from the regency government for sport and leisure 
activities. As his Javanese friends in the village had obtained subsidies in the same 
way, he planned this and applied. The result was that they obtained the funds and 
bought several footballs and volleyballs. Then, at the end of the 1990s, he applied to 
the village headman to open the hinterland forest at the border area of the village in 
the name of OPSA (see Chapter 3). At this time, around a hundred households joined 
this application, and they cleaned up the forest. At the beginning of the 2000s, he 
again applied for subsidies from the government for the purpose of distributing tanks 
for holding rain water and plastic chairs and tables to Suku Asli households. He also 
obtained this material and distributed them to the households of Suku Asli in Teluk 
Pambang.  
       His leadership has been obviously established through the successful political 
communications with outsiders, especially with the government. On the other hand, 
he rarely intervenes in the everyday life of ordinary people in other spheres, and his 
leadership outside the sphere of communicating with the government is quite vague. 
Here, present leadership is linked with the past batin headmanship. The authority of 
the past batin was legitimated by the state in their tributary relationship, and this 
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relationship was established by the batin’s approach to the state. In the same way, 
Pak Ajui obtained his leadership through approach to the government and his success 
in obtaining the subsidies and the recognition of their land possession. In short, 
leadership among the Suku Asli is formulated in the political communication with 
outsiders. In this view, the state is the most powerful outsider; therefore, the most 
‘powerful’ leaders are people who can communicate with the state. The people I am 
referring to as the leaders are those who can take care of the communication with the 
government as representatives of the community. Because of such a quality, when 
the government intervention increased, leadership became more necessary and 
leaders’ power increased. I will explore this in the latter part of this chapter. 
 
 
Political communication and shamanic power 
 
       In addition to engaging with outsiders, there is another sphere in which 
leadership emerges in Suku Asli society. This is in the context of ritual. In weddings 
and funerals, specific elders who know the procedures of the rituals and adat are 
asked to take the role of organising them. Yet, it is particularly obvious in shamanic 
rituals. In Suku Asli communities, dukun often hold rituals for the purpose of healing 
villagers’ diseases and asking for peace in the community. At the ritual, it is 
necessary to prepare food and small model shrines that are offered to the spirits. On 
the day of the ritual, neighbours gather together in the house where the ritual will be 
held and prepare the offerings. In these procedures, a dukun gives detailed 
indications for the preparations and distributes roles to the people. Dukun can 
directly communicate with spirits and ask for their support during trance. Using 
supernatural power, they care for ordinary people’s troubles and anxiety. They hold 
healing rituals when people fall sick. Some of them also hold annual rituals to guard 
the people and the territory from the intervention of evil spirits. Shamanic power is 
not something that everybody can access. Although everyone can communicate with 
spirits in their dreams, the communication is very vague and passive. Dukun are 
people who were initiated by spirits to be shamans; they have learned spells and 
other forms of control under the tuition of other dukun, and can now actively control 
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the spirits. As only dukun can hear the voices of the spirits, the leader of the rituals is 
always a dukun.  
       Shamanic séance is not political communication with the government. However, 
they are analogous in the significance they attach to a generous personality, 
adventure, courage, and knowledge of the leaders involved. Pak Odang, a famous 
dukun in Teluk Pambang, explained the details of their shamanic cosmology to me. 
According to him, a dukun’s soul (semangat) can fly to a different world when he 
falls into trance during shamanic séances. This different world has a seven-layered 
structure, and dukun can ask for the support of spirits (datuk) living at each stratum 
in exchange for gifts, that is, offerings of food and tobacco prepared for the rituals. 
The higher the stratum, the stronger the spirits and the more danger the dukun’s soul 
is in. Pak Odang can reach the third stratum, but he cannot reach higher ones. In the 
past dukun had stronger shamanic techniques (ilmu), and they were sometimes able 
to reach the seventh stratum and ask for the support of the strongest spirits. His 
sketch of shamanic power is almost analogous to the reputation and power of batin in 
the past as described earlier. They travelled to the palace and brought gifts to the 
sultan. In return, they obtained the title of batin and the legitimacy of the Utan 
community. The present communication with the government involves similar 
implications. The higher the bureaucratic ranks the officials or the offices have, the 
stronger their powers are considered to be. But the higher officials or offices are 
further away, so accessing them is more difficult. A person who can access the 
higher ranks in the government and bring their power to bear in the community is 
regarded as a stronger leader. Interestingly, Pak Ajui ‘became’ a dukun several years 
ago. According to him, the spirits of his father, Pak Koding, who was a famous 
dukun in the village, emerged in his dreams several years ago, and he mastered the 
way of controlling these spirits under the tuition of his father. He held an annual 
shamanic séance together with Pak Koding to pray for the peace of the village.  
       In short, the power and authority of leaders is dictated by their communication 
skills. The powerful leader is one who can adequately communicate with members of 
their community, with outsiders, and with the spirits belonging to the supernatural 
world. In particular, the most difficult and important task is communicating with the 
government. Through communication, leaders can accumulate power and authority 
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within their community. It is remarkable that this skill is totally down to individuals. 
Inheritance is not important at all. Nor is economic power, though economic power 
may often be obtained by people who have communication skills. Therefore, Suku 
Asli leadership is charismatic. I use the word ‘charisma’ in the Weberian sense. 
According to Max Weber (1947), charismatic leaders are ‘natural’ leaders, those who 
apart from the bureaucratic system and their occupation, emerge in ‘times of psychic, 
physical, economic, ethnical, religious and political distress’. And, such leaders hold 
‘specific gifts of the body and spirit; and these gifts have been believed to be 
supernatural, not accessible to everybody’ (1947: 245). Weber saw these leaders as 
important agents of social change but as unstable because their authority is not 
institutionalised. In Suku Asli leadership, such charismatic power is ensured by 
successful communication, especially, with the government, which ordinary people 
find hard to carry out. Yet, as it can be seen as their past batin headmanship and 
present-day leadership in everyday life, Suku Asli leaders have not been really 
interested in ruling or controlling others. IKBBSA was established on such 
leadership; leaders have actively tried to communicate with the government and 
adopt government policies as long as the policies do not contradict their own customs 
and way of life. 
       The establishment of IKBBSA was not only due to the leader’s quest for power, 
but also the government drive to establish the organisation in recent years. As a result, 
the unstable charismatic power is partly institutionalised in a bureaucratic 
organisation. In the next section, I would like to explain how the government 
approached Suku Asli to establish it and how the leaders adopted the government 
approach. 
            
 
Establishment of IKBBSA and its influences 
 
Project to issue marriage letters 
 
       I could not confirm the very first agent that suggested the establishment of 
IKBBSA. The Suku Asli leaders said that they had asked the government to entrust a 
153 
 
new organisation with an administrative procedure; on the other hand, government 
officials said that the government had needed to implement the administrative 
procedure among the Suku Asli and thus had established the organisation. Either way, 
it is certain that the administrative procedure of issuing marriage letters and birth 
certificates was the main trigger for the establishment of IKBBSA. 
       In Indonesia, legal matters of marriage are administrated by the department of 
religious affairs. On the one hand, Muslims can obtain the necessary letter at an 
office of the department of religious affairs. On the other hand, Buddhists, Christians 
and Hindus need to each apply for it to the specific religious body to which they 
belong (see also Chapter 6). A religious body that is authorised by the government 
issues a marriage letter (surat pernikahan) for a couple only when they hold their 
marriage ceremony under its management. This letter is used for obtaining a birth 
certificate (akte kelahiran) at the government office, which is an essential official 
document when children want to enter higher educational institutions or obtain a 
passport. Although it is possible to obtain the birth certificate without the letter, this 
exception is basically meant for a child of a single mother; applicants for this form of 
the certificate have to complete cumbersome office procedures in the regency capital 
and pay relatively expensive charges. 
       Before 2005, almost all Suku Asli did not have a letter or a birth certificate. This 
is because they did not belong to any religious body, and even if some did, they 
rarely held a marriage ceremony under its management. They preferred to hold this 
within their community in the traditional way. Although it is possible to hold the 
ceremony twice both in administrative and traditional ways, this was economically 
difficult. It was also extremely difficult for them to obtain the birth certificate 
without the marriage letter, because it involved the cumbersome office procedures at 
the regency office and the expensive charges. Nevertheless, the lack of documents 
was not so problematic for them at first, as their family registers were kept in 
administrative village offices and their basic citizenship was assured. However, 
according to Pak Ajui, problems arose in recent years. According to him: 
 
It was very difficult to get marriage letter for us in the past. So, everyone did not 
have the birth certificate. It was unequal and often inconvenient. When we want 
to send children to high schools or professional schools and get a passport, we 
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had to complete troublesome chores at regency offices. The charge was also 




For them, obtaining the letter was concerned with access to education that it has 
become essentially important for the future of the Suku Asli. Also they wanted to 
change the situation of having to pay considerable amounts of money for obtaining 
the letter and being able to obtain a passport. Therefore, changing the system of 
letters was an issue that was related to their disadvantaged and marginalised situation. 
According to him, it was Pak Ajui who had asked the government to issue the latter 
more easily and cheaply.   
       On the other hand, from the government’s perspective, it was judicially 
necessary that the Suku Asli obtained such basic official documents. Therefore, the 
officials needed to begin negotiation with Suku Asli leaders to encourage them to 
obtain it. As mentioned later, sending their children to high school and obtaining 
passports that Pak Ajui emphasised was not to do with ordinary villagers’ aspirations. 
Therefore, it is probable that Ajui’s emphasis was a result of the government 
approach at their previous communications with him, in which the officials had 
emphasised Suku Asli’s marginal position, and stimulated his desire to be like 
ordinary Indonesians in terms of their legal obligations.   
       This was the context in which a government project to provide the Suku Asli 
with the letter and certificate started. First, the government enabled the Suku Asli to 
issue the marriage letter (surat perkawinan) by themselves.47 In order to issue the 
letter, it was necessary to have a body that recognised and ensured the marriage in 
their community on behalf of the religious bodies. Therefore, IKBBSA was 
established as the body that certified the marriage. Second, it was necessary to have 
people who were in charge of issuing the letter. Therefore, this role was established 
at each administrative village and given the traditional title of batin in the 
                                                          
47 Strictly speaking, this letter, surat perkawinan, is different from the one issued by religious bodies, 
surat pernikahan. Pernikahan means marriage legitimised by the national laws. On the other hand, 
perkawinan indicates de facto marriage recognised by the community. Therefore, the birth 
certificate issued with the surat perkawinan deals with the child as the mother’s child out of wedlock. 
This means that almost all Suku Asli are children out of wedlock. But this legal status has not caused 
any problem in Suku Asli society, as far as I know.  
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organisation of IKBBSA. Third, the government allowed a sub-district office (kantor 
kecamatan), which is slightly nearer to Suku Asli villages than the regency office, to 
issue the birth certificate with less expensive charges based on the letter issued by the 
batin.  
       This system started in 2005. In this system, batin are not formal officials. They 
do not receive any salary or have roles in the government. Their task is to issue some 
types of letters in terms of marriage, divorce, death and the identity of the Suku Asli 
in return for a small charge.48  However, those letters are valid only when written by 
batin of IKBBSA at each village, and these documents are often required to be 
submitted in the course of various procedures at the government offices at village 
and sub-district levels. Therefore, in practice, the batin’s role is backed by the 
government legitimation, and the government recognises them as representatives of 
Suku Asli.   
       The government and Suku Asli leaders would have designed this system 
consulting the model case of the Akit. In Rupat, batin began to issue the marriage 
letter in the late 1990s. Among the Akit, as the role of the two batin had been 
maintained, the government could simply delegate to them to issue the letters, and 
there was no dramatic transformation. However, in the Suku Asli case, it was 
necessary to appoint new batin first, a process which brought about the strong 
leadership of some people and the consolidation of their power.  
 
 
The selection of batin and establishment of IKBBSA 
 
       When the project to entrust Suku Asli with issuing the letters began, the 
government and Suku Asli leaders had repeated meetings. The main negotiators for 
the government were officials of Bengkalis regency. On the other hand, the main 
negotiator of the Suku Asli was Pak Ajui, and he was strongly supported by Pak 
Kimdi. Pak Kimdi was another essential agent in establishing IKBBSA. He was a 
‘pure’ ethnic Chinese and a touke in Teluk Pambang. He was born in the village of 
                                                          
48 The letter of descent, Surat Keterangan Suku Asli, shows that one is a member of Suku Asli. 
According to villagers, it is necessary to apply for the recommendation of the administrative village 
headman when they want to obtain a passport. 
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Selat Baru, but he moved to Teluk Pambang when he married a peranakan wife in 
Teluk Pambang. He had a masters degree in political economy from a university in 
Jakarta, and was elected a regency assembly member (DPRD; Dewan Perwakilan 
Rakyat Daerah) of Bengkalis regency in 2005. He was also much respected by the 
villagers, as he made donations to maintain graves, shrines and roads in the village. 
Also, many Suku Asli worked in his coconut farms and boatslip which exported the 
coconuts. The houses of Pak Ajui and Kimdi were very close and they would often 
come and go to each other’s house. In terms of the start of the project, Kimdi’s 
contribution would have been very large, as he had considerable knowledge of the 
law in terms of issuing the letters and strong connections with the government 
officials. He often advised Pak Ajui in the ways of negotiation. Also, as the assembly 
member, he approached the government officials to smooth the go ahead of the 
project. 
       After the negotiation between Pak Ajui and the regency officials, Pak Ajui was 
in charge of selecting new batin at each administrative village in the Bengkalis and 
Padang Islands. Pak Ajui actively went back and forth between every administrative 
village and met his friends and leaders at each administrative village. He asked them 
to be the new batin or recommend someone else who was adequate to take on the 
role. The essential qualification was good literacy because the new batin’s main task 
was to write the letters. In some villages, the leaders became batin. On the other hand, 
in some villages, young and educated men were appointed as batin, as they were 
more literate than the leaders, who were often aged.  
       At the establishment of IKBBSA, Suku Asli leaders adopted the government 
image of an ethnic organisation to a large extent. First, the organisation has a 
bureaucratic order involving hierarchical and regional organisations. The role of 
regency batin is at the top of the hierarchy. Then there are the roles of the sub-district 
batin and village batin. Under the village batin, there are the adat manager and 
secretaries. The first regency batin of Bengkalis regency was taken by Pak Ajui. The 
eastern islands of Padang, Ransang, Tebing Tinggi and Merbau Islands became a 
new regency of the Meranti Islands regency, separated from Bengkalis regency in 
2010. At this time, a leader who engaged in the selection of batin on these islands in 
2005 became the new regency batin of the Meranti Islands regency. In addition, a 
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similar organisation was established among the people who had been called the 
Rawa living in Siak regency under the support of Pak Ajui, who had a strong 
connection with the Rawa region. Second, the organisation has an election system, in 
which the batin was appointed by voting within their committee. According to Pak 
Ajui, this system was introduced as the government required them to use a 
‘democratic way’ of choosing. The first vote was conducted in 2005. At this time, all 
committee members, who had been recommended by Pak Ajui, were appointed to 
batin. Then, in 2010, the second vote was held. At this vote, some batin were 
rejected, because ‘they did not carry out their responsibility’, according to Pak Ajui. 
These systems are totally new ones created through the cooperation between the 
government and the Suku Asli leaders. The batin system among the Akit does not 




Identification and certification 
 
      The establishment of IKBBSA brought about a change in terms of Suku Asli 
identification and certification. This change began with the creation of their ethnic 
name, the adoption of which took place in parallel with the establishment of 
IKBBSA. Before 2005, the government had, since the colonial era, continuously 
used the term ‘Orang/Suku Utan’ to refer to them. Indeed, the government 
documents and books that were written before 2005 referred to the people in this way. 
However, the people themselves would have used a variety of names depending on 
the context and situation. The term most frequently used was ‘Orang Asli’. As I 
mentioned in Chapter 2, this term most fitted their identity. Even during my 
fieldwork, many informants used this term when they referred to themselves in 
conversation. However, this term is vague as ‘orang asli’ is generally used for 
indicating a number of tribespeople – ‘Orang Akit’, ‘Orang Sakai’ and ‘Orang 
Talang’ are all ‘orang asli’. Even if they identify themselves as ‘Orang Asli’ in 
conversation with an outsider, the outsider would ask an additional question in order 
to specify the group such as ‘And, what is your suku’ (Dan, sukunya apa?). In this 
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context, they used ‘Suku Asli’. ‘Orang Akit’ was also used by many people who had 
kinsmen or ancestors related to the Akit in Rupat. Yet, according to present-day Suku 
Asli, they have refused to be called ‘Orang Utan’. Pak Ajui says: 
  
In the past, our ancestors lived in the forest (utan). So, they may well be called 
‘Orang Utan’. However, now, we live in a village (desa). This name is very 
rough (kasar) and impolite (tidak sopan) as we live in villages at present. Orang 
utan is a kind of ape who lives elsewhere. We are human. 
 
However, some would probably have used ‘Orang Utan’ as well, at least, in their 
interactions with the government, because it was the ethnic name legitimised by the 
Siak kingdom, and one the post-independence government used until 2005.  
       At the establishment of the organisation of the Suku Asli, it became necessary to 
integrate the various and vague names. In this process, there was tough negotiation 
between the government and the people, and they considered a number of different 
options. For example, ‘Orang Asli’ was entertained because the people had used it. 
However, this name was rejected by the government because it was not a proper 
name but a shared one. The government suggested the name ‘Suku Melayu Utan’ 
(the Forest Malays). However, Suku Asli leaders strongly rejected this name as they 
were neither Malays nor living in the forest. In addition, ‘Suku Akit’ and ‘Suku Rawa’ 
were options and the leaders considered these in their discussions, but they could not 
decide between them because there was no consensus. Eventually, the government 
decided on a completely new ethnic name, ‘Suku Akit Jaya’ (the Prosperous Akit) 
overriding the objections from the leaders. The first organisation was established 
with the name of ‘Suku Akit Jaya’ in 2005, and the government called them that. 
However, this name was completely new and remote from their own identification, 
so the people did not accept it. Therefore, in 2006, the leaders again requested the 
government to change the name to ‘Suku Asli’ which they had been used to calling 
themselves. This name involved a similar problem as ‘Orang Asli’ and the 
government were hesitant to recognise it. However, as a result of the leaders’ 
negotiations, the name ‘Suku Asli’ was officially recognised by the regency officials. 
       The name, Suku Asli, was fixed. This means not only accomplishing an 
agreement with the government but also clarifying their identity. This clarification of 
their identity was reinforced by the documents. All documents that are issued by 
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batin have the letterhead of IKBBSA that includes the name ‘Suku Asli’. In addition, 
the marriage letter was issued in sets with SKSA (Surat Keterangan Suku Asli), 
which certifies the holder as a member of the Suku Asli community. This can be seen 
as a landmark event in terms of the certification of their identity. They have had 
choices of identification based on their individual history of moves, complex of 
kinship networks, ancestral connections and the community in which they lived (see 
Chapter 2). However, the documents simplified the issues and clearly designated 
them as belonging to one ethnic group, the Suku Asli. Although their identity does 
not always coincide with the addresses on documents, this certifies them as Suku 
Asli and becomes the main basis of their identification in relation to the government 
administrative procedures. According to Pak Ajui, all Suku Asli who obtained the 
letter from IKBBSA are members of IKBBSA, and they are Suku Asli. 
        It is remarkable that, many peranakan – the peranakan Chinese, who had less 
intimate ancestral relationships with the Suku Asli, spoke the Chinese language and 
lived in Chinese communities (see Chapter 2) – asked the batin to issue their letters 
too. At the establishment of IKBBSA, the role of batin was important not only at the 
administrative villages where many Suku Asli lived, but also in those villages where 
most of the population were peranakan. This would have been a concern of Kimdi’s 
participation in which he tried to support the peranakan Chinese and enable them to 
acquire the right kind of letter. Until 2007, when the ethnic Chinese wanted to obtain 
a passport and to register in order to vote, they had to apply for SBKRI (Surat Bukti 
Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia) at regency offices; this was an official 
certification to show the person was an Indonesian citizen. The charge was very 
expensive, and it was an economic burden for non-wealthy peranakan. However, the 
SBKRI could be replaced by the letter from the batin, SKSA. Therefore, they 
actively applied for the latter. According to Pak Ajui, ‘At present, more and more 
peranakan (Chinese) become (masuk) the Suku Asli.’ Many people who may have 
been regarded as ethnic Chinese ‘became’ Suku Asli, at least, on the document. 
       On the other hand, through the change of the ethnic name and the documentation 
of the letters, the boundary with the Akit is becoming clearer than in the past. During 
my short trip to Rupat, an Akit leader showed his sceptical attitude to the change of 
the ethnic name of the Utan. According to him, ‘They say “We are the Suku Asli”, 
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but which suku asli are they (suku asli siapa)? They were the Akit or Utan, but I 
don’t know who the Suku Asli is.’ His opinion was the same as that of the 
government officials, i.e. the name ‘Suku Asli’ is ambiguous; but for the Akit, the 
Utan are people who have the same ancestors with them. Therefore his opinion 
involved some discomfort in terms of Suku Asli’s disregard of their common history. 
After IKBBSA was established, Suku Asli leaders repeatedly invited Akit leaders to 
their meetings and festivals, but the Akit leaders did not attend them. In addition, the 
documents with the new name can be a potential criterion in distinguishing the Suku 
Asli form the Akit. The Akit are also an ethnic group as a result of government 
intervention around the late 1990s. However, in Chapter 2, I mentioned Odang’s 
comment ‘I may well become an Akit’ when he would move to Rupat. This shows 
that while ordinary Suku Asli villagers did not really recognise the importance of the 
way in which their identity was being crystallised on the document during my 
fieldwork yet, it is possible that it will gain more importance than one based on the 
region in the future.      
       Through the fixing of their ethnic name and the official certificates, their identity, 
which involved vagueness and diversity characterised mostly by the ‘non-Islamic 
alliance’ until recently, has started obtaining coherent and distinctive substantiality. 
However, Scott (1998: 1-83) points out that the government have attempted to reduce 
complex local knowledge and backgrounds through the simplified identification in 
order to control them more easily and effectively. It could be argued that the 
government accomplished this through the establishment of the organisation in the 
Suku Asli case. In addition, as Hirtz (2003) points out, when one tries to legitimate 
‘tradition-based’ social institutions, they are ‘forced to make use of rational form of 
organization and institution-building’ that the national or international authorities 
legitimate (2003: 910). Nevertheless, in many ways, this is a real change. 
 
 
Leaders’ power and its limitations 
 
       The establishment of IKBBSA brought about changes not only of identification 
and certification, but also in terms of the leaders’ power. First, IKBBSA created 
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political networks between the leaders living in distant communities. Before its 
establishment, they did not generally communicate, and if they did, it was 
individually. However, after the establishment of IKBBSA, they held meetings 
inviting all the incumbents together at certain times of the year. In these meetings, 
they discussed the problems and issues of each village, and decided the direction of 
IKBBSA. Their identity that was rather fragmented and vague in the past was 
integrated, at least, at the level of the leaders. 
       Second, IKBBSA enabled the leaders to behave as the representatives of the 
Suku Asli in their engagement with the government. The government had to deal 
with the leaders’ petitions in the same way they had to deal with those from the 
ethnic organisations of the Javanese or Malays. This dramatically raised the 
possibility that the Suku Asli could receive support and recognition from the 
government as ‘Suku Asli’. The change of their ethnic name became possible only 
after the leaders were recognised. They built a community centre (balai pertemuan) 
of IKBBSA in Teluk Pambang receiving government subsidies. They began holding 
annual festivals and periodic meetings, which received government support. The 
relation between leaders and the government became closer, and they were able to 
acquire government support. 
       Finally, the reputation of some leaders was dramatically strengthened. This was 
to do with the accumulation of knowledge about negotiation with the government. 
During my fieldwork, I saw that many people, who were leaders around Teluk 
Pambang, gathered in Ajui’s house every day. Their purpose was to make up various 
kinds of documents and petitions to the government. The contents of the documents 
were various, such as petitions to obtain subsidies for fishing and agricultural groups 
and the certification of land possession. Pak Ajui had a computer and kept various 
copies of documents that he had submitted to the government. People wrote the 
documents in his house, brought them back to their communities, and applied for 
government support or recognition. This raised Pak Ajui and the leaders’ reputations 
in their community. In short, the establishment of IKBBSA dramatically increased 
leaders’ power in society. 
       Yet, the ordinary villagers’ situation has not changed dramatically. After the new 
batin began issuing the letters, almost all of them obtained the letters and certificates 
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from the new batin. However, they have just kept them in their houses and not used 
them for the purpose that Pak Ajui specified. This is natural because, although a few 
well-off Suku Asli and many peranakan Chinese actually had the desire to obtain the 
documents easily and cheaply for the purpose of sending their children to higher 
education institutions or obtaining passports, ordinary Suku Asli had no such desires. 
For them, it is often difficult to send their children even to junior high school in the 
village. Also, I have never heard of cases that any Suku Asli, including the leaders, 
obtained passports using the letters, though some peranakan Chinese would have 
done so. For ordinary Suku Asli, obtaining the letter was no more than a new 
obligation imposed by the government. They have not obtained any benefits from the 
documents, at least not yet. 
       In addition, they have not been concerned with the selection of batin. The choice 
of batin was exclusively conducted by Pak Ajui and some of the other leaders. The 
organisation has been maintained by the voting system conducted within the batin’s 
committee. Furthermore, because batin were appointed by the administrative village, 
the leaders of some small distant communities were not selected as batin or other 
functionaries. In this situation, I met some villagers living on the periphery of an 
administrative village who did not know who the village batin was and confused the 
village batin with the ‘informal’ leader of their small community. This resulted from 
the fact that while people obtained their letters and certificates following the advice 
of the government or the new batin, they have not understood that they were also 
involved as members of IKBBSA.  
       In short, IKBBSA has been organised and operated neither to reflect the 
aspirations nor the participation of ordinary Suku Asli. Rather, it is an embodiment 
of elite (leaders and the peranakan Chinese) and government administrators’ 
aspirations. On the one hand, the organisation has allowed the elites to accomplish 
their aspirations, and then increase their economic and political power through their 
communications with the government. On the other hand, the government has 
managed to force the people to obtain the administrative certificates that all 
Indonesian citizens are required to hold, and identify them more clearly within the 
administrative procedures. It is also true that ordinary villagers began using their own 
preferred ethnic name ‘Suku Asli’ and have received some indirect benefits from the 
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operation of IKBBSA. However, these are just the results of their leaders’ quest for 
economic and political power, and ordinary people are not really involved in these 
activities.  
       This shows some of the ways in which there is a separation between an ethnic 
organisation and the actual ethnic group. Ethnic organisation and ethnic group are 
not equal. As Roger Brubaker points out:  
 
[…] organizations cannot be equated with ethnic groups. […] Although common 
sense and participants’ rhetoric attribute discrete existence, boundedness, 
coherence, identity, interest, and agency to ethnic group, these attributes are in 
fact characteristics of organisation. (2004: 15) 
 
IKBBSA is at the centre of how identity, boundedness and coherence are 
demonstrated; however, it does not reflect the feelings of ordinary villagers. 
   
 
A new relationship between tribespeople and the state 
 
       In the recent political engagement between the Suku Asli and the regency 
government, we can see a specific way of creating a new relationship between 
tribespeople and the state. The state’s readiness to recognise the local and traditional 
authorities has not been a new governing method; the government have always 
looked for ‘informal’ leaders, who are outside of state politics, in order to exert 
control over rural areas effectively (Ufford 1987). For example, in the period of 
‘ethical policy’ (1905-1930; see Chapter 5), the colonial government looked for 
volkshoofden, or ‘informal’ leaders, and legitimised them through voting in order to 
drive forward ‘modernisation’ in rural areas (Ufford 1987: 146-148). After 
independence, kijaji, local Muslim teachers in Java, were transformed into ‘cultural 
brokers’ who mediate between the national and local levels under the government 
pressure to implement religious policies in rural areas (Geertz 1960). Philip van 
Ufford (1987: 146) analyses the government attitudes as follows: 
 
Any government which declares that modernization is important must find tools 
for implementing its views. It is in this context that the government may look for 
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people's representatives, […] informal leaders. The quest for change requires not 
only 'tradition', but also a view which makes change manageable. The 
government, incapable of knowing the myriad of local differentiations, is also 
faced with its incapability to deal with all of them, and must find people who are 
able to do so effectively. The concept of the local leader, representing all those 
'bound by tradition', provides this need.  
 
However, the government seems to have taken this approach only in its encounters 
with relatively ‘civilised’ populations like Javanese and did not apply it to 
tribespeople. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, during the Sukarno and Suharto eras, the 
government almost ignored tribespeople or tried to directly reform and restrict their 
behaviour and ways of life. Tribespeople were regarded as the subjects of 
development projects that were supposed to make ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’ people 
‘civilised’. In this scheme, recognising leaders’ positions was contradictory with the 
government scheme of ‘development’ or changing the traditional society, and indeed, 
the government replaced their traditional headmen by administrators from the 
civilised outsiders (Effendy 1997: 633-634).  
       In the post-Suharto era, these policies have been changed, and, in this change, 
we can see the emergence of ‘governmentality’ in the manner of government’s 
intervention in the life of tribespeople. The government has recognised their 
traditional but ‘informal’ leaders and political institutions and engaged with them. 
Through these policies, they try to educate the leaders and ultimately to configure 
habits, aspirations and beliefs among tribespeople as a whole. In other words, the 
government has tried to shape their ‘conduct of conduct’ (Li 2007b: 5). The desire, 
aspirations, and habits that the government want to introduce into tribespeople’s 
communities can be summarised as ‘becoming “adat community”’, a government 
image of an ideal and harmonious rural community, a specific form of ‘indigenous 
people’. Therefore, in the process of these policies, the government requires the 
leaders to show their coincidence with the government image and criteria, and the 
tribespeople show it in ‘modern’ ways that the government accepts. In the Suku Asli 
case, they introduced the bureaucratic and ‘democratic’ ethnic organisation and the 
documentation of identity. In other words, the government have tried to introduce 
both indigeneity and modernity to tribespeople’s society by effecting an ethos of 
‘governmentality’. In this sense, indigeneity can be a tool to bring tribespeople to a 
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modernisation which is framed in terms of how the tribespeople are or, perhaps, 
ought to be as first and foremost ‘indigenous’. 
       Thus, this ‘governmentality’ is limited. This limitation emerged because of the 
cultural logics among the tribespeople themselves. In the Suku Asli case, the leaders 
pursued their charismatic power in communication with the government, but they 
were not really interested in controlling or ruling the ordinary villagers, which the 
government had expected. On the other hand, the ordinary villagers did not want a 
strong leadership except in the context of communication with the government in 
their traditional uncentralised and segmentary social structure. As a result, while 
Suku Asli identity has been obtaining the coherent and distinctive substantiality for 
the government and Suku Asli participating in the organisation, there are many 
people who are outside this consolidation. 
        Therefore, it is necessary for the organisation to demonstrate a distinctive and 
coherent position of themselves in relation to ordinary villagers. Indeed, IKBBSA 
have tried to integrate ordinary people through performances which demonstrate the 
Suku Asli  as an ‘adat community’. I will explore the way in which IKBBSA tries to 




















Manifestation of Tradition: Adat, Performance and Integration 
 
        ‘Adat’ is a key word for understanding cultural diversity and national 
integration in Indonesia, but its meaning is quite complicated. The term ‘adat’ is 
derived from Arabic, and often translated as ‘tradition’, ‘custom’ and ‘customary 
law’. In more detail, Franz von Benda-Beckmann (1979: 429) translated this word in 
his glossary as ‘tradition’, ‘custom’, ‘law’, ‘morality’, ‘political system’, and ‘legal 
system’. Clifford Geertz (1983: 210) added ‘ritual’ and ‘etiquette’. In short, ‘adat’ 
can be seen as a whole set of enduring practices or ideologies that have been 
inherited from the ancestors in a society. It is said that adat has certainly existed in 
each rural community since the pre-colonial era, and there are myriad communities 
having their own adat, i.e. ‘adat communities (masyarakat adat)’, in Indonesia. As 
adat involves the local legal system that may be different from national laws, there 
have been continuous communications between the locals and the state in terms of 
and about adat. In the colonial era, the government recognised the significance of 
adat as local law in each ‘adat community’ as a subpart of the national laws. After 
independence, while adat lost its legal legitimacy in the implementation of integrated 
national laws, ‘adat communities’ were seen as the essential components of post-
independence Indonesia. In recent years of ‘decentralisation’, ‘adat’ and ‘adat 
community’ have been a banner of the Indonesian ‘indigenous movement’. They are 
the basis on which the local populations claim their land rights that were ignored 
during the Suharto regime. Adat emerges on the interfaces between locals and the 
state in the history of the Indonesian state once again, and national activists and local 
authorities have tried to regain the authority of adat in recent years. 
       However, the relationship between adat and state policies cannot be reduced to a 
simple and fixed arrangement of historically continuous local traditions versus newly 
imposed national regulation. Reflecting the debates on ‘the invention of tradition’ 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger 1992), the concept of ‘adat’ in each local community has 
been influenced by state policies since the Dutch colonial era (e.g. Burns 1989; 
Henley & Davidson 2007; Josselin de Jong 1948). While some locals, such as ‘dresta’ 
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in Bali, ‘aluk’ in Tana Toraja and ‘adat’ in western Sumatra, had unique terms for 
indicating their ‘tradition’, ‘custom’ or ‘customary law’, these have been transformed 
into the pan-Indonesian concept of ‘adat’ by policies regarded as acceptable by the 
state (Acciaioli 1985). In addition, the forces of ‘tradition’ or ‘custom’ within a 
community are different from region to region. Although some local populations, 
such as the Balinese, Toraja and Minangkabau, have had strong ‘traditions’ or 
‘customs’, there were communities where traditions or customs were more flexible 
and diffuse (Li 1999: 10; 2000: 159). In the latter case, people have conceptualised 
their adat in communications with the government as relatively flexible and 
situational, and this process has continued until today.  
       The Suku Asli are some of the peoples who have had a flexible and diffuse adat. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 2, their collective identity does not necessarily depend on 
a single adat, and they have used the term adat in the very limited sphere of ancestral 
worship. Rather, their adat has been something conceptualised and objectified in 
historical interactions with the state rather than implying a whole set of socially 
enduring systems or ideologies. However, in recent interactions with the government 
through IKBBSA, they have begun using the term adat more frequently and with 
slightly different meaning from their traditional usage – that is, as ‘art’ represented 
performatively. By describing the national concept of adat, the meaning of adat in 
Suku Asli communities, and their recent manifestation of adat in art, I would like to 
explore the Suku Asli way of manifesting indigeneity in this chapter. 
       First, I summarise the historical process of conceptualising ‘adat’ and ‘adat 
community’ in political communication between the state and locals. Second, I 
analyse the meaning of adat in Suku Asli everyday life and how it has been 
conceptualised. Finally, I describe the new applications of adat after the 
establishment of IKBBSA and its influence on their society. Suku Asi adat is 
acquiring a new meaning as ‘art’ through the activity of IKBBSA, and this embodies 
not only an image of the ‘adat community’ as it emerges in state development 
policies but also as an attempt to create homogeneity within communities through 





Conceptualisation of ‘adat’ and ‘adat community’ in political 
communication 
 
Conceptualisation in the late colonial era 
 
       The state definition of adat began to be formulated in the early days of the late 
colonial era in the process of the government trying to effectuate national laws over 
the archipelago. In the early colonial era of the eighteenth century, the main interest 
of the VOC was in the exploration of resources and products obtained from the 
archipelago, rather than ruling the native population. The distinction between 
Europeans, Dutch subjects and other native populations were not so strict in the legal 
system of this era, and local legal systems were outside the VOC control. For 
example, Christians and city dwellers, who were engaged in the miscellaneous 
activities of Dutch trade, were regarded as the subjects of Dutch national laws, but 
the rural populations were regarded as the subjects of their traditional customary 
laws. The VOC government flexibly applied this legal system to the population 
(Fasseur 1994; Li 2007b: 44). However, after the Dutch government set about 
reinforcing direct rule over the archipelago at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
the government tried to classify the population based on ‘racial’ difference between 
‘Europeans’ and ‘Natives’ (inlanders; bumiptera) (Moniaga 2007: 277). In the 
government regulations for the Netherland Indies of 1854, for example, it was 
codified that, while Europeans were subject to Dutch national law, ‘Natives’ 
including city dwellers and Christians were to be the subjects of ‘their own religious 
law, institutions, and customs’ (Fasseur 2007: 50; see also Li 2007b: 44). This local 
‘religious law, institutions, and customs’ was adat. The court system was also 
divided into two: one for ‘Europeans’ and one for ‘non-Europeans’ (Fasseur 2007: 
50). In this legal pluralism, local law systems held a fully legitimised position, even 
though the laws played only a minor role under the Dutch national laws. In this 
system, land ownership by the local customary communities was fully recognised, 
and although the uncultivated land was leased out to Europeans and Chinese, they 
could not possess the land permanently (Henley & Davidson 2007: 20).  
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       However, this legal pluralism gradually became difficult to sustain at the turn of 
the twentieth century when some Europeans and officials began insisting on the 
necessity of effectuating an integrated national law (Fasseur 2007: 50). The 
ownership of uncultivated lands became problematic outside Java following the 
expansion of private plantations, and Europeans began requiring the government to 
apply a European system of land ownership, which allowed Europeans and Chinese 
to permanently possess the uncultivated lands (Henley & Davidson 2007: 19- 20). In 
response to this movement, some scholars and officials required the government to 
protect the rights of the local communities based on their ‘ethnic’ nature because the 
severe economic policies, best represented by the ‘Culture System’ imposed on Java, 
brought about serious poverty among the locals (Li 2007b: 40-41).49 Between the 
two factions, a debate was sparked at the beginning of the twentieth century on 
whether a single legal system should be established or not. The centre of the latter 
stance was at Leiden School of adat law studies in Netherland, where Cornelis von 
Vollenhaven and his colleagues began to elaborate the concept of adat in order to 
oppose the application of the Dutch national laws in the Netherland East Indies.    
       Von Vollenhaven claimed the recognition and protection of the ‘right of 
allocation’ enjoyed by an ‘adat law community’ (adatrechtsgemeenschap). He 
defined the right of allocation as one to recognise the free use of uncultivated land 
within a territory by the adat law community and its members, and to restrict 
alienation and an outsider’s use of the lands (Burns 1989: 9-10, 2007: 74). In parallel 
with this claim, he and his colleagues elaborated the concepts of ‘adat’ and ‘adat 
community’. Peter Burns (1989: 56-57) argues that Leiden scholars regarded adat as 
a total world view. For them, adat community was an organic whole; in which 
people were related with each other and were also connected with the natural world 
through supernatural beliefs; the role of ‘adat law’ (adatrecht; hukum adat) was to 
restore and maintain the balances and harmonies in the world (see also Li 2007b: 48). 
As this idea was totally different from the European legal system, the Leiden 
scholars insisted that the population of the Netherland East Indies should be 
governed by their own legal principles (Henley & Davidson 2007: 21). In order to 
                                                          
49 A ‘Culture System’ is a system in which peasants were forced to cultivate cash crops such as coffee, 
indigo, sugar cane and gambier for exportation. This suppressed the cultivation of self-supporting 
crops among the peasants, and they fell into serious poverty.  
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develop their argument, the scholars carried out research on adat and rural 
communities. They categorised the legal-cultural areas of nineteen ‘adat law areas’ 
(adatrechtskringen) in the Indonesian archipelago, each of which involved numerous 
but similar adat communities. This categorisation almost corresponded with the map 
of major Indonesian languages and cultures (Burns 2007: 73).  
       It is remarkable that the Leiden scholars’ discourses saw the cultural 
independence of each local community as the main source of the legal right to land. 
As a local community maintained their cultural independence, in which the locals 
harmoniously and ‘naturally’ adapted to a region and environment, they held priority 
over access to the land. By emphasising the position of a historically coherent culture 
that continued from the past to the future, the Leiden scholars tried to strengthen the 
argument that local communities’ land rights should be protected. As Li points out 
(2000: 159), ‘The Dutch concept of the adat law community […] assumed, as it 
simultaneously attempted to engineer named, bounded, and organized groups’ across 
the archipelago. The government adopted this idea, and reflected it in the policies to 
control the archipelago. A series of government policies that actively intervened in 
the rural lives with the intent of their reforms based on this idea was called ‘ethical 
policy’ which continued from 1905 to 1930 (Li 2007b: 32, 41-51). Through these 
policies, ‘adat community’ began to be considered the basic rural component of the 
colonial state polity.  
       Some scholars point out that the Leiden School was the main agent in 
constructing the images of ‘adat’ and ‘adat community’. For example, around the era 
of Indonesia’s independence, J. P. B. Josselin de Jong (1948) questioned the validity 
of the concept of ‘adat law’ referring to it as ‘confusing fiction’. He points out that 
the government and Dutch scholars’ emphasis on adat was based on European 
centred perspectives on ‘law’ and ‘custom’ and ignored the complexity of adat at 
local levels. Burns (1989) also suggests that the concept of adat is ‘myth’, which was 
constructed by Dutch scholars and embedded in the polity of post-independence 
Indonesia as an ‘axiom’ of the state ideology. He stated: ‘the difficulty I have with 
the myth […] is that once it is offered as an explanatory device, it is not susceptible 
to empirical correction’ (1989: 93). It worked as a too persuasive and powerful 
conceptual framework and rejected deviations. The deviations were interpreted as 
171 
 
breakdowns or polluted repertories of a pristine adat as ever existed (Burns 1989: 78-
79, 94-97). The images of ‘adat’ and ‘adat community’ – that is, a historically 
continuous and harmonious rural community – was articulated in the interactions 
between locals and the state for administrative and economic reasons before the 
independence of Indonesia.  
 
 
The transformation of the state concept of adat after Independence 
 
       The Leiden scholars promoted an ideal, balanced and harmonious image of ‘adat’ 
and ‘adat community’, and this image was inherited by the post-independence 
government. The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia included this ideal 
image of adat. This was accomplished by the contribution of Supomo, a graduate of 
the Leiden School and a principle author of the constitution. However, ‘adat’ in the 
constitution was not the same as that of the colonial era, and the value of rural 
communities was more emphasised. During the Japanese occupation, the Japanese 
colonial government deployed propaganda that Asian people share common values 
completely different from those of Europeans, especially the Dutch. In this 
propaganda, adat was regarded as the basic value among Indonesians (Bourchier 
2007: 116-117; Henley & Davidson 2007: 21). As a result, the concept of adat was 
abstracted and embedded in the constitution as a pan-Indonesian value. Li  (2007b: 
51 - 52) expresses this abstraction as: ‘the adat of the constitution was adat in the 
abstract, adat as the embodiment of the zeitgeist, repository of the authentic 
Indonesian spirit, not the functioning customary practices of rural communities’. 
Adat became something related to the Indonesian nation and nationalism, to which 
everyone who lived in Indonesia was or should be related. Because of this 
idealisation, both elites and peasants accepted the concept of ‘adat community’, but 
it was embedded in the political structure of post-colonial Indonesia as a political 
tool. 
       The new national concept of ‘adat community’ had two remarkable points. First, 
the legal legitimacy and autonomy that had been enshrined in the past concept of 
‘adat community’ was dramatically disempowered. In the Sukarno regime, for 
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example, the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 referred to the term ‘customary law 
community’, but it specified that when customary land rights and national law 
contradicted each other, it was adat that had to be amended. In the beginning, this 
law had provisions on behalf of local communities in order to ‘recognise customary 
land rights, redistribute former plantations leased to Europeans, and distribute private 
land held by individuals in excess’. However, as the bureaucracy was limited when it 
came to exerting state authority, the government failed to implement the reforms (Li 
2007b: 52-53). In addition, in the early Suharto regime, the Basic Forestry Law of 
1967 also involved the term ‘customary law community’. However, this law was 
generally interpreted as ensuring the priority of the state’s right over the adat 
communities (Henley & Davidson 2007: 11). By this minimisation of the legal 
aspects of adat, the government tried to defuse not only obstacles based on adat that 
might prevent the state from having free access to the resources in a territory, but 
also the potential risk that adat might bring about particularism and even secession 
from the state.  
       Second, the linkage between ‘culture’ and adat was maintained or even 
celebrated. ‘Culture’ here is the traditional practices with ‘“thing-like” quality’ such 
as dances, songs, music, architecture, handcraft and so on (Shu-Yuan Yang 2011). 
This is partly because the government tried to facilitate tourism, in which ‘culture’ 
became the important resource to attract foreign travellers. Indeed, Bali and Tana 
Toraja became the centre of mass tourism emphasising their ‘culture’ after the 1980s 
(Acciaioli 1985: 158-159). However, more importantly, this is because the 
government tried to control local populations through the culturalisation of adat. By 
defining local adat as ‘culture’, the government was able to reduce the legal and 
political influence of local adat without strong resistance. By simplifying the local 
cultures in terms of adat, the government was also able to catalogue them and make 
them ‘a constituent of an alleged national culture’ (Colombijn 2003b: 337). I will 
return to this topic at a later part of this chapter.  
       After the fall of Suharto in 1998, the autonomy and self-determination of local 
communities was reconsidered under the banner of reformasi. A series of laws, 
which suppressed local rights, were amended. Under this government framework, the 
connection between adat and the law has been reconstructed by NGOs and local 
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authorities. The most influential NGO AMAN includes the term ‘adat community’ in 
its very name, and translates the transnational concept ‘indigenous peoples’ as ‘adat 
community’ (see Introduction). They are trying to recover local land rights in the 
areas where the government and corporations have exploited land and its resources 
emphasising the importance of protecting the rights of local people in terms of adat. 
In addition, the local elites also have begun to claim their customary land rights 
against the government’s encroachment. They also emphasise the value of their ‘adat’ 
and ‘adat community’ and have tried to negotiate with the government (Henley & 
Davidson 2007: 1-5). This means that a legal character has been attached to ‘adat’ 
once again in the recent indigenous movement in Indonesia.  
 
 
The impact of the state concept on local communities 
 
       The state concepts of ‘adat’ and ‘adat community’ were formulated after the late 
colonial era, and their implications have been changing in accordance with the 
implementation of the government administrative and economic policies. However, 
at the level of local communities, local authorities have employed their own adat 
when mediating negotiations and disputes within their communities (Acciaioli 1985: 
150; Li 2000: 159). Therefore, the locals have been confronted with the necessity to 
adjust the implications and operations of their adat, which were inherited from their 
ancestors as practices, in accord with the change in implications created by the state 
concept. 
       On the one hand, the impact of the state conceptualisation of adat on the local 
adat can be seen as a process related to its reduction or ‘erosion’ (Acciaioli 1985: 
152). Greg Acciaioli (1985) describes such a process among the Da’a Toraja. 
Suggesting that ‘adat has provided the primary frame of reality’ for the local 
communities, he argues that ‘the penetration of national organizational forms has 
operated to relativize adat, to situate it as but one plan for living among a host of 
others’ (1985: 151-152). Then, he continues:  
 
No longer a matter of practice, following adat has become a matter of 
consciously adhering to prescribed ceremonial, of performing ritual and acting in 
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accord with an etiquette deemed valuable though not exclusive in its claims to 
adherence (1985: 152). 
 
Adat was an unconscious and exclusive frame of reality for the local communities. 
However, in the process of the state’s penetration into local life, adat was eroded and 
became an alternative to the national law and reduced to a ceremonial one. Yet, in 
contrast, the state policies also encouraged the locals to codify and elaborate their 
adat. Franz von Benda-Beckmann & Keevet von Benda-Beckmann (2011) argue that 
the Minangkabau elites elaborated and codified their adat in terms of land rights in 
the judicial pluralism that existed under the Dutch colonial rule. Analysing the 
records of local government and courts in western Sumatra, they note that in the 
colonial government policies that forced the Minangkabau to cultivate cash crops for 
exportation, Minangkabau elites conceptualised the right of allocation as adat in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, and this was maintained by the locals until today. 
They emphasise the role of local agency and, in this sense, adat became a 
counterclaim of the locals against the national policies. In either way, the ancestral 
practices, which have been unconsciously inherited from the ancestors, have been 
objectified and fixed in each local community under the influences of the state 
policies regarding adat. 
       However, the transformation of the local adat did not happen simultaneously in 
every community across the archipelago; rather the process has been gradually going 
ahead. As the trigger was the Dutch colonial or post-independence government 
politics, the transformations have been brought about in accordance with the increase 
of engagement with the government. Li (2000) points out that tradition or adat was 
formed as a result of the state interventions rather than inherited from ancestors, and 
the process is not homogeneous over the archipelago. According to her: 
 
[…], it corresponded better to the formations that arose as result of colonial 
interventions (including the adat codification process itself) than it did to those 
that existed prior to Dutch control. In regions of little interest to the Dutch, the 
process of traditionalization did not occur or was incomplete, and identities, 
practices, and authority in matters of custom remained—and in some cases still 
remain—flexible and diffuse. (Li 2000: 159; see also Benda-Beckmann 1979; 




The communities that experienced the transformation of adat were those in the areas 
only where the colonial government was interested and had strong influence, such as 
western Sumatra and Bali (see Benda-Beckmann 1979: 120-125). However, there are 
many areas where the colonial government was less interested; the local authorities 
did not work adequately; and the possession of uncultivated land was not competitive. 
In such communities, adat has remained flexible and diffuse, and the transformation 
of adat is something continuous until the present. The Suku Asli are obviously some 
of those who have not been influenced by state policies until very recently and have 
had flexible and diffuse customs.  
     
 
Meaning of adat in the Suku Asli community 
 
The usage of adat among Suku Asli 
 
       While some societies have a unique term to indicate their ancestral practices in 
their language such as ‘dresta’ in Bali and ‘aluk’ in Tana Toraja, the Suku Asli do 
not have it and use ‘adat’. Given the fact that the term was derived from Arabic, 
Suku Asli initially adopted the concept through their communication with dominant 
Malays and Minangkabau after they were subsumed under the polity of the Siak 
kingdom in the eighteenth century. It is unknown how they used the term adat in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, present-day Suku Asli use the term 
adat in a very limited sphere of everyday life, and the meaning appears to be vague. 
       They do not use the term adat in terms of possession of land and resources at all. 
As for the lands of homestead and hinterland gardens, they just follow the national 
law. Each household usually registers the ownership of the homestead and gardens at 
the village office, and they buy and sell the lands based on the market rate and their 
negotiating skills. On inheritance of the lands, they divide it among their children 
equally. They do not express such rules as adat; the people concerned seem to 
naturally accept it without any references to adat. As for the mangrove swamps, to 
which the ‘right of allocation’ might be applied, they also do not use the term adat. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, the most important source of livelihood before was 
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mangrove logging in the swamps. With regard to logging, people went to the swamps 
in small canoes and freely logged the timbers where they wanted in the basin of the 
Kembung Luar River. There was no ownership or priority of use there. Therefore, 
the Javanese and Malays also logged mangrove timbers freely. Only after the 
government began to intervene in ownership after the 2000s, did they begin to claim 
their ‘ancestral land’ (see Chapter 3). However, they do not use adat in order to 
claim it. 
       In addition, the moral rules or prescriptions of individual behaviours are not 
referred to as adat. For example, Pak Koding refused the idea that a rule related to 
mutual aid should be expressed as adat. One day, we talked sitting on a bench that 
was fixed in front of his house. During our chat, his tobacco finished and he asked 
me for a cigarette with a phrase, ‘Please give me one (Minta satu)’. Smoking the 
cigarette, he began talking about a rule or moral called satu in Suku Asli society in 
the past. Satu literally means ‘one’ in Indonesian as well as in their dialect. But it 
was often used when a person asked someone to give a part of their personal 
belongings as seen in his use of the phrase. At this time, according to him, the person 
having the cigarette was never able to reject the request without a plausible reason. If 
rejected, he might not have received any cooperation from others. This rule was 
applied not only to tobacco and food, but also to cooperation in economic activities 
in general. Even though this is still the case if one always rejects requests from others, 
according to Pak Koding, the constraint in the past was much stronger than it is today. 
Hearing his explanation about ‘satu’, I asked him ‘“Satu” was a kind of adat, right?’ 
He looked slightly pensive and answered ‘No, it’s not adat. It’s a kind of rule 
(macam peraturan); it’s just a wrong behaviour of the person (itu salah dia).’ It is 
very common that they refer to the prescribed behaviour as a ‘rule (peraturan)’ and 
individual derogations from the rule or prescription as ‘wrong (salah)’. However, 
they do not explain the prescription using the term adat. I have never encountered a 
scene where one tried to negotiate with others using the term adat in the sense of a 
whole set of rules prescribing their behaviour or moral conduct in everyday life. 
       However, Suku Asli certainly use the term adat to indicate a part of their 
practices within their community – that is, in the context of rituals related to ancestral 
worship. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the basic rituals that are related to their 
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ancestral worship are weddings, funerals, the anniversary of the dead, and the feast 
of tujuh likur, and these rituals are characterised by communication with their 
ancestral spirits. In the wedding ceremony, they call their ancestral spirits by burning 
incense and informing them of the marriage of a descendant. The parents of the bride 
treat the attendants to sirih, tobacco, areca nuts, gambier and so forth which are 
contained in a sacred sirih box inherited from the ancestors. Dances, music and silat 
are performed as an essential part of the ceremony. At the funeral, they inform the 
ancestral spirits of the death. While the funeral ceremony does not include dances, 
they perform silat when they carry the coffin out of the house. The feast of tujuh 
likur (means ‘twenty seven’; New Year’s feast held based on the Islamic calendar) is 
said to be the largest annual festival, and it is held on the 27th Ramadan of the 
Islamic calendar. They set seven bowls of rice as offerings to their ancestral spirits at 
the front and back entrances of each house. Seven is a sacred number in Malay 
culture (Skeat 1900: 508-509), and the number emerges in many scenes of every 
Suku Asli ritual as well. Dance and music are performed through the night. All these 
ceremonies include a ritual to offer meals to their ancestors and to communicate with 
them. They prepare bowls of food in the living room and burn resin incense at the 
entrance to the house. The head of the family confirms the ancestors’ arrival by 
dropping two pieces of coins or wooden tags on the floor. The combination of heads 
or tails shows the ancestors’ will in terms of ‘yes’ or ‘no’. After several minutes, the 
head of family drops the coins or tags again to confirm that the ancestors have 
finished eating the meals. All these rituals are called adat. More correctly, the word 
adat indicates not only the ritual itself, but also all procedures, conventional actions, 
properties and rules that emerge in the ceremonies. For example, they describe the 
sirih box itself as ‘adat’. Dance, music and silat itself are also expressed as ‘adat’.  
       In the same way, marriage rules are also often referred to as adat. In Suku Asli 
adat, the marriage between bilateral kinsmen is regarded as incest. If two kinsmen 
want to marry, the marriage is regarded as an immoral marriage violating their adat 
(sumbang) (see Chapter 2). The reason that these marriages are prohibited is because, 
according to the Suku Asli villagers, ‘We cannot inform the ancestors of such 
marriage’. In the past, the couple who violated this adat was confined to a large fish 
trap made of thorny plants, and sunk in the river. At present, if such marriage is 
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conducted, the couple cannot receive any support or celebrations from their parents 
and ancestors, and have to leave their community. In short, for them, everything that 
is related to their ancestral worship is adat. 
       Interestingly, other rituals are not referred to as adat. First, they often conduct 
shamanic rituals for the purpose of healing the sick or protecting their hamlet from 
malevolent spirits. This kind of ritual is not referred to as adat. It is explained as a 
kind of encounter between shaman’s individual supernatural power and the 
benevolent spirits, and described as ilmu batin (inner technique or headman’s 
technique). In this ritual, while they often offer food to the spirits, there are no 
procedures that imply connections with their ancestors. Second and more importantly, 
all rituals held in the peranakan or Chinese way are not referred to as adat. As I 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the peranakan or Chinese way also involves ancestral 
worship and such rituals are held periodically; however, this kind of ritual is just 
called ‘ritual (acara)’, and its procedures and instruments are not described as adat. 
The rituals, procedures and instruments that may be described as adat are all related 
to those that are ‘real’ Suku Asli. Therefore, adat is something related to ‘real’ Suku 
Asli ancestral worship.  
       However, there is another use of the term adat with a more comprehensive and 
abstract meaning, which emerges in the context of their relation with outsiders. One 
day, I talked with Pak Koding about the people living in Teluk Pambang focusing 
especially on the history of the relationship between the Malays and Suku Asli. After 
we talked about the topic for a while, he concluded: ‘But today, there are various 
Suku Asli in this village. There are people of the ethnic Chinese, the Batak (orang 
Batak), and people from Kalimantan (orang Kalimantan) and Flores (orang Flores).’ 
Indeed, in the western part of Teluk Pambang where I conducted the survey, there 
are three households in which peranakan Suku Asli men married with Batak women 
and there is a household in which a man from Kalimantan married a Suku Asli 
woman. A bachelor from Flores also worked in the house of Pak Ajui. I asked him: 
‘Are they Suku Asli as well?’ He answered ‘Sure. They married here and are 
following our adat (ikut adat kami).’ In the same sense, they sometimes claimed that 
those who converted to Islam and Christianity (see Chapter 6) or violated the 
marriage rule: ‘are not following adat (tidak ikut adat).’ In these contexts, the term 
179 
 
adat is obviously used for indicating not only ‘real’ Suku Asli ancestral worship but 
also peranakan or Chinese worship. Furthermore, adat in these contexts can be seen 
as their everyday life in their community. In either way, adat can work as a criterion 
for distinguishing ‘us’ and ‘others’.  
       In short, the term adat is, first and foremost, used for indicating the practices and 
instruments that are related to ‘real’ Suku Asli ancestral worship, and occasionally 
used as a criterion of differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘others’ including 
peranakan/Chinese ancestral worship. However, the term adat is not used for 
indicating other rules and morals. Throughout my field work, I did not encounter 
situations in which adat was used in this way. 
 
 
Adat as an embodiment of resistance 
 
       Adat has often been seen as a total world view of a local community in the 
studies of Indonesia. Leiden scholars saw adat in this way. Acciaioli (1985) also sees 
adat as having similar implications and states that, in the past, ‘adat provided the 
cosmological order, the primary, perhaps sometimes the only, explanation that 
rendered the world intelligible and informed one as to how to act in it’ (1985: 152). 
For him, and probably among the Da’a Toraja, adat involves a macrocosm which 
shows how people should be and what the world is. Adat was seen as a primary and 
comprehensive explanation of the cosmos and a norm for behaviour. In a similar way, 
Renske Biezeveld (2007: 204) explains adat among the Minangkabau as follows: 
 
[...] adat can mean either local custom or a society’s fundamental structural 
system, of which local custom is only a component. In this latter sense adat forms 
the basis of all ethical and legal judgements and the source of social expectations. 
In short, it represents the ideal pattern of behaviour. 
 
However, the Suku Asli do not explain their moral prescriptions, rules of land 
possession, social values and cosmological order with the term adat. Rather, adat 
emerged only in the contexts of ancestral worship and distinguishing themselves 
from others. This does not seem to be just a result of the reduction or simplification 
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of adat caused by state intervention. Why have they used this term only in these 
contexts? 
       Although I cannot comment specifically about why they do not use adat in the 
sense of a total cosmos or as an ideal pattern of behaviour, these issues seem to be 
related to the historical process of forming their ethnic identity. As I argued in 
previous chapters, first, they were coastal foragers who individually moved around a 
vast coastal area. In this ways of life, they communicated and lived with people who 
had, more or less, different norms, rules and practices. Second and more importantly, 
after the mid-nineteenth century, many ethnic Chinese and some of their customs and 
beliefs, which were not expressed or understood as adat, were accepted by the Utan 
communities. Through these processes, their adat, which might have been an 
exclusive framework of their actions and reality in the past, was relativised as one of 
a number of frameworks. Indeed, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, there are two ways of 
understanding their ancestral souls in Teluk Pambang, and both are accepted as 
possible ways. The Suku Asli do not summarise the whole body of their customs or 
ancestral practices through the symbolic term adat because of the historically 
continuous communications they have had with other orang asli communities and 
the ethnic Chinese even before state intervention in the concept became obvious in 
post-independence Indonesia.  
       Here, I would like to suggest that adat in Suku Asli society is not a total 
cosmological order or an ideal pattern of behaviour inherited from the ancestors. 
Rather, it is a part of their whole tradition, which has been objectified in and through 
the communications with the state, and especially Muslims. In Suku Asli society, 
ancestral worship and their criterion for distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘others’ are strongly 
related. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, they have had orang asli identity based on the 
image of having common ancestors, in which their non-Islamic ancestral religious 
practices have been the main criteria for belonging. However, on the eastern coast of 
Sumatra, the dominant majorities have been the Malays, Minangkabau and Javanese, 
and their religion is exclusively Islam. The Suku Asli have been discriminated 
against and marginalised because of their relatively weak association with agama 
legitimised by the state. In this situation, the Suku Asli have continuously confronted 
the necessity to demonstrate the legitimacy of their ancestral worship that does not 
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include the ideology or doctrine of agama (see also Chapter 6). In this process, they 
would have adopted the term adat and tried to explain its legitimacy. This term 
legally enabled them to differentiate their thoughts and beliefs from the dominant 
ideology and maintain their traditional way of life in the binary schema of adat 
versus state control. The Malays and Javanese could accept it as the term involves 
the legitimation and justification of local customs in the state image. Therefore, the 
term adat in Suku Asli community comprehensively indicates their traditional 
ancestral worship, and it also emerges in the context of distinguishing themselves 
from outsiders. 
       Yet, the other spheres of Suku Asli life were not really involved in 
contradictions or competitions with others, and such practices and beliefs are not 
referred to as adat. First, they were not involved in the competition for living space 
with the Malays and Javanese until very recent years. Before the late 1990s, their 
livelihoods depended exclusively on the mangrove swamps, and they accessed its 
resources freely. Therefore, they did not need to objectify and claim traditional land 
usage and rule as adat. Second, the Malays and Javanese had not intervened in or 
tried to change their moral prescriptions and the codes of individual behaviour, as 
they regarded the Suku Asli as ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’ people who do not have 
agama. Therefore, the Suku Asli did not objectify such practices and values as adat. 
Third, the Malays and Javanese in this region have not intervened in the shamanic 
practices of the Suku Asli. Although the Javanese and Malays are Muslims, they also 
have traditions of shamanic techniques. Finally, in terms of the peranakan or 
Chinese way of rituals, the situation seems to be more complex. The form of rituals 
is obviously derived from China, and Chinese cultures have been always ‘foreign’ 
and hence oppressed in Indonesian policies after the 1960s. Given such restrictions, 
it would have been difficult to claim Chinese rituals as the Suku Asli tradition in 
communication with Muslims. Therefore, they do not refer to the rituals as adat, 
although the rituals may be included in the comprehensive and abstract meaning of 
their adat.   
       In short, adat is a part of the whole local tradition that was objectified in 
competitions, contradictions and conflicts with state interventions and other outsiders 
in order to claim the legitimacy of local practices. Moreover, this is the case, or 
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partly applied to, elsewhere in Indonesia, where the concept of adat has been much 
more developed and elaborated than in Suku Asli communities. For example, as 
mentioned above, the Minangkabau objectified and elaborated their traditional rules 
and rights of land as adat when the competition of land possession with the Dutch 
colonial government became serious in the mid-nineteenth century (Benda-
Beckmann & Benda-Beckmann 2011: 178-179). Also, their matrilineal system has 
been strongly associated with adat, as it involves contradictions with Islamic law, 
which is characterised by a patrilineal system. Their traditional headmanship, the 
panghulu system, has also been strongly related with adat, as it does not always 
conform to the state bureaucratic administrative headmanship (Kahn 1993: 31-50, 
119-120,160-165). While Li recognises (2007a: 338) that adat institutes orderly rule 
and promotes harmony, she also points out that it may be deployed to challenge the 
state authority. Adat always involves contradictions with the central power or 
ideology, which the state has exerted on local communities. By claiming adat, the 
local communities may have legitimated their traditional local customs implying the 
difference of local particularity and national universality. 
       In this sense, adat can be seen as an embodiment of resistance among the locals 
against the interventions by the state. Indeed, the concept of adat has been 
constructed by the state through the late colonial era policies and inherited by the 
post-independence Indonesia, as Burns (1985) and others have pointed out. However, 
in the constructed framework, the locals have protected and maintained their 
customary practices by objectifying and defining them as adat. In particular, this was 
the only way to claim local rights, self-determination and autonomy during Suharto’s 
era, in which the government strongly implemented the exploitation of local lands 
and resources under the banner of ‘development’. Using terms such as ‘rights’, ‘self-
determination’ and ‘autonomy’ was dangerous in an oppressive polity. If the local 
community had any conflicts with the government, they used the term ‘adat law’ to 
negotiate. This choice of the term ‘was a safer, although not necessarily more 
successful, way of defending rights than expressing them in overtly political terms’ 
(Benda-Beckmann & Benda-Beckmann 2011: 183). Adat is an objectification of 
local traditions in the struggle with the state, where it is utilised as a tool to claim 
legitimacy in a form that the state might accept. 
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       I do not intend to insist that all adat in Indonesia are manifested in the context of 
relationships with the state. It is actually the case that adat has taken the role of 
customary laws, a cosmological order, moral prescriptions and the rules of land 
usage in contexts which do not display resistance against the government. In addition, 
the government have constructed adat for the purpose of controlling the population. 
However, adat involves a qualification that has been formed and objectified in the 
resistance of the locals against the central power. This qualification is very obvious 
in Suku Asli communities. For them, adat has been not a whole tradition or a simple 
inheritance from ancestors nor constructed by the government, but an embodiment of 
resistance that was objectified in their engagement with the state. 
      
 
Adat as performance 
 
Adat as dance, music and song 
 
       As I have already suggested, Suku Asli term ‘adat’, first and foremost, indicates 
ancestral worship and the procedures surrounding it, which has been formed in 
communication with Muslims. Although this has been the case until today, the 
meaning of the word has been changing. They are increasingly using the term to 
indicate a specific part of rituals, i.e. music, dance and songs. This change of accent 
is related to the government’s intervention in their life. However, this change is not a 
form of their resistance as mentioned above, but rather an adoption of the 
government idea, and one which brings about the integration of their communities as 
an ‘adat community’.  
       The use of ‘adat’ that I first encountered in Teluk Pambang emphasised dance 
and music in ritual. On the very day of my first visit to the village, a wedding 
ceremony was held at a house, and I was able to join the feast. Pak Atang, who was a 
village batin at Selat Baru, led me around the site. When four girls with matching 
green clothes began dancing together with music played by a band consisting of a 
clarinet, a viola, a gong and two drums, he said to me: ‘This is the Suku Asli adat’ 
(‘Inilah adat Suku Aslinya’) indicating their dance. After that, I sometimes heard the 
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word ‘adat’ in other contexts. As mentioned above, they called funeral rituals and 
weddings as ‘adat’ or ‘adat ceremony’ (acara adat); an elder explained that 
marriage between cousins was prohibited by ‘adat’; also, they mentioned adat in 
distinguishing the Suku Asli from others. However, most frequently, they used it to 
indicate dances, music with a traditional band, silat, or clothes and objects like a sirih 
box used in rituals. The word seemed to be equivocal and ambiguous, but 
conventional as in the phrase of: ‘This is the adat’.     
       One day, I asked Pak Odang, who took the role of ‘adat manager (kepala adat)’ 
in IKBBSA, about the meaning of adat. ‘People use adat in the sense of dances, 
music, clothes and so on. Is the meaning of adat really like that?’ He answered:  
 
No, it’s different from adat. Dances, music and clothes are ‘art (kesenian)’, not 
adat. Art is a part of adat (sebagian adat). […] There are various adat. 
Ceremonies like funeral and wedding are also adat. Adat is whole ways from our 
ancestors and for respecting them. […] But I know people often use ‘adat’ in the 
meaning of art. This is because officials in the Department of Culture and 
Tourism say adat is like that.  
 
Dances, music, clothes and songs are actually important components of their adat or 
ancestral worship. However, these are not the whole of adat. Nevertheless, the 
reason why Suku Asli often refer to these as ‘adat’ is because the officials at the 
Department of Culture and Tourism (Dinas Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata) used it for 
indicating their dance, music and clothes.      
       Their emphasis on ‘art’ in the usage of adat is related to their recent 
communications with the government. The Department of Culture and Tourism is a 
department in the regency government, which is in charge of promoting culture 
(kebudayaan) and tourism (pariwisata). Although the Suku Asli had not had any 
relationship with this department in the past, after IKBBSA was established, they 
began working together when IKBBSA held ethnic festivals and meetings. The 
department contributed the subsidies for these events, and the leaders received it 
from them. According to Pak Ajui, the department budgeted for the instruments of 
their adat, such as clothes, gong, viola, drums and other decorations used in rituals, 
and encouraged them to perform the dances and music at the festivals and meetings. 
Although I could not see actual communications between the officials of the 
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department and Suku Asli leaders, the government officials must have tried to 
educate the leaders in how important manifesting this form of adat was for the Suku 
Asli in state policies and to configure their attachment to this form of adat when they 
negotiated the subsidies. 
 
Photograph 10. Marriage ceremony and dance (tari gendong) of the Suku Asli (Teluk 
Pambang) 
 
       This form of adat is most fruitfully performed at the ethnic festival held by 
IKBBSA. It was first held in 2010 at Penyengat, which is a village of the Rawa or 
Suku Asli Anak Rawa, in the Siak regency. Then, in 2011, it was held at the village 
of Sesap of Tening Tinggi Island in Meranti Island regency. Although IKBBSA 
planned to hold it at Teluk Pambang in 2012, this was cancelled because they could 
not obtain the subsidies from the Bengkalis government. Although I could not attend 
the festival in 2012, I heard about it from Pak Ajui and watched scenes recorded at 
the festival held in 2010. At the festival, hundreds of Penyengat villagers, all batin 
headmen of IKBBSA of the three regencies, and a dozen followers of each batin 
joined in. In addition, a dozen officials were invited as guests of honour. During the 
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festival, several officials and batin headmen made a speech in which they spoke out 
about the necessity of development (pembinaan) and progress (maju) of Suku Asli 
communities as a group of the KAT. Then, Suku Asli attendants performed dances, 
music and silat wearing Malay-like ethnic clothes, which had been prepared for this 
festival, in front of the officials. According to Pak Ajui, there was a dance 
competition of tari gendong, which is a group dance and performed at wedding 
ceremonies in Suku Asli communities, by the representatives of each administrative 
village. The dancers of each village practised dances and music for the events. In 
their training, according to Pak Odang, the performances were termed adat following 
the officials’ expressions of the ‘art’ as adat. As a result, many ordinary villagers 
began describing dances and music as adat, although it was only a part of their 
rituals.   
       In addition, Odang’s role, adat manager, is also related to the ‘art’ rather than 
ancestral worship. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, some roles were newly created when 
IKBBSA was established in 2005 in accordance with the government guidance. In 
this process, the role of adat manager was also created. Other ethnic organisations, 
such as LAMR (Lembaga Adat Melayu Riau; Riau Malay Adat Organisation) and 
IKJR (Ikatan Keluarga Jawa Riau; Javanese Family Association in Riau) had this 
role managing the matters of their own adat, and IKBBSA adopted it. Pak Odang 
had adequate knowledge of ancestral worship and its procedures. However, he rarely 
engaged in this work because the ancestral rituals were usually held by the kinsmen 
and neighbours of the household. Instead, his main role was to give instruction about 
dances, music and songs to the girls who performed them in the wedding ceremony 
and periodical meetings of IKBBSA, and because of this, he was recognised as the 
adat manager of Teluk Pambang by the villagers. 
       It is noteworthy that this usage of adat is applied only to the dances and music 
that emerge in the rituals of ‘real’ Suku Asli. The procedures and instruments, which 
emerge in the rituals of the peranakan or Chinese way, such as paper money, incense 
sitick and red symbols, are not referred to as adat. Also, although Suku Asli use the 
dedicated drums and gongs in the rituals held by Chinese spirit mediums, they do not 
refer to the instruments and rhythms as adat. In the festivals and meetings, while the 
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adat that are performed in front of the officials are only those of ‘real’ Suku Asli, the 
Chinese performances and symbols never make an appearance.  
       The term adat is increasingly used to indicate a part of their ancestral worship, 
that is, dances and music, among ordinary villagers. This is a result of the 
government constitution of ‘art’ as adat, and this usage has been accepted by 
ordinary villagers through the activities of IKBBSA. It is very important that the 
ordinary villagers are actively engaging in this kind of adat, i.e. dance and music, 
recognising that these are their traditional activities, though, as I argued in Chapter 4, 
they are not really concerned with the political activities of IKBBSA. In other words, 
as a result of their emphasis on ‘art’, the ordinary villagers have been involved in the 
activities of IKBBSA. 
 
      
Performance as erosion or participation 
 
       The state attempt to redefine local traditions as ‘art’ is also found in other 
regions, and it is associated with the reinforcement of state control over the local 
populations. First, it is concerned with reducing local tradition in the process of 
strengthening national laws, norms and morals, as I mentioned in the first part of this 
chapter. In the study of the Da’a Toraja, Acciaioli (1985) finds the state attempt to 
identify song, dances and death rituals as adat separating it from their total 
cosmology and religious beliefs, i.e. aluk. By doing so, the state can relativise and 
reduce the values of laws, morals and norms in their tradition without the local 
resistances that might emerge if the state completely rejected their local tradition as a 
whole. ‘Regional diversity is valued, honoured, even apotheosized, but only as long 
as it remains at the level of display, not belief, performance, not enactment’; as a 
result, the belief and enactment of the local tradition is eroded (Acciaioli 1985: 161-
162). Second, it is related to the efficacy of reinforcing the political and economic 
dependency between locals and the state. Through the description of the Bunun, an 
Austronesian-speaking people of Taiwan, Shu-Yuan Yang (2011) suggests that 
‘music, art, dance, ritual, ethnic attire, and handcraft’, which are a part of the local 
tradition actively supported by the state, contain a ‘thing-like’ attribution. This 
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‘thing-like’ tradition is vulnerable to appropriation by the state in comparison to their 
beliefs, norms and morals, and the state can control the people and their tradition 
through the appropriation. She concludes: ‘The politicization of culture has the 
potential to draw the Bunun into the bureaucratized discourse of tradition which 
would result in their greater dependence on the state and a commodity logic that can 
further marginalize them’ (2011: 327).  
       This analysis is also true in the case of the Suku Asli. The traditional usage of 
the term adat was an embodiment of their resistance, with which the Suku Asli were 
able to contrapose their ancestral ways with the state ideology and to justify its 
legitimacy. In this meaning, adat was something existing outside or as opposition to 
the state control. Yet, adat as ‘art’ is something visible, aesthetic and performative, 
and it can be placed under the government’s cultural policies. That is to say, this adat 
is domesticated and has lost the contraposition to the state ideology. In addition, it is 
also the case that this adat is very vulnerable to appropriation by the government. 
Subsidies from the government are obviously an incentive for the leaders of 
IKBBSA to hold ethnic meetings and festivals. In order to obtain the subsidies, they 
follow the government guidance of the way of adat and emphasise dances, music and 
songs, which were only a part of their ancestral rituals, as adat. Now, adat as an 
embodiment of their spirit of resistance exclusively belonging to the Suku Asli 
community is declining. Instead, it is becoming a part of the diversity of Indonesian 
‘culture’, which the state admits and can control through appropriation. 
       However, simultaneously, it also offers a new conceptualisation of the meaning 
and consolidation of the Suku Asli identity beyond various distinctions within their 
community. First, as a result of adat connected with dance and song, adat becomes 
related to more people in everyday life. For example, in Teluk Pambang, the dancers 
at weddings are young girls. While they were not concerned with the adat of the 
ancestral worship, they become the bearers of Suku Asli adat through their 
participation in music and dance. For the audiences, whereas music and dance were 
only performances undertaken at wedding ceremonies, now they are seen as their 
own adat inherited from their ancestors, and this brings about a confirmation of their 
identity as the Suku Asli. Second, the new emphasis on adat enables them to fill the 
gap in identities derived from distinct descent. Peranakan Suku Asli conduct their 
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ancestral rituals in the peranakan/Chinese way, and these are difficult to express as 
adat because they clearly belong to foreign Chinese culture. However, in terms of 
adat as music and dance, they can actually participate in adat through their mutual 
cooperation with ‘real’ Suku Asli, and they can insist that they actually have Suku 
Asli adat in their communication with outsiders. By participating in dance and music 
as adat, they can consolidate their identity as Suku Asli and leave aside their 
ambiguous and ambivalent identity as peranakan which is potentially somewhat 
risky in Indonesian politics. Finally, through their participation in adat, ordinary 
villagers are involved in the political activities of IKBBSA. Although they are not 
really related to the political activity of IKBBSA, they are actively joining in dance 
and music. This results in reinforcing the organisation. Although some leaders 
monopolise the political and economic activities in IKBBSA, all members of the 
community can equally share the aesthetic activities as either performers or 
audiences. This quality contributes to the consolidation of Suku Asli identity beyond 
the social distinctions of generation, gender, descent and political power. Suku Asli 
leaders actively adopt this definition, and adat that is abstracted and embodied in ‘art’ 
comes to be a symbol of their identification as Suku Asli. 
       On the one hand, the culturalisation of adat has disempowered local legal 
systems and transformed adat into harmless culture. This is the case also among the 
Suku Asli; adat that was the embodiment of their boundary with Muslims has 
transformed into ‘art’. On the other hand, it also has the power to connect the people 
concerned and consolidate the diverse identities among the locals through 
participation in the manifestation of the culture. Because the culturalisation involves 
the latter aspect, even though the local communities experienced the 
disempowerment of adat between the colonial and Suharto eras, adat in local 
communities have been revived as a symbol of local solidarity and self-determination 
in the post-Suharto era. In particular, tribespeople, who may often have segmantary 
and uncentralised social structures and flexible and diffuse adat, can be consolidated 
by culturalisation. 
       This process is not necessarily seen as construction or invention of their tradition 
because they actually have had these constituents of their adat – dance and music – 
in their practice of ancestral worship. Therefore, their way of conceptualising adat 
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can be seen as a process of objectification and abstraction of their flexible and 
diffuse traditional practices in the government framework of adat. By doing so, they 
are integrating their diverse traditional practices and reinforcing their identity as 
Suku Asli in relation to the state.  
       Again, adat is the basic component of the Indonesian version of ‘indigenous 
movement’ – that is, the quest for ‘adat communities’. Although activists and local 
authorities may emphasise the ‘revival’ of adat – that is, local tradition and 
authenticity, it is framed in engagement with historical government policies. 
Indigeneity emerges in such engagement, and the local community indigenises 
themselves in relation to the image of being ‘indigenous’ held by the state. 
       In a similar way to adat, Suku Asli tried to objectify and abstract their whole 
religious practices in relation to state religious policies in Indonesia. In the next 
chapter, I explore the process of adoption, objectification, abstraction and integration 
of their agama, i.e. religion recognised by the state, in Suku Asli society. 
        





















Creation of Homogeneity: Religion (Agama), Buddhism and 
Abstraction 
 
In the previous chapters, I described the processes whereby the Suku Asli 
conceptualised and embodied their ancestral space, political organisation and the 
concept of adat in accordance with the state image of how they should be. In 
addition, religion or agama 50  has been increasingly an important factor in 
constituting their ethnic identity as Suku Asli in recent years. This has occurred 
through the implementation of the government’s religious policies.  
       In Indonesia, identifying one’s agama is very important in civil life. The state 
has a national principle of ‘Belief in one God (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa)’ in the 
five philosophical foundations of the Indonesian state, the Pancasila. People are 
obliged to register their chosen religion from one of six agama, i.e. Islam, Catholic 
(Katolik; Kristen), Protestant (Protestan), Hindu, Buddhism and Confucianism. 
Agama is addressed on various official documents such as ID cards (KTP) and 
marriage certificates, and it constitutes an essential part of one’s citizenship. Also, in 
school curricula, agama is a compulsory subject, and children learn the history and 
doctrine of the agama that they chose. These policies have been developed under the 
initiatives of Muslims (and some Christians), who have been the overwhelming 
majority and are dominant in post-independence Indonesia. 
       The people who had converted to Islam and Christianity before independence 
could identify their own agama relatively easily. However, people who had been 
neither Muslim nor Christian and conducted traditional religious practices, i.e. adat, 
confronted the necessity to show their agama in response to Pancasila politics. Two 
powerful ethnic groups, the Balinese and ethnic Chinese, succeeded in having their 
traditional religions recognised as agama just after independence (Picard 201; Tsuda 
2012; Brown 1987). Some people have tried to legitimise their adat as agama by 
                                                          
50 ‘Agama’ is generally translated as ‘religion’. However, I use the term ‘agama’ with the strong 
implication of political construction and monotheism in state politics, distinguished from ‘religion’ or 
‘religious practices and beliefs’ that have been practised in each local community.  
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fitting their adat into the state image of agama. For example, after the 1970s, adat 
among the Ngaju Dayak in central Kalimantan and the Wana in Sulawesi were 
reformulated as having monotheistic doctrines and were recognised as versions of 
Hinduism (Schiller 1996; Atkinson 1983). On the other hand, some people adopted 
one of the established faiths. For instance, the Sakai have been involved in a wave of 
Islamisation and many Sakai identify themselves as Muslim (Porath 2004), while the 
Forest Tobelo in central Halmahera converted to Christianity in the 1980s and 
accepted the American-based New Tribal Mission (Duncan 2003).  
       In any case, the adat of each local community has confronted the necessity to 
transform itself because of implementation of religious policies, as agama often 
intervenes in religious practices and beliefs based on adat (Schiller 1996; Kipp & 
Rodgers 1987). The Suku Asli also confronted the serious necessity of adjusting the 
relationship between adat and national agama after IKBBSA was established. This is 
because, in the process of claiming their position as Suku Asli, the leaders have had 
more opportunities to explain to government officials what Suku Asli agama is. 
However, this was very difficult because they have two forms of religious practices 
based on ‘real’ and peranakan traditions. In this situation, Suku Asli have tried to 
integrate their agama into Buddhism by redefining the concepts of agama and other 
religious practices based on their cultural logic in order to show the legitimacy of it 
in relation to the national law. How have they conceptualised and embodied agama 
and what kind of social change does this bring about? This is the question that I try to 
answer. 
       In this chapter, I describe the Suku Asli conceptualisation of agama and its 
influences on their community, focusing especially on the process of interactions 
between agama and adat in their world. First, I address the historical background of 
national religious policies and the regional situation in Bengkalis regency. Second, I 
describe their attitude to and interpretation of agama. While they have 
conceptualised various views of agama through the communications with outsiders, 
the leaders have aspirations to integrate their agama. Third, I describe the process of 
designating Buddhism as their ancestral agama in IKBBSA’s activities, and its social 
influences. Their social association characterised by ‘non-Islamic alliance’ obtains its 
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substantiality by specifying their ancestral agama, and the Suku Asli enter the realm 
of modernity leaving behind the position of ‘tribespeople’. 
       Most of the ethnographic facts in this chapter were obtained in my main site, 
Teluk Pambang, where almost all villagers identify their agama as Buddhism. 
Although I do not have much data on the Christian point of view, I try to describe it 
based on an interview with a one-time Christian. 
 
 
Identification of agama: Religious policies and the spread of agama 
among the Suku Asli 
      
National religious policies: Agama, state and adat  
 
       The Indonesian word, agama, is derived from Sanskrit, and was introduced to 
the Indonesian archipelago during the early centuries of this millennium when the 
archipelago became an important trading hub between China, India and the Near East 
(Atkinson 1983: 686). This term originally meant ‘‘a traditional precept, doctrine, 
body of precepts, collection of such doctrines’; in short, ‘anything handed down 
fixed by tradition’’ (Gonda 1973: 499). Therefore, in its original sense, agama is not 
so different from adat. The elites in the pre-colonial kingdoms actively accepted the 
word because they used the Sanskrit language as a sign of their spiritual political 
power, though it was not really related to ordinary people and their lives (Kipp & 
Rogers 1987: 15).  
       However, the meaning of agama was changed and politicised after the 
nineteenth century when the state tried to control local religious practices and beliefs 
(Atkinson 1983: 686-689). The religious policies in the colonial era emerged in the 
system of interactions between Christianity and Islam. In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century when the Dutch colonial government attempted to tighten its 
control over the archipelago, Islam was considered as a main source of resistance. 
Therefore, the government permitted and encouraged missionaries in non-Muslim 
areas for the purpose of making up Christian enclaves or ‘buffers’ (Kipp & Rodgers 
1987: 16). Then, during the Japanese occupation in the 1940s, the Japanese colonial 
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government supported Islamic organisations, i.e. Masyumi, because they regarded 
Muslims as nationalists who resisted the Dutch Christian authority. These Islamic 
organisations continued as major political parties after independence (Tsing 1987: 
196). Through these colonial policies, agama gradually became something related to 
state independence and the lives of local populations.  
       After independence, the importance of agama dramatically increased. The 
Pancasila was first declared in a speech by Sukarno in 1945. 51  The Pancasila 
included five principles, i.e. Belief in One God, Nationalism, Humanism, Democracy 
and Social Justice (Kipp & Rodgers 1987: 17). The belief in one agama was also 
addressed in the statements of the constitution. Through these processes, agama 
became a foundation of the new nation state and associated with social order and 
citizenship.  
       In parallel with the process of codifying the importance of agama in the 
Pancasila and Constitution, the bureaucracy elaborated the meaning of agama. The 
main agent was the ministry of religious affairs, which was established under the 
initiative of Muslim leaders in 1946. In 1952, this ministry designated the meaning of 
agama – ‘the prerequisite elements of a prophet, a holy book, and international 
recognition’ (Tsing 1987: 197). Then, in 1959, the ministry put forward the 
definition involving belief in one God as a unified principle of life (Kim 1998: 363). 
These definitions were obviously reflecting the monotheism of Islam and 
Christianity. Michael Picard summarises its main elements as follows: 
  
  While the word agama in Indonesia is commonly translated as ‘religion’, it is a 
peculiar combination of a Christian view of what counts as a world religion with 
an Islamic understanding of what defines a proper religion - divine revelation 
recorded by a prophet in a holy book, a system of law for the community of 
believers, congregational worship, and a belief in the One and Only God. (2011: 
483)  
 
       Between the 1940s and the 1950s, the government encouraged people who did 
not belong to one of the two agamas to demonstrate the legitimacy of their religious 
practices and beliefs. In response to this political atmosphere, the Balinese claimed 
                                                          
51 Although the words, ‘Belief in one God’, were the fifth principle at the beginning, they were then 
given the first position after controversies between Muslims and non-Muslims (Kim 1998: 357). 
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their traditional religious practices and beliefs as Hinduism by constructing an image 
of being monotheistic, having a prophet, a holy book and a codified system of law, 
and gaining international recognition and believers outside Bali (Geertz 1973; Picard 
2011: 497). The ethnic Chinese also approached the government to recognise their 
faiths as agama. On the one hand, some ethnic Chinese who followed Buddhism sent 
their leaders to Burma to learn Buddhism, and established a religious body 
elaborating their doctrine as a ‘world religion’ (Brown 1987). On the other hand, the 
practitioners of Chinese folk religions based on Chinese temples (klenteng) were 
integrated as Confucianism under a particular religious body. Although such temples 
enshrined the various deities of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism, the body 
designated Tiang Gong as the supreme God (Tsuda 2012). After numerous 
controversies in terms of the definition of agama, a Sukarno-era presidential decree 
(No. 1/1965 on the Prevention of Abuse and/or Disrespect of Religion) recognised 
six legitimate agama, i.e. Islam, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu, Buddhism and 
Confucianism in Indonesia (Salim 2007:116). 
       While the importance of agama arose in the government politics of the new 
Nation State, discrimination and marginalisation against those who did not or could 
not register their agama gradually formed in the state atmosphere. In post-
independence Indonesia, such people were regarded as ‘people who do not yet have 
agama (orang belum beragama)’ or ‘people who believe in animism (animisme)’ 
(Kipp & Rodgers 1987: 21-25; Atkinson 1983). The expression ‘not yet’ of the 
former phrase involves the implications of ‘an inevitability about the future of these 
people’ (Kipp & Rodgers 1987: 21). On the other hand, ‘animism’, which as a notion 
would have been introduced to Indonesian archipelago in the late Dutch colonial era, 
is associated with an emphasis on anthropomorphism and the implication that ‘all 
natural phenomena have soul’; it also encompasses the implications of Western 
evolutionism (Tsintjilonis 2004: 427). In particular, in the context of Indonesia, this 
term is used as the antonym of monotheisms that are legitimated by the state. Thus, 
the people who were labelled as ‘animists’ were regarded as not believing in one 
God, and should come to believe in an agama in accordance with their progress and 
civilisation. Either way, the people who maintained their traditional forms of 
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religious practices and beliefs without the identification of one agama were 
connected with the image of being ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’.  
       In addition to this negative image, the marginalisation of and discrimination 
against people who did not claim their own agama dramatically increased in the rise 
of the anti-communist movement in the 1960s. The communists were regarded as 
having a strong connection with atheism, so people who did not identify with an 
agama were regarded as communists and a threat to the state. In the anti-communist 
purge between 1965 and 1966, these people became the main target of oppression. 
After this event, people who did not specify their agama rushed to register it at the 
government offices (Kipp & Rodgers 1987: 19).52 In some areas, mass conversion to 
Christianity occurred (Kipp & Rogers 1987: 19). Furthermore, one of the recognised 
agama, Confucianism, was dropped from the list of legitimate agama in 1967 
because it was regarded as having strong relationships with communism (Kim 
1998:360; Salim 2007: 116). Many ethnic Chinese, who had registered their agama 
as Confucianism, converted to being Buddhist or Christian or at least identified 
themselves as such (Tsuda 2012: 393; Yang Heriyanto 2005: 3).  
       It is noteworthy that Confucianism was recognised as agama again around 2000 
by the central government (Yang Heriyanto 2005: 6). However, at the local 
government level, it is not recognised in practice. As far as I know, I have never met 
any Suku Asli or ethnic Chinese who had ID cards of Confucianism or claimed the 
legitimacy of Confucianism in the Bengkalis regency.   
       During the Suharto regime, these religious ideologies were enforced through 
various policies. On national ID cards, a column for ‘agama’ was provided, and 
people had to fill it in. In 1974, a statute on marriage was enacted. This law ordained 
that marriages should be conducted under the rules of a couple’s agama (Yang 
Heriyanto 2005: 3), and their agama is stated on the actual marriage certificates (see 
Chapter 4). Thus agama became the essential identity in people’s citizenship. Also, 
agama plays an essential role in school education. For example, in 1985, it was 
announced that students progressing from primary school to high school had to take 
                                                          
52  While some regulations in terms of agama have loosened in the post-Suharto era, the 
discrimination in terms of atheism, polytheism and animism remains. In particular, atheism is still 
regarded as having a relationship with communism, and, indeed,  one who had declared his atheism 
was being put to the test in 2013 (Paker & Hoon 2013: 159).   
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compulsory classes on agama. The ‘new curriculum’, which was put into practice in 
1994, states that elementary school children have to attend agama classes for two 
hours a week (Schiller 1996: 410). In 2013, the government decided to increase the 
hours of religious education in school, as ‘more religious instruction is needed 
because a lack of moral development has led to an increase in violence and 
vandalism among youths, and that could fuel social unrest and corruption in the 
future’ (New York Times 2013). Generally, in government schemes, religious 
education has been associated with the moral development of children. As a result, 
agama was associated with nationalism and social order, and identifying an agama 
became essential in civic life in Indonesia. 
       The national concept of agama required people to assert one of the recognised 
universal agama associated with Indonesian nationalism, social order and morals. 
Therefore, this can be seen as partly contradicting the concepts of adat or ‘adat 
community’ that are associated with locality and diversity. Therefore, not only 
followers of Hinduism and Buddhism, but also ones of Christianity and Islam have to 
adjust the relationship between adat and agama through controversies and political 
actions, while, at a practical level, religious practices and adat are difficult to 
separate (Schiller 1996: 410).  
      Just after independence, the ideology of state religious politics was not concerned 
with the Suku Asli who lived in a peripheral area; nor had they the political power to 
claim their traditional religious practices as an agama. They had been categorised as 
‘people who do not yet have agama’, and indeed they did not identify their practices 
as an agama. However, through the anti-communist purge and the corresponding 
political requirements for citizenship and education, they confronted the necessity to 
show they too had an agama – an agama they started to construct in and through 
their involvement with the state and the quest for development. 
 
 
Contacts with agama: Passivity and contingency 
  
       It is uncertain what meaning the term ‘agama’ had in the Siak kingdom and Utan 
communities before the mid-nineteenth century. However, it seems likely that the 
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term was used generally as a synonym of Islam because, in this region, Islam was 
overwhelmingly predominant and, even if there were Christians, only a few Dutch 
settlers and North Sumatran (Batak) immigrants were its followers. Therefore, in 
Utan communities, the term agama would not have been used, and even if they had 
used it, it would have been a synonym for Islam. They did not have contact with 
Christianity or Buddhism, which could be counterposed with Islam. Only after the 
1970s, did Christian missionaries go into their settlements 53 and Buddhist followers 
become organised in this region. On the other hand, the Utan must have recognised 
that religious practices and beliefs were related to their social status in the state. As I 
mentioned in Chapter 1, they were categorised as the lowest class in the Siak 
kingdom because they were not Muslim. Some Utan communities converted to Islam 
and obtained the higher status of Malay. In any case, while the concept agama may 
have been more or less important only in their communication with the Malays, it did 
not have any importance in their communities. 
        In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the diffusion of the ethnic Chinese 
population was accelerated from towns to rural areas as a result of the introduction of 
the panglong system. While there would have been some Chinese temples, or 
klenteng, before the nineteenth century, they were concentrated in towns such as 
Bengkalis and Selat Panjang where many Chinese traders lived and established their 
communities. However, as a result of immigration, the immigrants established 
klenteng in the rural areas as well, and some were founded in the areas where the 
Utan and Akit lived. Such well-known old klengteng built in this period include 
those in Titi Akar, Rupat Island, and Selat Akar, Padang Island. In this process, the 
Utan and Akit had contact with Chinese folk religions that would be legitimised and 
then banned as Confucianism. However, it is improbable that they described Chinese 
folk religion as agama in a way similar to the present meaning, because, in this 
period, Chinese folk religion was foreign culture and the Islamic Malays would not 
have intervened in their religious practices. 
                                                          
53 Considering the situation of Christian missionaries in Indonesia, the introduction of Christianity to 
Suku Asli society seems to have been late. There would have been some missionaries who went into 
their society early on. However, I have never heard such stories from Suku Asli informants and, even 
if some had tried to missionise Suku Asli before the 1970s, the influences were minimal.   
199 
 
       As I mentioned in Chapter 2, Suku Asli accepted some elements of Chinese 
religion, mainly ancestral worship and offerings for local spirits, through the 
collaboration with peranakan over ritual in their everyday life. However, 
worshipping at klenteng was something outside their everyday life. First, the various 
klenteng were sustained by mutual aid and donations within each Chinese 
community, the members of which were generally traders (touke) and their Chinese 
subjects, who spoke Chinese, and identified themselves as Chinese. The ‘real’ Suku 
Asli did not live in such communities. Second, in klenteng, people pray for various 
Chinese deities in order to achieve ‘secular’ desires such as the success of business 
and the safety of family. This worship was separated from ancestral worship, and the 
peranakan Suku Asli did not have an obligation to perform this unlike ancestral 
worship.  Klenteng thus did not become the place of worship for ‘real’ or peranakan 
Suku Asli. Even today, it completely depends on individual choices whether one 
joins in or not. Some peranakan Suku Asli who maintain strong social relationships 
with ethnic Chinese may often join the worship at klenteng. However, most ‘real’ 
and peranakan Suku Asli do not participate in this worship.  
       Just after independence, most of the peranakan Chinese and some peranakan 
Suku Asli registered their agama as Confucianism. However, before the 1970s, there 
were few Suku Asli who had fully completed their administrative registration, and so 
they did not identify their agama. A turning point, then, came after the anti-
communist purge and the start of Suharto’s New Order regime. In accordance with 
the rise of political pressures to register their agama and the prohibition of 
Confucianism, they confronted the necessity to choose one of the other agama. 
Although Islam was not a choice as they had maintained their identity and position as 
‘non-Muslims’, their choice varied from community to community (or even from 
person to person).  
       Some Suku Asli registered their agama as Buddhism. Just after Confucianism 
was prohibited, a Buddhist community of ethnic Chinese began their activities in 
Bengkalis town, and was recognised by the regency government in 1971. This 
community, Maitreya Great Tao, was the first and only Buddhist community in this 
region, which was originally established in Taiwan in the twentieth century and 
introduced to Indonesia in the 1940s by a Taiwanese (Brown 1990: 115). In Taiwan, 
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this community is known as Yi Guan Dao, or Unity Sect, a new religious movement 
that incorporates elements of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. Yet, this 
religion is recognised as Buddhism in Indonesia. Between the 1970s and the 1980s, 
this community rapidly spread through Indonesia and obtained many believers 
among the ethnic Chinese (Brown 1990). While they have a supreme God (Tuhan), 
this God is not the direct recipient of one’s devotion. Instead, Buddha Maitreya, 
which God sent to the human world, is the main objective of their devotion. This 
Buddha is represented in the figure of Budai which has been worshipped as one of 
the deities of wealth in Chinese folk religion, and has actually been enshrined in 
many klenteng in Indonesia. Therefore, this sect of Buddhism has strong connections 
with Confucianism, and took the role of a shelter for the Confucians when 
Confucianism was prohibited. Many ethnic Chinese and some the peranakan Suku 
Asli who had identified with Confucians changed their agama to Buddhism.  
       It is notable that, because Buddhism and these Chinese folk religions are 
historically associated, believers recognise their similarity. Although this community 
had an organisation and doctrine which fitted with the concept of agama, present-day 
Suku Asli and ethnic Chinese may still use ‘Buddhism’ as a synonym for 
‘Confucianism’ and vice-versa. Furthermore, this community permitted the worship 
of a Chinese folk religion. For example, in a temple of this Buddhist community, 
vihara, at Selat Panjang, a large icon of Guan Yu (Kuan-tei), which is one of the 
most popular deities of wealth in Chinese folk religion and often enshrined in 
klenteng in Indonesia, is enshrined together with that of Buddha Maitreya. In 
addition, as this Buddhist community obtained many Chinese believers in its first 
stages and accepted the diversity of rituals, they did not actively engage in 
missionary work. Therefore, Suku Asli could identify themselves as Buddhists 
without any pressure from the Buddhist community to be ‘real’ Buddhists. It is much 
later that this Buddhist community established some vihara in Suku Asli settlements. 
In Teluk Pambang, a temple was first established in 2001. In this situation, more and 
more Suku Asli have identified themselves as Buddhists. 
       On the other hand, quite a few Suku Asli converted to Christianity when the 
government increased the pressure to identify agama after the 1970s. Various 
Christian missionaries went into Suku Asli communities. For example, Catholic 
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churches were established in the villages of Kelamatan and Bantan Air in the 1970s; 
a Pentecostal missionary began activities in Selat Baru in 1987. These churches 
eagerly engaged in missionary activities offering support such as medical care, 
instruction on agricultural techniques and the organisation of collective labour. As a 
result, missionaries obtained a certain number of converts in each community. Some 
people, who lived in different settlements but had relations with Christians, also 
converted to Christianity, and accepted their exhortations.  
       However, many Christian Suku Asli later changed their agama to Buddhism. 
This is because, according to them, ‘church prohibited our adat’. This adat means 
both ways of ancestral worship, i.e. ‘real’ and peranakan Suku Asli ways. For 
example, missionaries required them to conduct funerals and marriages under the 
management of the church, and encouraged the peranakan Suku Asli to throw away 
the altars which were in their houses for ancestral worship. Many Suku Asli rejected 
such interventions in their ancestral religious practices and beliefs. The church of 
Selat Baru retained most of the believers by permitting some of the Suku Asli 
traditional ways to continue. However, this was rather an exceptional case. In Bantan 
Air, the church lost most of its converts and retreated before the 1990s. In 
Kelamantan, while the church has been maintained, only a few dozen households are 
still Christians. In Teluk Pambang, although a church of the Batak Christian 
Protestant Church was established in 2001, it retreated within one year as the 
villagers had already identified with Buddhists and it could not obtain any following 
at all.  
 
 
The choice of agama in government policies 
 
       The concrete government policies, which drove Suku Asli to identify with 
Buddhism, were mainly of two kinds. The first one was concerned with the 
administrative register. According to Pak Koding, the village officials visited Suku 
Asli houses in the 1970s and 1980s, and questioned the details of family members 
and their agama repeatedly. At this time, many Suku Asli who had not identified 
with an agama were registered as Buddhists by the officials who pointed out their 
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kinship with Chinese Buddhists. Second, the identification with an agama is 
necessary for children’s education. From around the 1980s, every Suku Asli child 
began to go to primary school. In school, all students have to register their agama 
and take the compulsory classes in religious education. During my fieldwork, for 
example, children took religious education for three hours a week in school classes, 
and went to vihara every Sunday where they were taught about history, doctrine and 
the devotions of Buddhism for three hours. Under these government policies, Suku 
Asli were identified as Buddhists. 
       While they fully registered their agama as Buddhism, their devotion to the 
Buddhist community is limited. For example, the religious community requires 
believers to conduct temple services at vihara three times a day, ideally. However, I 
have never seen any of my informants, adult Suku Asli, going to vihara for the 
purpose of a temple service. Also, this community encourages believers to be 
vegetarians. However, meat and fish have been and still are essential foods for Suku 
Asli villagers. 
       Their choice of agama at the beginning of their identification with it seems to 
have been characterised by their passivity and a degree of contingency. Those who 
had had social ties with the ethnic Chinese chose Confucianism, those who had lived 
in a settlement where a Christian church organised itself became Christians, and 
others were identified as Buddhists often by village officials. However, after their 
first choice, Suku Asli began identifying with Buddhists, because Confucianism was 
banned and the Christian church ‘prohibited their adat’. As a result, most Suku Asli 
in Bengkalis Island identify themselves as Buddhists at present, except for some 
Christian ‘enclaves’ where the churches are maintained. Yet their identification as 
Buddhists is not based on their positive conversion to the doctrine of Buddhism, at 
least, from the perspective of the definition of agama. They rarely join the activities 
at vihara. Rather, it is based on their attachment to their traditional ways and 
practices, their adat, which only Buddhism permitted without restrictions. This can 
be seen as a similar process to their rejection of Islam. They have continuously 
rejected converting to Islam since the pre-colonial era in order to maintain ancestral 
worship inherited from their ancestors, or adat (see Chapter 2).        
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       However, their recognition of agama is changing. Its passive and contingent 
character is transforming into a positive and necessary one. Suku Asli leaders have 
begun regarding Buddhism as the exclusive and authentic ancestral agama of Suku 
Asli, and after IKBBSA was established, identifying with Buddhism has become an 
essential criterion of IKBBSA membership. 
 
 
Stance and Interpretation of the concept agama 
 
Agama, percayaan and adat: a ‘real’ Suku Asli view 
      
       Let me scrutinise the stance toward and interpretation of the concept agama 
among Suku Asli villagers before describing the process in which Buddhism became 
the agama of the Suku Asli.  The stance and interpretation varies even within a 
single community. This is not because the significance of agama varies among 
individuals, but because they had to engage with the different backgrounds of 
religious practices and beliefs, i.e. ‘real’ and peranakan forms of religious practices 
and beliefs. Furthermore, the leaders of IKBBSA take a firmer stance on agama 
because they have been involved in the political and cultural communications with 
the government. I describe Odang’s view of agama. He was a ‘real’ Suku Asli and 
did not engage in the political communications with the government. Therefore, his 
comments reflect the general view of agama among the ‘real’ Suku Asli without the 
influences of the recent political movement. Moreover, his comments seem to be 
more in tune with the historical facts described above than other views that I will 
describe, and many Suku Asli would agree with his opinion.      
       One day, I talked with Pak Odang sitting on the floor of a living room in his 
house. He was repairing his fishing net with a needle and lines. While I was thinking 
about what I should ask him, I glimpsed a poster on the wall of the room. This poster 
was distributed by the Buddhist community, Maitreya Great Tao, and I had seen it 
several times in Suku Asli houses. The poster showed an icon of Buddha Maitreya 
with some slogans in Chinese characters. Indeed, Pak Odang identified himself as a 
204 
 
Buddhist and as a member of the Buddhist community just like many other villagers 
in Teluk Pambang.  
       Looking at the poster, I asked him, ‘What was the agama of Suku Asli before 
Buddhism came?’ He paused in his work, and appeared to catch me looking at the 
poster. He answered: ‘It was animism (animisme). We worshipped (sembayang) trees, 
rivers, forests and so on.’ According to him, his father had an ID card which 
described his agama as ‘Animism’. When Pak Odang first obtained his own ID card, 
it stated his agama as ‘Buddhism’. Although his explanation was convincing to a 
certain extent, his attitude of seeing their worship of the natural world as something 
in the past was slightly strange to me. This is because they still saw ‘souls’ in natural 
phenomena in an anthropomorphic way and practiced rituals for them. For example, 
in shamanic séances, they communicated with the spirits living in rivers, trees and 
forests. Also, they held rituals at sacred places, i.e. keramat or datuk kong, in which 
they provided offerings for the spirits living in that place. Worshipping the souls of 
the natural world was not a past practice but a present one. Pointing out these facts, I 
attempted to confirm it with him by asking: ‘Don’t Suku Asli really believe in 
animism anymore?’ He asserted ‘No, animism was our agama just in the past. We 
believe in Buddhism now.’ He continued:  
 
We register our agama as Buddhism now. And, we believe the existence of 
Buddha as God (Tuhan) in our heart (dalam hati). It’s enough, we are Buddhists. 
[…] In the past, we did not know Buddhism. Therefore, our agama was animism. 
[…] Rituals for the spirits (datuk) are not agama. It’s percayaan (‘belief’). 
Percayaan and agama are different. There are such percayaan even among 
Muslims just like Suku Asli. 
 
According to him, the peranakan’s offerings at the altar are also percayaan, not 
agama. Although the discussion as to whether one ‘really’ believes in an agama or 
not can often be a sensitive topic in Indonesia, he gave these comments looking 
relaxed as usual. For him, ‘real’ belief in Buddhism was not a sensitive topic that was 
concerned with his identity. Then, I questioned the relationship between agama and 
ceremonies (acara) such as marriages and funerals. He said ‘the ceremonies are not 
agama either. It is adat that have been inherited from our ancestors.’  
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       He stated that Suku Asli agama in the past was ‘animism’. It was a general 
tendency that, while peranakan Suku Asli identified their past agama as 
Confucianism, ‘real’ Suku Asli often identified it as ‘animism’ or say: ‘We did not 
have agama’. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, the ways of rituals among ‘real’ Suku 
Asli and peranakan ones are different, and the peranakan way was often described 
as Confucianism. For ‘real’ Suku Asli, Confucianism is the way of the peranakan, 
not their own. Therefore, ‘real’ Suku Asli do not consider Confucianism as their past 
agama or associated Confucianism with Buddhism. The term ‘animism’, which was 
obviously introduced to their society in post-independence state policies, has 
negative meanings of ‘backwardness’ or ‘primitiveness’ in Suku Asli society the 
same as in government circles. Despite this, the reason why he identified with 
‘animism’ was, on the one hand, because of the fact that he had seen the ID card of 
his father. On the other hand, it was also true there was no proper term to express 
their religious practices and beliefs other than ‘animism’, though the rituals among 
peranakan could be summarised under the term Confucianism. Therefore, he 
described their past agama as ‘animism’ in the same way as the government, 
emphasising it had been something that belongs in the past. 
       More importantly, Pak Odang categorised their rituals in terms of the natural 
spirits as ‘percayaan’ and ceremonies as ‘adat’ differentiating them from ‘agama’. 
‘Agama’ does not indicate all religious practices and beliefs. Rather, its meaning is 
limited. Agama is first and foremost something concerned with administrative 
registration. His ID card labelled his agama as Buddhism, and his child, a primary 
school pupil, was learning Buddhism in school and going to a vihara every Sunday. 
These were the only reasons why he identified himself as Buddhist. Their agama 
emerges in a limited sphere of their everyday life. Therefore, his statement that he 
believes in Buddha ‘in his heart’ was by no means a declaration of his pious belief in 
Buddha, but showed his ceremonial or performative attitude to Buddhism. His 
expression has the implication that he does not practice any devotions, rituals or 
vegetarianism for Buddha in his life but he believes in it only ‘in his heart’. It is 
‘enough’ to identify himself as a Buddhist. Even if it is only ceremonial and 
performative, this expression seems to be very effective for persuading the 
government officials or Muslims who ask about his agama, because although it is 
206 
 
minimal, it is a sufficient explanation to show their belief in one God. In the situation 
that he needed to show the identification with an agama, he would have employed 
this manner of explanation in conversations with outsiders. Still, his belief in 
Buddhism is political and belongs in the religious politics imposed on Suku Asli.  
       On the other hand, he categorised other rituals in everyday life as ‘adat’ and 
‘percayaan’. Why did he distinguish the two categories? Why did he associate 
weddings and funerals with adat and shamanic rituals with percayaan? In short, 
these categories have been moulded by the government definition of agama, and he 
did it this way to fit in with the government image and to avoid them becoming 
problematic in local politics.   
       First, in terms of the relationship between agama and percayaan, he categorised 
the rituals for natural spirits as percayaan. Although he described the rituals for the 
spirits as ‘percayaan (or kepercayaan in formal Indonesian)’ at this time, shamanic 
séances and sacrifice for the natural spirits were more often referred to as ‘ilmu batin 
(or kebatinan)’ (see Chapter 2).54 These terms were originally conceptualised in the 
controversies about the definition of agama at the national political level in Java. In 
1955, scattered ‘mystical’ groups primarily among the Javanese established Badan 
Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia (BKKI; Indonesian Kebatinan Organisation).55 This 
organisation tried to have the government recognise kebatinan as an agama in the 
same way as Islam and Christianity (Kim 1998: 363; Kipp & Rodgers 1987: 27). 
Although kebatinan has not been officially recognised, they avoided being labelled 
as communists during the anti-communist purge, and flourished during the New 
Order. The movement has attracted many government authorities and military 
leaders (Kipp & Rodgers 1987: 27). As for ‘kepercayaan’, this term was also 
associated with ‘tribal religion’ like ‘animism’ and differentiated from agama in 
                                                          
54  The words ‘ilmu batin (or ilmu kebatinan)’ in Suku Asli dialect seem to be derived from ‘kebatinan’ 
in Indonesian. However, Suku Asli do not recognise it. ‘Batin’ means ‘inner’ in Arabic and ‘kebatinan’ 
is an abstracted form of the word, and the term in Indonesian is thus translated as ‘(supernatural) 
internal power’ or more often ‘mysticism’. However, in Suku Asli dialect, batin means first and 
foremost, their traditional headman. Therefore, they are recognising ‘ilmu batin’ as ‘headman’s 
technique’ vaguely. Probably, the Indonesian expression ‘ilmu kebatinan’ was introduced to Suku Asli 
society in the last several decades in the communication with the Malays or Javanese, and they 
connected it with their traditional headman later.  
55 Although it is difficult to define the word ‘kebatinan’, it can be summarised as ‘mysticism’ or ‘a 
belief system which mixes indigenous religious elements with influences of Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Islam, and emphasizes the Human spirituality’ (Kim 1998: 363). 
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government religious policies (Kipp & Rodgers 1987: 21; Tsing 1987: 197). 
However, the word has been continuously used as a simple translation of ‘beliefs’ 
with some connotation of local, individual and even superstitious ones. Although 
‘Confucianism’ and ‘animism’ have been associated with negative meanings such as 
‘communism’, ‘backwardness’ or ‘primitiveness’, ‘percayaan’ and ‘kebatinan’ are 
relatively neutral and acceptable words in Indonesia, insofar as the terms do not 
violate the official definition of agama. Odang’s expression of ‘percayaan’ is an 
acceptable expression when he uses it to explain the meaning of their rituals to 
outsiders. In other words, these terms are used to indicate practices and beliefs at the 
essentially vague boundary between legitimate agama and illegitimate non-agama 
rituals.   
       Second, in terms of the relationship between agama and adat, Anne Schiller 
(1996) describes the process of the conceptualisation of agama among the Ngaju 
Dayak. While they were regarded as people who ‘do not yet have agama’, they 
succeeded in having the government recognise their adat as a variety of Hinduism, 
Hindu Kaharingan, in the 1980s. According to her, although their agama was 
involved in adat, government policies separated the conceptual categories of adat 
and agama based on their definitions in state policies. However, this seems not to be 
the case in Suku Asli society. This is because, as I mentioned in Chapter 5, not only 
agama but also the adat of Suku Asli were formulated, or at least dramatically 
changed, through communications with the state or outsiders. The conceptualisations 
began in the mid-nineteenth century when the Utan were subsumed under state 
control. Before then, they would have just practised their own ways of life in every 
sphere. However, through the increasing communications with the ethnic Chinese 
and the state policies in terms of adat and agama, when they organised rituals in 
terms of ancestral spirits in the category of adat (see Chapter 5), they placed the 
rituals for the natural spirits in the category of ‘kepercayaan’ or ‘ilmu batin’ by not 
employing the terms ‘agama’ and ‘adat’ that the government designated. They can 






The conceptualisation of agama in dialogue: A peranakan view 
 
       The second example is a peranakan view. Pak Kiat was in his mid-forties and a 
peranakan Suku Asli. He was the head of my host family. He took on the role of 
secretary of IKBBSA, but his participation in communications with the government 
officials was limited. The peranakan are often more sensitive about the topic of 
agama than the ‘real’ Suku Asli. This is because, from their perspective, they 
actually had their agama, Confucianism, in the past, and they strongly reject being 
categorised as people having ‘animism’ or ‘no agama’, which Muslims often 
describe the Suku Asli as. Pak Kiat identified himself as Buddhist. But, in contrast to 
Odang’s explanation, he thought that Suku Asli agama in the past had been 
Confucianism; in addition, he categorised their everyday worship at the altar as 
agama, Buddhism, as explained below.           
       During my stay at his house, Pak Kiat sometimes poured out the complaints 
against doubts among the Javanese concerning Suku Asli Buddhism. According to 
him, his Javanese acquaintances living in a different village often asked whether the 
Suku Asli ‘really’ believed in Buddhism. One day, he told me a story about one such 
question. According to him,  
 
When I was talking with a Javanese, he asked me ‘Why don’t Suku Asli go to 
vihara for devotion (sembayang)?’ So, I answered ‘I am praying to Buddha 
every day in my house’. […] I know they often say ‘Suku Asli agama is agama 
for altar (agama tepekong)’. But we are actually real Buddhists. 
 
 
The Javanese on Bengkalis Island were generally pious and went to mosque several 
times a day for the purpose of devotions. They thought such behaviour was a 
necessary attitude for the believers of an agama. Therefore, the question to Pak Kiat 
involved not only curiosity, but also some accusation and disdain of Suku Asli 
attitudes to agama. In response to it, he answered: ‘I am praying to Buddha every 
day in my house’. As he was a peranakan Suku Asli, he had an altar that enshrines 
his ancestral spirits and a Chinese deity. Indeed, he prayed in front of it, burning 
incense stick three times a day. By demonstrating this everyday worship, he tried to 
show that he really had an agama and this agama was Buddhism. However, in 
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general, such worship was not acceptable for the Javanese sense of agama, because 
they often knew that altars enshrined a deity derived from China and their ancestors, 
and it was not necessarily related to one God and Buddhism. Therefore, the Javanese 
called ‘Suku Asli agama, an agama for altar’ poking fun at it as worship for altars, 
not devotion to God. 
       Pak Kiat has often experienced similar questions from the Javanese, who often 
tried to point out the variance between the doctrines of Buddhism and Suku Asli 
religious practices, such as those involving beliefs in one God, vegetarianism and so 
on. At each opportunity, he tried to persuade them by emphasising that Suku Asli 
were really Buddhists who associated Buddhism with their worship of the ancestral 
spirits and Chinese deities. However, his explanation did not fit in with the strict 
doctrines of the Buddhist community. Although the Buddhist community permitted 
worship at altars, the religious teachers of the community did not regard it as a part 
of Buddhism. According to a teacher at a vihara in Bengkalis town, the worship at 
altars is a part of ‘Confucianism’ or ‘Chinese beliefs’ (percayaan Tionhua) rather 
than Buddhism. Moreover, Pak Kiat knew that the meaning of worship at his altar 
was not for Buddha. He and other villagers explained to me that altar offerings were 
meant for their ancestral spirits and the deity (untuk nenek moyang dan dewa-dewa) 
enshrined in the altar, for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the house. Therefore, 
his association between Buddhism and altar was situational. However, this 
association was necessary in the communications with Muslims because, again, not 
identifying himself as a Buddhist may include the affirmation of his ‘primitiveness’, 
‘backwardness’ and anti-social personality. Therefore, he tried to explain that Suku 
Asli everyday worship was a part of an agama, not sticking at the strict doctrine and 
original meaning of what happens at the altar. In other words, in communication with 
the Javanese over the role of Buddhism, he attempted to embed agama in the 
everyday life of the Suku Asli. 
       Thus, once they were officially identified with Buddhism, Suku Asli were then 
required to be ‘real’ Buddhists given the pressure of state religious policies. In their 
society, this process was not directly caused by government policies, but rather by 
the everyday relations with Muslims. Through such constant dialogue with Muslims, 
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they introduced the concept of agama or Buddhism to their world, by organising 
their existing ritual practices in accordance with these concepts.  
       Although the explanations by Pak Odang and Kiat appear to be different, what 
they share is that they have tried to embed the national concept of agama into their 
social system. However, the heterogeneity of rituals between ‘real’ and peranakan 
Suku Asli make it difficult to construct a common concept of agama, and indeed, 
there are various interpretation of agama in Suku Asli society. It is also remarkable 
that they both seem to be trying to avoid outsiders’ interventions in rituals. On the 
one hand, Pak Odang categorised their rituals as something different from agama 
using the terms ‘percayaan’ and ‘adat’, both of which are acceptable in the 
government category of agama. On the other hand, Pak Kiat tried to associate their 
rituals based on Chinese folk religion with recognised Buddhism in order to justify 
them. Emphasising that they ‘have agama’ is an essential way to claim their position 
is not ‘backward’ or ‘primitive’ but is legally acceptable. Agama has been something 
that emerged only in the context of the communications with outsiders, and it did not 
become problematic within their community.  
        Jane Atkinson (1983) argues that the definition of agama among the Wana of 
Sulawesi has been constructed through ‘a debate among themselves, with their 
neighbours, and with the government authorities over what constitutes a religion’ 
(1983: 684). While she sees the Wana concept of agama as constructed in the 
implementation of government policies and ideology, she places more importance on 
the influences that situationally emerged in ongoing ‘ideology-charged debates’ 
between the Wana and others (1983: 685), rather than the influences that emerged in 
fixed controversies between government policies and their historical practices. As a 
result of such repeated ‘ideology-charged debates’, the Wana demonstrated their 
practices, including an assemblage of diet, burial practices, healing rituals and so on, 
as directly relevant to ‘real’ agama, and this resulted in their political action to have 
such practices recognised by the government. 
       The ‘ideology-charged debates’ can be seen as an indirect effectuation of 
‘governmentality’. Although the government may not directly engage in this 
operation, the debates with the people who have a specific agama can configure 
beliefs about how wrong the ambiguity of agama is and how wrong the lack of 
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regular religious services is among the people who do not specify an agama. 
Through the ongoing debates with Muslims, Suku Asli have conceptualised the logic 
of their own agama, not necessarily adhering to the ‘true’ precepts of Buddhism. 
Such debates between Suku Asli and Javanese must have been repeated from the past 
like Kiat’s experiences. Yet, these debates have not driven ordinary Suku Asli 
villagers to changing their stance on agama. Because the communications between 
ordinary Suku Asli and Javanese are generally limited, it is sufficient to give a 
situational explanation for persuading the Javanese, like Kiat’s explanation. Javanese 
villagers who have continuous communications or friendships with Suku Asli 
villagers do not provoke Suku Asli in terms of agama.  
       However, the situation of Suku Asli leaders is different. After the establishment 
of IKBBSA, Suku Asli leaders have had opportunities to specify and explain their 
agama not only to the Javanese villagers but also to government officials much more 
frequently than ordinary Suku Asli. They confronted the necessity to clearly specify 
a Suku Asli agama. Yet, unlike the Wana, they could not have the government 
recognise their religious practices as agama. This is because, first, they have two 
distinctive forms of religious practices and beliefs. As mentioned above, an agama 
should have an integrated doctrine, and they cannot show this integration. Second 
and more importantly, religious practices and beliefs among the peranakan Suku 
Asli were associated with Chinese culture, which were the main targets of the 
government oppression during the New Order regime. Even though it is possible that 
Pak Kiat can justify himself by pointing out the association between Buddhism and 
worship at altars in informal communications with his Javanese acquaintances, it is 
still impossible to argue for them as the basis of political action in formal 
communications with the government.  
 
 
Buddhism as ancestral agama: A leader’s view 
 
       The third view of agama is a leader’s one. Pak Cingyou was in his late-fifties 
and the village batin of Kembung Luar. His grandfather was the last batin recognised 
by the Siak kingdom before independence, and he was one of the most active leaders 
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of IKBBSA like Pak Ajui. Although he was a ‘real’ Suku Asli, he had an altar in his 
house and conducted day-to-day worship. The description comes from my first 
interview with him. While his opinion seems to be a far-fetched argument, it reflects 
leaders’ stance towards agama. 
       I talked with Pak Cingyou, sitting in a guest room in his house. After having a 
chat for a while, I asked him the same question as Pak Odang: ‘What was the past 
agama among Suku Asli before Buddhism came?’ He looked slightly surprised, and 
asserted, ‘Suku Asli have continuously believed in Buddhism from the past’, which 
was strongly worded answer. This response did not fit in with the information that I 
had obtained from other people. Therefore, I told him that I had heard that Maitreya 
Great Tao was established in the 1970s and its temple, vihara, was first built in 2001 
in this area. He answered: ‘Yes, it’s true. However, we believed in Buddhism before 
it.’ According to him, in the 1970s when he travelled to Titi Akar, Rupat, he saw an 
idol of Buddha enshrined in the ‘vihara’ which had been established a long time ago; 
and, ‘the Suku Asli’ (the Akit) living in the village had worshipped the idol. 
Therefore, the Suku Asli had believed in Buddhism. At first, I felt curious because I 
had lived in Titi Akar and knew that the ‘vihara’ in Titi Akar had been established at 
the end of the 1990s. However, I then realised that he was talking about a klenteng, 
established by the ethnic Chinese at the end of the nineteenth century. Indeed, in the 
klenteng, some idols of Buddha were enshrined together with many Chinese deities. 
So, I said: ‘I think it is a klenteng of Confucianism, not a vihara of Buddhism.’ In 
response, he said: ‘It’s the same. Whether it is klenteng or vihara, the Suku Asli have 
worshipped Buddha from our ancestors. So, we have been Buddhists.’ For him, 
Buddhism is an agama inherited from their ancestors.  
       This was a general tendency for the leaders of IKBBSA, in which they equated 
Buddhism and Confucianism. When I asked a similar question, Pak Ajui also 
asserted that Buddhism had been their ancestral agama and pointed out the existence 
of klenteng. However, their view is not common among ordinary Suku Asli. 
Although there is actually some ambiguity about the relationship between 
Confucianism and Buddhism, they distinguish vihara and klenteng as well as 
Confucianism and Buddhism. Also, many informants regard Buddhism as having 
been introduced to their society within the last several decades. Furthermore, even if 
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their ancestors had worshipped the icon of Buddha in klenteng, they were only 
Chinese or peranakan Chinese. ‘Real’ Suku Asli and most of peranakan Suku Asli 
have rarely engaged in religious practices in klenteng.  
       In spite of these facts, the leaders strongly insist that Suku Asli have followed 
Buddhism from their ancestors. The reason is related to the establishment of 
IKBBSA and their role of batin. First, their emphasis on historically continuous 
beliefs in Buddhism among the Suku Asli was an essential strategy to have the 
government recognise the position of the Suku Asli in state politics. Pak Kimdi, a 
regency assembly member and strong supporter of the activity of IKBBSA, told me 
that the ambiguity of agama gave a very bad impression to the government. Giving 
the example of the Sakai of inland Bengkalis regency, whose agama was ambiguous 
and changeable rather than the Suku Asli, he emphasised how the government had a 
bad impression on Sakai communities because of their flexible agama and that Suku 
Asli agama should be integrated and made stable in order to give the government a 
good impression on their communities. His opinion was shared by the leaders. As the 
headmen of the Suku Asli, the leaders had met the government authorities, who 
asked about the Suku Asli with some curiosity. In such conversations, the question of 
Suku Asli agama is inevitable, as agama is one of the most important criteria that 
distinguish indigenous minorities. At such opportunities, they have clearly described 
their agama by emphasising historical worship at klenteng as Buddhism. 
       Second, although IKBBSA is their ethnic organisation for claiming their position 
as Suku Asli, it also takes charge of the operation of religious bodies. As I mentioned 
in Chapter 4, IKBBSA was first established for the purpose of issuing marriage 
letters as substitutes for those issued by religious bodies. Just after its establishment, 
the leaders of IKBBSA started issueing the letter to anyone of Suku Asli origin who 
came to ask for it. However, the churches then claimed to the government that 
Christian Suku Asli should obtain the letter from them, and the government 
pressured the leaders to issue the letter only to Buddhists. As the basis of the activity 






Integration of agama and the integration of Suku Asli 
 
Buddhism as the ancestral agama of the Suku Asli 
 
       As a result of government pressure, agama came up for discussion in the leaders’ 
annual meeting. At a meeting of batin headman in Bengkalis regency around 2011, 
Pak Ajui suggested that the leaders should issue the letter only to Buddhists, not 
Christians. He insisted that as IKBBSA was an ethnic organisation of the Suku Asli, 
the leaders should issue the letter only to the people who practised marriage in the 
way of Suku Asli adat, that is, Buddhist Suku Asli. On the other hand, according to 
him, as Christians accepted the church’s intervention, they should conduct marriages 
and funerals in a Christian fashion; this meant that they did not follow Suku Asli 
adat; thus, the leaders should not issue the letters to them. As there was no Christian 
leader in IKBBSA, all leaders agreed with his suggestion. This meant that Buddhism 
became a ‘proper’ agama for the Suku Asli in the view of IKBBSA, and indeed, this 
idea was shared by all the leaders.   
     It is remarkable that, in the meeting, Pak Ajui would have described Buddhism as 
their ancestral agama without associating klenteng and Buddhism. Equating worship 
at klenteng with Buddhism is only a reflection of the manner in which 
communication with the government officials takes place. Instead of acknowledging 
this, he described Buddhism as their ancestral agama by associating it with adat. 
This logic seems to be plausible only in so far that excludes Christians from 
membership in IKBBSA. This is because, as mentioned above, a section of the Suku 
Asli experienced the church’s intervention in their adat. Once agama is associated 
with adat; it comes to be something concerned with ancestors, because adat in Suku 
Asli society is, first and foremost, concerned with ancestral rituals and descent. 
Therefore, for the leaders, agama should necessarily be an ancestral one.  
       They emphasised the importance of Buddhism as a religion under which 
ancestral rituals or adat could be maintained without undue interventions. Therefore, 
although Buddhism is regarded as a ‘proper’ agama in IKBBSA, the leaders were 
not interested in encouraging people to strengthen the faith of Buddhism as led by 
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Maitreya Great Tao. Rather, they strengthened their involvement in rituals that I 
described in Chapter 5, which can be categorised as adat.  
 
 
Buddhist and Christian perspectives 
 
       The consolidation of their identification with Buddhism has brought about a 
somewhat negative view of Christians in Teluk Pambang. According to Pak Ajui, 
following Christianity is a ‘mistake’ (salah), because Buddhism is their ancestral 
agama. Although ordinary Suku Asli’s views are more moderate, they also have 
rather negative opinions of Christians. Pak Kiat stated that the life of Christians was 
‘difficult’ (susah). According to him, while people who held Christian marriage 
ceremonies should obtain the marriage letter from church, there were many couples 
who did not hold it in the church or who had already married when the church 
entered the community. As they did not have the marriage letter (see Chapter 4), they 
suffered much difficulty concerning their children’s education or other administrative 
procedures. In addition to such practical aspects, Buddhists generally saw Christians 
as people who ‘do not follow adat’, as mentioned above. 
       On the other hand, Pak Atong was a Christian living in Selat Baru, in which 
there is one of the largest Christian Suku Asli communities on Bengkalis Island. In 
this settlement, a Pentecostal church was established by a minister from Sulawesi in 
1987, and there were about sixty households of Christians during my fieldwork.  
       Before 1987, Pak Atong identified himself as a Buddhist. However, just after the 
church was established, he converted to Christianity. The reason for his conversion 
was because he felt that ‘the government laughed (pemerintah tawa) at’ their 
nominal Buddhism. At first, the minister required them to hold the rituals such as 
funerals and weddings under his management. However, many people protested, and 
using adat was permitted to some extent. He ‘really’ believed in God, and went to 
church services once a week together with other villagers. However, several years 
ago, his wife, a peranakan Suku Asli from Teluk Pambang, fell sick and was called 
by Kuat’im, a Chinese deity, in her dream. This means that she had to become a 
Chinese medium, and to have an altar for the deity in the house. He consulted the 
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minister whether he could continue to be a Christian, but the minister gently 
encouraged him to become a Buddhist. Therefore, he returned to Buddhism. 
       According to him, he converted to Christianity because ‘the government laughed 
at’ their Buddhism. Although he did not clearly address this, Christian Suku Asli 
regard those who identify with Buddhism as not really having an agama. Probably, a 
gap between Buddhist and Christian Suku Asli which was derived from the 
differences over what counted as ‘real’ belief, emerged just after the church had 
entered their community. This gap deepened after IKBBSA decided that Buddhism 
was their agama. As mentioned above, batin did not issue the marriage letter to 
Christians anymore nor support any other official procedures.  Some Buddhists said 
marriages with Christians were not appropriate because of the difference of agama. 
This split was also found in their everyday friendships; I did not see Buddhist Suku 
Asli in Teluk Pambang attend the ceremonies of funerals and marriages held in the 
Christian community.  
       This split is a result of the emergence of the orthodoxy of agama in Suku Asli 
society. Through the activities of IKBBSA, agama was politicised within their 
community. Although they avoided having their religious practices and beliefs 
problematised by the government policies, these have been changed in accord with 




The abstraction of everyday practices and the conceptualisation of 
indigeneity 
 
       The Suku Asli attitudes to and manipulation of agama are somewhat different 
from other indigenous communities. Although most Suku Asli identify their agama 
with newly introduced Buddhism, this is not a simple ‘conversion’ like the Forest 
Tobelo that I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Moreover, they do not 
directly claim their traditional rituals as agama or positively politicise them in 
relation to the government like the Ngaju Dayak and the Wana. The reason why they 
chose Buddhism introduced to them in recent years was because of the existence of 
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the peranakan Suku Asli in their society. Indonesian religious policy has been 
strongly connected with nationalism and social order, and it may often be oppressive 
to marginalised indigenous communities. The Suku Asli would have felt this political 
pressure especially strongly because, among them, there are a number of peranakan 
with a number of practices that stem from Chinese culture. They could not simply 
demonstrate their religious practices and beliefs as agama because such a claim 
could provoke government oppression. Instead, they chose a way that has allowed 
them to continue with their religious practices and beliefs under the name of 
Buddhism in a passive fashion. However, in the process of trying to claim their 
position as an indigenous ethnic group, they confronted the necessity of having to 
demonstrate their position in terms of agama. As a result, they actively identify 
themselves as Buddhists excluding Christian Suku Asli.  
       Clifford Geertz (1973) describes ‘internal-conversion’ among the Balinese 
before the 1960s, quoting Max Weber’s famous argument about ‘traditional’ and 
‘rationalised’ religions. Describing the situation within which the Balinese 
strengthened religious concerns and systemised the doctrines of Hinduism, he 
demonstrates that, although their religion had been based on the correct practice of 
ritual, it was objectified and increasingly became based on the ‘correct belief’ 
through their experiences of reading religious publications and discussing the 
meaning of belief among themselves. In other words, their understanding of their 
religion shifted from a stress on ‘orthopraxy’, or the right kind of practice, to 
‘orthodoxy’, or the right kind of belief. Suku Asli adoption of Buddhism cannot be 
seen as ‘internal-conversion’. They are not seeking a systematised doctrine or a way 
of ‘correct belief’ in Buddhism. Moreover, they try to maintain their traditional 
religious practices, adat, and avoid the religious body’s interventions. Rather, they 
identify themselves as Buddhists in relation to the state religious policies and 
neighbouring Muslims. Therefore, their adoption of Buddhism can be seen as 
performative in the same way as some elements of their adat, which I described in 
Chapter 5.  
       Instead of internally pursuing the systematised doctrine, Suku Asli 
objectification of their practices in terms of agama follows a particular kind of logic 
– that is, a logic that demonstrates their legitimate position in relationship to 
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government religious policies and Muslim perception of agama. For now, their focus 
is on manipulating the image of themselves held by others through identifying with 
Buddhism. This is directly connected to their claims regarding their position as an 
indigenous ethnic group distinguished from Islamic populations, and one that avoids 
serious conflicts with the government policies.   
       Nevertheless, I would like to suggest that Buddhism is becoming an important 
part of their identity, because Buddhism is something abstracted from their religious 
practices and beliefs according to their cultural logic. Their Buddhism is different not 
only from the ‘orthodox’ version of the religious Buddhist community but also from 
their actual religious practices. However, they summarise the maintenance of adat, 
belief and other religious practices, which includes diversity and individually 
different interpretations, with a ‘Buddhism’ label, and indeed most of them accepted 
it as their agama. Thus, even though it would be wrong to suggest that their practice 
has been rationalised or shifted to ‘orthodoxy’, Suku Asli conceptualisations of 
agama seem to indicate leaving behind certain elements of practices, – that is, the 
very beginning of a shift from ‘orthopraxy’ – a shift that has brought about a much 
more explicit emphasis on their tradition and identity as distinct signs of being Suku 
Asli.  
       The abstraction of their everyday practices, or shift from their ‘orthopraxy’, can 
be seen not only in their adoption of agama, but also in the other spheres of their 
identity that I have described in the previous chapters. They have abstracted their 
various, heterogeneous, ancestral backgrounds in order to start creating a common 
past. They have objectified the hinterland as ‘land for descendants’ and started 
treating the mangrove swamps as ‘ancestral land’ stressing their connection with 
particular spaces. They have strengthened the existence of the ‘Suku Asli’ through 
IKBBSA’s activities. They have started to integrate their diverse adat into the form 
of ‘art’. In these processes, their unconscious, small-unit, actual practices and 
associations, which can be summarised by the term ‘indigeny’ are objectified and 
abstracted, and more conscious, comprehensive and imagined concepts are 
constructed. It is important to keep in mind that these operations may well be the 
beginning of a change which will eventually take them from a universe of 
‘orthopraxy’ to a universe of ‘orthodoxy’ – a beginning more than apparent in the 
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way in which their practices have started to be seen as an embodiment and 
manifestation of a distinct ‘indigenous’ and ‘ethnic’ identity. Their identity and 
categorisation that were characterised by relational ‘non-Islamic alliance’ are 
transforming into distinct one which includes substantiality, integration and criteria 
as Buddhists. 
       Furthermore, this change brings about a change of their position as tribespeople 
in terms of modernisation as well. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the reasons 
why the Suku Asli were marginalised and discriminated as ‘tribespeople’ was 
because of their non-Islamic religious practices. Because they have not adopted 
Islam, they have been seen as ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’. Therefore, when their 
agama is specified and recognised by Muslims, they can start to amend the image of 
their ‘backwardness’ and ‘primitiveness’ to a considerable extent. In other words, by 
specifying an integrated agama, they can accomplish the beginning of their transition 
to modernisation. The leaders of IKBBSA have tried to configure their position as an 
indigenous ethnic group and an ‘adat community’ by adopting the government 
image; in this process, the specification and integration of a Suku Asli agama were 
essential for the leaders. In short, through their manifestation of indigeneity, the Suku 
Asli entered the realm of modernity. Although their Buddhism was not adequately 
recognised by dominant Muslims during my fieldwork, they are on their way to 

















The Suku Asli have manipulated their indigenous identity; more specifically, they 
have conceptualised ancestral land, established an ethnic organisation, transformed 
adat into performative culture, and integrated agama. These processes show that 
indigeneity has not emerged on the stable basis of ancestral inheritances, such as 
ancestral territory and traditional political organisation, or clearly bounded, 
homogenous and primordial identity. Rather, in and through the instability and 
problematisation of their identity, they have objectified and abstracted their historical 
practices and constructed their indigenous identity. The trigger of the instability and 
problematisation was government interventions which attempted to configure and 
stimulate their aspirations to becoming a ‘traditional’ community, which is 
represented by the idealised image of an ‘adat community’. While adopting this 
image as a perspective, the Suku Asli created their adat identity using their own 
cultural logic that is configured by a complex and diverse social situation and 
traditional but unconscious practices in everyday life. In other words, indigenity has 
been created by instability and problematisation of their identity that was introduced 
by state politics. 
       As I mentioned in the introduction, Li (2000: 151) suggests: ‘a group’s self-
identification as tribal or indigenous is not natural or inevitable’. This view seems to 
be the case in the sense that rural communities may have some room for choice of 
their identities. This was especially so just after 1998 when the Indonesian polity 
changed and national or international activists began the ‘indigenous movement’ in 
the scheme of struggling with the state. However, in present-day Indonesian politics, 
the room for choice has become narrower and a group’s self-identification as 
indigenous has become more inevitable especially among tribespeople. This is 
because the government policies with a ‘governmental’ ethos tried to embody ‘adat 
communities’ in rural areas. Under such policies, more and more tribespeople have 
‘inevitably’ confronted the instability and problematisation of their identities, and 
this would result in that they configure and conceptualise an adat identity or 
indigenous one like the Suku Asli. This would be applied not only to tribespeople in 
Indonesia but also to those elsewhere in the world. When the government recognises 
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the position of ‘indigenous peoples’ and designates their criteria, tribespeople have to 
configure and conceptualise their indigenous identity by objectifying and abstracting 
their historical practices, somewhat inevitably. 
       As Suku Asli indigeneity has only emerged over the past ten years, the social 
changes it reflects and causes are parts of a dynamic process. In this conclusion, I 
would like to describe some of the possibilities generated by the emergence of their 
indigeneity.   
       At present, Suku Asli’s objectification and embodiment of indigeneity does not 
involve clearly organised political actions such as demonstrations; they do not 
actively claim their rights to more territory or government support based on their 
indigenous position, nor do they exclude outsiders by demonstrating their indigeneity 
in an organised fashion. However, since the fall of Suharto, it seems to be common 
that tribespeople begin to struggle with the government and outsiders by manifesting 
their indigeneity in organised political actions. For example, the Sakai living in the 
same regency often visit government officials to claim their land rights as the basis 
of their future prosperity, and these negotiations may take the form of organised 
political demonstration in front of the government offices (Porath 2002: 790). The 
Orang Rimba in Jambi have also engaged in public relations activities with the strong 
support of a number of NGOs and media, and obtained the right to live in a national 
park (Li 2000). Therefore, it is an essential question whether Suku Asli indigeneity 
will be transformed into such organised political actions. 
       The first scenario is that they will reinforce their indigeneity and begin to 
struggle with the government to protect their rights. As Brubaker (2004) points out, 
ethnicity attracts the loyalty and aspirations of people and mobilises them to 
reinforce the ‘groupness’ at ‘events’ during which people are confronted with the 
necessity to show their ethnicity. In the same way, indigenous identity can be 
transformed into organised political demands if the people confront matters they 
have to struggle against. In some respects, this seems to be the case with the Suku 
Asli. The activity of IKBBSA is still developing briskly, and involving more and 
more people in the various fields of Suku Asli life. In terms of adat and agama, in 
particular, their indigeneity would be reinforced by struggle. In the context of 
IKBBSA, the social value of practising ancestral worship and identifying themselves 
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as Buddhists becomes increasingly important. In addition, there are some signs of 
immediate problems. In the Rawa region and Padang Island, a government-
sponsored corporation has begun drilling for oil and enclosing the potential oilfields 
by constructing fences and ditches. This prevents Suku Asli from hunting wild boar 
in the forest, which is an important source of livelihood in these regions. In Rawa 
region, an environmental NGO in Pekanbaru has begun to support the Suku Asli 
through claiming their traditional land rights and organising them. If this movement 
spreads to other communities, the Suku Asli may begin to take organised political 
action.  
      The second scenario is that although they have started constructing their 
indigeneity, they will not really be concerned with organised political action based 
on this indigeneity. This seems to be much more probable than the first scenario. As I 
have emphasised throughout the previous chapters, their manifestation of indigeneity 
emerged in a collaboration between them and the government policies rather than 
through serious and emergent conflicts and competitions over land and other urgent 
problems. Their aspiration was to have the government recognise their identity as 
Suku Asli and revise their uncertain and marginalised position within the state. This 
aspiration was achieved through the establishment of IKBBSA. Therefore, while 
IKBBSA continues their activities to elaborate and integrate ancestral worship and 
agama into internal cohesion, it may not transform into collective political action in 
relation to the state. 
       Their marginalised position in state politics is changing in accord with the shift 
in the government’s local policies. In the political movement of ‘decentralisation’, 
the Bengkalis regency has been dividing the existing administrative villages in recent 
few years. According to one official, this policy is to correct a tendency whereby 
government subsidies for infrastructures were used only for the central part of each 
village and, instead, distribute them to the peripheral areas more equally. Under this 
policy, at the end of 2012, Teluk Pambang was divided into three independent 
administrative villages, and the western part of the village where many Suku Asli 
live became the new village of Suka Maju. As the majority of this new village is 
Suku Asli, it is highly probable that a Suku Asli will take the role of the 
administrative headman in the 2015 election. This will bring them more access to 
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state power, and their aspirations to further development projects may be achieved 
through this formal channel. This can be an alternative to the political demonstration 
of indigeneity, which would necessitate ‘standing up’ to the state in a much more 
aggressive fashion. 
       However, this does not mean that their indigenous identity will be completely 
integrated into the Indonesian national identity. As minor, non-Islamic, tribespeople 
in this region, they can stabilise their position in the state politics and accomplish 
their modernisation only by claiming their indigeneity in accordance with the 
government rules. Therefore, the ‘cultural’ activities of IKBBSA must continue, and 
their identity as Suku Asli will have to be produced an established further in this 
ambivalent situation.  



























adat tradition or custom; customary law; norms; ancestral ritual 
agama 
religion, in particular, universal religion legitimated by the 
state 
bakau a species of mangrove trees, the Rhizophoraceae family  
batin  indigenous title of headman, mainly, for orang asli groups  
bomo cina spirit medium possessed by Chinese deities, similar to kiton in   
Chinese 
empat suku literally ‘four clans’, a class/set of people with Minangkabau  
origins in the Siak kingdom. 
datuk kong  
shrine for local spirits related to Chinese folk religion; 
synonym  
of keramat in Suku Asli communities 
daulat charismatic power of the ruler; sovereignty  
dukun 
shaman employing spirits in Suku Asli culture, equal with 
bomo  
Asli 
hamba raja literally ‘king’s subjects’; a class of Malay peasants in the  
Siak kingdom.  
ilmu magic, knowledge  
imlek New Year’s feast based on the Chinese lunar calendar 
kelenteng Confucian temple 
masyarakat adat literally ‘adat community’ 
masyarakat terasing 
literally ‘isolated community’, a label given to tribespeople 
who  
were the main target of the government development 
programme 
kacu mixed; not pure 
keramat sacred place in Malay and Suku Asli culture; synonym of  
datuk kong in Suku Asli communities 
kertas mas mock money to be burnt in peranakan/Chinese rituals  
orang People 
orang asli literally ‘real/genuine people’; indigenous people; tribespeople 
panglong system a system to delegate timber harvesting to Chinese merchants    
peranakan mix-blood Chinese; acculturated Chinese; one having  
Chinese patrilineal descent   
rakyat banang a sub-class/set of rakyat raja in the Siak kingdom for  
non-Muslims and the forest or coastal dwellers, i.e. the Sakai,  
Akit, Utan and Rawa   
rakyat raja literally ‘king’s folk’, a lower class in the Siak kingdom  
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composed of rakyat tantera/banang  
rakyat tantera a sub-class/set of rakyat raja in the Siak kingdom for Muslims   
in peripheral regions including the Orang Laut, Petalangan and 
some Malays 
reformasi reformation, the slogan of Indonesian political movement in  
post-Suharto era 
sirih box a box containing sirih (betel leaves), tobacco, areca nuts 
and other luxuries used at Malay and Suku Asli rituals  
suku clan in Minangkabau; tribes in modern Indonesian;  
regional group based on fictive kinship in rural area of Riau; 
administrative unit based on region in the Siak kingdom 
suku-suku terasing literally ‘isolated tribes’, a label of tribespeople                
in the government development programme replaced by  
masyarakat terasing in the 1970s 
tepekong (Chinese) altar put in each house of the pernanakan Suku Asli  
and Chinese 
totok China-born ethnic Chinese; ‘new comer’;           
Chinese who are maintaining their Chinese culture and identity     
touke (Chinese) middleman; traders 
tujuh likur New Year’s feast held based on the Islamic calendar 
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